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Abstract 
This thesis examines the practice of UN peacekeeping operations during the first 
decade of the post-Cold War era, focusing on three cases: Somalia, Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, and Kosovo. During the early 1990s, the international community 
escalated its expectations of and demands upon the UN and its peacekeepers for 
massive and expanded interventions to deal with increased intra-state conflicts. In 
this sense, the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina were the test cases 
of the UN's capabilities and the political willingness of the international 
community. Many believe that the peacekeeping experiences in both regions were 
one of the most important developments for the evolution of UN peacekeeping 
operations in the 1990s. This thesis argues that the operations in Somalia and 
Bosnia were not evidence of the evolution of peacekeeping, but were cases of the 
misuse of peacekeeping techniques, and furthermore that this misuse was the key 
reason for the failures of the operations. In other words, the deployment of UN 
peacekeepers to places where there was no peace to keep deeply affected the 
outbreak of the Black Hawk Down incident in Somalia and the Srebrenica 
massacre in Bosnia. The decision-makers of the UN and member states of the 
Security Council employed an inappropriate measure to tackle the crises that 
required well-prepared military enforcement actions in terms of planning and 
capabilities including structured command and control systems. As an agential 
factor of the failures in Somalia and Bosnia, the misuse of peacekeeping techniques 
was deeply affected by the structural features of the post-Cold War order: the 
increase of intra-state or regional armed conflicts with intense hostility on an 
unprecedented scale and the construction of an identity by Western governments to 
tackle conflicts stemming from the widespread belief of the `liberal triumph' in the 
early post-Cold War era. For the better performance of future peacekeeping 
operations, the Kosovo intervention has taught two useful lessons: the major 
involvement of regional military organization and use of air power. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
UN peacekeeping operations were born of necessity in 1948 when the UN 
intervened in the first Middle East war. Since its birth, peacekeeping has played an 
important role in maintaining international peace and security. In terms of global 
security, it is one of the most innovative and useful creations in the modern history 
of international relations. For five decades, military and civilian personnel from 
many countries have carried out under the UN flag tremendous tasks to save lives 
in danger, implement settlement to conflicts, and preserve peace in troubled areas. 
Their efforts in hostile and dangerous circumstances have played a significant role 
in reducing the level of conflict over the globe. UN peacekeeping forces received 
the Nobel Peace Prize for1988. ' 
With the end of the Cold War UN peacekeeping operations suddenly 
seemed reborn. The change of the international system dramatically increased the 
demands on the UN and its peacekeepers for massive and more effective 
interventions to tackle the conflicts in the post-Cold War order. There emerged an 
optimistic expectation of the UN's role in maintaining the post-Cold War 
international peace and security. The first half of the 1990s was the period when 
the increased demands and expectation were matching the complex and dangerous 
realities on the ground. The interventions in Somalia and Bosnia were the test cases 
of the UN's capability and the political will of the international community in 
terms of conflict resolution of the post-Cold War order. Unlike the optimistic 
expectation and notwithstanding the initial enthusiasm to tackle intra-states crises, 
the results in Somalia and Bosnia were very unsatisfactory and eventually not 
' UN agencies, and mission bodies or persons have been awarded the Nobel Peace 
Prize 7 
times since 1950: The prize for 2001 to the UN and UN Secretary-General, Kofi 
Annan; 
1988 to UN peacekeeping forces; 1981 to UNHCR (The Office of the United Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees, Geneva); 1969 to the UN labour agency, ILO (International 
Labour Organization); 1965 to UNICEF (The United Nations Children's Fund); 1961 to 
UN Secretary-General, Dag Hammarskjöld; 1954 to the UN refugee agency, UNHCR 
(Geneva); 1950 to UN Middle East mediator in Palestine, Professor Jeremy Ralph Bunche 
(Nobelprize. org 2007). 
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successful. What is interesting is that in the Kosovo crisis the international 
community chose multilateral armed intervention by NATO from the initial stage 
of its intervention instead of using peacekeeping techniques under the auspices of 
the UN like in Somalia and Bosnia. Its response to the Kosovo conflict was also 
very different from the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia in that the intervening 
states heavily depended on the use of air power rather than sending massive ground 
troops. Why did the international community react differently to the conflicts? This 
fundamental question has led me to conduct this study. This introductory chapter 
begins by outlining the main research questions and arguments before going on to 
explain the choice of case studies and research methods. 
1.1 UN Peacekeeping Operations and the End of the Cold War 
It is difficult to subsume peacekeeping operations under any one clause of the 
Charter. When the UN was founded, its creators established the collective security 
system in Chapter VII of the Charter to maintain international peace and security. 
Due to the political stalemate between the West and East in the Security Council, it 
was impossible to properly implement the collective system during the Cold War 
era. Instead of using the system, which rarely came into being under the constraints 
of the Cold War, attempts were made to give the UN any means possible that could 
tackle conflict and contribute to peace. Peacekeeping operations were the attempts. 
The first peacekeeping mission was the UN Truce Supervision Organization 
(UNTSO)2, which initially came into being during the first Middle East war of 
1948 to supervise the truce in Palestine between Israel and Arab countries. The 
Swedish UN mediator, Count Folke Bernadotte, asked UN Headquarters to send 
urgently a small group of officers to help him monitor the cease-fire. He requested 
21 observers each from the three member states of the Palestine Commission 
2 UNTSO is the oldest peacekeeping mission body, which is still working. The unarmed 
observers of LJNTSO remain today in the region to supervise the Armistice Agreements 
between Israel and its Arab neighbours after the wars of 1956,1967, and 1973. 
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(Belgium, France, and the United States) with a further five staff officers from 
Sweden. The Secretary-General Trygve Lie responded by asking the states to make 
such officers available to the United Nations, and also made available 51 guards, 
recruited from the Secretariat's security force at Headquarters, to assist the 
observers. The Security Council finally passed its resolution 50 (1948) to form the 
basis of what would become UNTSO (United Nations 1996a: 17-20). It was the 
beginning of the history of UN peacekeeping operations. 
The UN and international community faced a major crisis as the second 
Middle East war erupted in 1956. The forces of Israel, the UK, and France 
occupied large portions of Egyptian territory including the Suez Canal area. Dag 
Hammarskjöd, the second UN Secretary-General, and Lester B. Pearson, the 
Secretary of External Affairs of Canada (Foreign minister of Canada) reacted with 
speed and firmness. To tackle the crisis, they considered a new - somewhat larger 
- operation, which was the first to be armed and was very different from UNTSO 
because the tasks of the operation would be to supervise not only the cease-fire but 
also the withdrawal of the armies of Israel and two super powers from the Suez 
Canal area. Thus, the First UN Emergency Force (UNEF I) was established as the 
UN General Assembly adopted resolution 997 (ES-I3) on 2 November and 1000 
(ES-I) on 5 November 1956. These resolutions refer to the creation of a 
peacekeeping force and the first large-scale armed peacekeeping operation. Soon 
after that the resolutions were adopted, Dag Hammarskj öd submitted to the General 
Assembly a report on the plan for the emergency international United Nations 
Force for UNEF on 6 November 1956 (United Nations 1996a: 35-7). In this report, 
he defined the concept of the force and provided principles for the organisation and 
guidelines on its functions. Eventually, the practices of UNEF according to the 
report established many of the principles and guidelines on which later operations 
have heavily relied, including the three basic principles of consent, impartiality, 
and the use of force in self-defence only. Most of the detailed rules and specific 
ways and means of quickly setting up and running a peacekeeping operation 
3 This is a sequential code used to identify the General Assembly sessions. ES-I means `the 
first emergency special' session. 
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emerged from actual practice, in which the Security Council and Secretariat played 
a major part. 
The end of the Cold War brought both chances of properly implementing 
peacekeeping escaping from the constraints of the Cold War and challenges of 
planning and conducting the increased and enlarged operations in terms of their 
number and size within complex contexts. Regarding the practices of peacekeeping 
in the early post-Cold War period, much of the debate about the nature of the 
practices revolves around the difference between traditional peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcement. Traditional peacekeeping is normally contingent on the 
existence of a genuine political agreement between the parties to the conflict. 
Military operations of traditional peacekeeping missions are undertaken with the 
consent of all major parties concerned and are designed to monitor and facilitate 
the implementation of a cease-fire and/or truce agreement between them. They also 
function to support diplomatic efforts to reach a long-term political settlement of 
crisis. In this sense, traditional peacekeeping operations are part of an overall 
package of assistance to a peace process facilitated by the UN. 
By contrast, Chapter VII enforcement actions are means to restore peace in 
an area of ongoing conflict. They may be needed when all other diplomatic and 
pacific efforts fail. Thus, peace-enforcement is almost a war-fighting mission, 
which includes low-level military operation to support humanitarian assistance. 
Fundamentally, the UN does not wage war. To maintain international peace and 
security the UN can authorise the use of force within enforcement contexts 
including war-fighting. The legal right to use force is entrusted not to the UN itself 
but coalitions of willing member states. Two examples are the Korean War in 1950 
and Operation Desert Storm against Iraq in the Gulf War authorised by Resolution 
678 (1991) (United Nations Security Council 1991d). Peace-enforcement is 
basically a legal, not a military term. It means all coercive actions, both non- 
military and military, authorised under Chapter VII. When the Security Council 
perceives that enforcement action is required, the member states of the Council 
collectively identify an aggressor and takes action using an escalating ladder of 
means until its aggression is stopped. 
The domain between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement is a `doctrinal 
5 
void', which is a vaguely defined area in terms of military activity. Ruggie (1993) 
dubbed the domain the `grey zone' in his famous article, `Wandering in the Void: 
Charting the U. N. 's New Strategic Role'. Regarding the UN's experience of 
peacekeeping operations in the early and mid-1990s, it is obvious that the UN and 
international community has got themselves into serious trouble by entering the 
grey zone without any guiding operational concept and proper preparations. The 
interventions in Somalia and Bosnia were the result. In both regions the majority of 
the blue-helmeted peacekeepers out in the field served within contexts for which 
peacekeeping was not intended. They continued to conduct their missions under 
inadequate rules of engagement and with frequently insufficient equipment 
somewhere between traditional peacekeeping mission and war-fighting. 
The UN and international community strategically and operationally failed 
in Somalia and Bosnia. The first research question of this thesis is: What has 
brought the UN and states involved in the interventions to the point of outright 
strategic failure? The practices of peace-enforcement actions by UN peacekeepers 
in both regions have made many believe that UN peacekeeping operations have 
radically evolved from traditional peacekeeping through the early post-Cold War 
era. For them, peacekeeping operations of this era are a comprehensive mission, 
which includes other kinds of peace operations, such as preventive actions, 
peacemaking, and state-building. Cerjan (1994) argues that `peacekeeping today is 
a term applied to a wide range of activities, including monitoring and supervision 
of cease-fires, stabilization of war zones, preventive military deployments, 
disarming of forces, monitoring of elections, administering transitions to new 
government, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, maintenance of civil order, state 
building, and peace-enforcement' (p. 4). From this perspective, the failure 
in 
Somalia and Bosnia can be understood as a problem of conducting the 
interventions. Put differently, if the UN and the states involved did properly in 
carrying out the peacekeeping operations there, the result of the 
interventions 
would have been successful. My hypothesis has a 
different perspective: the 
interventions of the UN and international community in the regions could not be 
successful because they used peacekeeping techniques as a means of 
intervention. 
That is to say, they used the wrong measure. The operations in Somalia and Bosnia 
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were not evidence of the evolution, but were cases of the misuse of peacekeeping 
techniques. I argue that the misuse of peacekeeping in an environment that required 
enforcement actions to be conducted was the primary cause of the failure in 
Somalia and Bosnia. In the first half of the 1990s its growing misuse did strain the 
UN materially and institutionally. I think this is the reason why the UN could not 
satisfy the optimistic expectations of the international society for a more active and 
enlarged role of the UN in maintaining international peace and security in the early 
post-Cold War period. It is one of the key purposes of this study to verify the 
hypothesis answering the first research question. 
There is the other aim of this research. Some scholars such as Ruggie 
(1993) and Ghebali (1995) also talk about the misuse of peacekeeping operations in 
the cases of post-Cold War interventions. However, it does not seem that there are 
many studies, which give emphasis to answering this question: What caused the 
misuse of peacekeeping? I answer the two research questions through examining 
and comparatively analysing three cases. 
1.2 The Analytical Framework and Case Studies 
As mentioned in the previous section, this thesis poses two research questions: 
`What has brought the UN and states involved in the interventions to the point of 
outright strategic failure? ' and `Why did the UN and international community 
inappropriately use peacekeeping as a means to tackle the crises in such hostile 
environments inadequate for their missions? ' These two questions are answered 
through the three case studies: Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo, and the 
answers are comparatively analysed in Chapter 6. Both questions are examined 
within the analytical framework of the structure-agency interrelationship. The 
`structure-agency' question is one of the most important theoretical issues in the 
social sciences. It seems almost unavoidable that any type of explanation will 
employ a position on structure and agency to examine the causality of political 
events. Agency refers to `individual or group abilities' to affect their environment. 
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Structure usually means the contexts or conditions, which `define the range of 
actions available to actors' (McAnulla 2002: 271). Some scholars heavily rely on 
structural factors in explaining political events. They are dubbed structuralist. 
Others tend to focus on actors of political events, studying the intention and 
behaviour of individuals and/or human groups. This kind of explanatory approach 
is labelled as intentionalism. Some contemporary social scientists have formulated 
quite clear and influential theoretical positions on the relationship. Such positions, 
like Giddens's structuration theory and Archer's morphogenetic approach, are 
usually referred to as `dialectical approaches'. They have attempted to overcome 
the theoretical limitations of both structuralism and intentionalism by examining 
the interactions and relationship between structure and agency in shaping the 
course of political events and phenomena. One of the most notable attempts was 
the strategic-relational approach of Jessop and Hay. 
Like Giddens's theory of structuration, the strategic-relational approach 
also recognises the artificial dualism of structure and agency. However, there are 
two clear distinctions between the strategic-relational approach and structuration 
theory. First, differing from Giddens's understanding of the dualism, Jessop and 
Hay argue that structure and agency are indeed different. Second, they insist on the 
idea that agents are reflexive and formulate strategies within the `strategically 
selective context' to tackle the problems, which are created by the context. For 
Jessop and Hay, actors are conscious, reflexive, and strategic. The strategic actions 
of agents within structural circumstances are continuously changed through an 
active process of `strategic learning'. As a key concept of the approach, `strategic 
action' provides an essential theoretical link between structure and agency because 
it is how an agent interacts with structure. Strategic action of actors yields two 
things: `direct effects' and `strategic learning' (Hay 2002: 126-33). In some 
occasions, behaviour and decision-making of actors 
directly affect structure, 
producing a partial transformation of the structured context, 
like the effects of 
Gorbachev's perestroika and glasnost upon the end of the Cold War. Through the 
process of strategic learning, agents are able to reformulate their 
identities and 
interests within the constraints and/or opportunities of the structured context and 
then engage in their strategically re-calculated actions. 
8 
Agential and structural factors are all important in explaining political 
events or phenomena. They should be to some extent equally considered as 
analytical perspectives. Archer suggests that `the key to avoiding structuralism or 
intentionalism is not, as Giddens proposes, to conflate structure and agency, but 
rather to examine how structure and agency relate to one another over time' 
(McAnulla 2002: 285). In this sense, what is needed in explaining political events 
is to examine how the factors affected each other. I employ this perspective of the 
structure-agency interrelations to analyse each case. Thus, each case study is 
conducted in both agential and structural analytical frameworks and then analysed 
within the perspective of the interrelationship between structure and agency. 
This thesis does not set out to `test' the strategic-relational approach. Rather, 
it borrows from the approach a way of analysing the interrelation between structure 
and agency. Since the key purpose of this thesis is not to verify the theoretical 
pretensions of the approach but to review the practices of UN peacekeeping 
operations in the early and mid-1990s, I would here neither provide a synthetic 
explanation of the approach itself nor pull together the pieces of explaining it in 
various perspectives. I only employ its theoretical structure to comparatively 
analyse the case studies. Thus, the epistemological and ontological basis of 
constructivism is not deeply discussed in this thesis. 
As mentioned above, the analytical framework of this research is inspired 
by the strategic-relational approach in terms of the following two epistemological 
perspectives: the structure-agency interrelationship concerning the formation of 
identity and interest of actors; and strategic action of agent within the strategically 
selective context of structure. The key factors of the explanatory framework of the 
thesis are national interests of the intervening states in peace operations and the 
humanitarian trends of the post-Cold War era. I regard the geopolitical context of 
each conflict in the 1990s and humanitarian trends of the post-Cold War era as a 
structure, in which the intervening states in peace operations formulated their 
identities and interests. These are two crucial motives of state behaviour, which 
make states choose between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement action 
including war-fighting within the post-Cold War structure. That is to say, as the end 
of the Cold War was ushered in, the leading states of the international community 
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formulated their identities and interests within the post-Cold War context, and then 
they strategically chose peace-enforcement actions with peacekeeping techniques 
in Somalia and Bosnia. In acting on hard-learned lessons from the interventions in 
both regions, the states reproduced their actions against threats to international 
peace and security. The Kosovo intervention was a product of the reformulated 
strategy and intention of the states through the process of strategic learning. 
The central research strategy of this thesis is based around the comparative analysis 
of the three case studies. My design of case study strategy is fundamentally a 
multiple-case design and the structure of the design is twofold: first, each case 
study exists independently to answer its own research questions; and then they are 
examined within the framework of the comparative analyses to answer the first 
main research question of the thesis. `Yin (2001) points out that in a multiple-case 
study, each case must be carefully selected considering whether it either predicts 
similar results to the other or predicts contrasting results (p. 47). The Somalia and 
Bosnia cases are selected to find out the similarities between the reasons for the 
strategic and operational failures, and the Kosovo case is chosen to compare with 
the other two cases to examine its implications in terms of the way of intervention. 
Regarding the selection of the cases, two important points were deeply 
considered. First, all the three conflicts were very brutal and complex cases, which 
UN peacekeepers could not tackle in terms of their facilities and mandates. Rather, 
they are the cases that required almost war-fighting missions with peace- 
enforcement mandates. However, the responses of the international community to 
these conflicts were very different. In Somalia and Bosnia, the UN and states 
intervened, using peacekeeping techniques within peace-enforcement circumstances. 
But, to tackle the Kosovo conflict, they chose multilateral armed intervention by 
the regional military organisation, heavily depending on the use of air power. What 
caused these differences of the strategic choices of the actors between the crises in 
the early 1990s and the conflict in the late 1990s? To answer this question is the 
key purpose of why the Somalia and Bosnia cases are comparatively examined to 
contrast with the Kosovo case. 
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The second point considered in terms of the research strategy of the 
comparative case studies is the success and failure of the interventions in the crises. 
The Somali and Bosnian interventions are very important cases among the peace 
operations in the post-Cold War era because they are the most unsatisfactory 
peacekeeping operations in the practices of UN peacekeeping. On the contrary, 
Kosovo is a relatively successful case. It is difficult to categorically state whether 
something is a success or not. The central focus of this thesis is not on whether or 
not the interventions were successful, but really why some actions were seen to 
have worked and some actions were not. Nonetheless, it is helpful to broadly define 
the three case studies in terms of which ones were successful. The criterion that I 
shall use is whether the key actors accomplished their stated objectives of the 
peacekeeping missions or armed actions. 
In Somalia and Bosnia, it is obvious that the key actor, the UN, failed to 
achieve the objectives of the missions established by its mandates. The key 
objectives of the UN mission in Somalia were: to prevent any resumption of 
violence; to maintain control of the heavy weapons of the organised factions; to 
seize the small arms of all unauthorised armed elements; and to secure or maintain 
security at all ports, airports, and lines of communications required for the delivery 
of humanitarian assistance (UN Secretary-General 1993b: paragraph 57). The 
attack on 5 June 1993 against Pakistani peacekeepers by Somali militiamen and the 
accident, Black Hawk Down, clearly mean that the peacekeepers failed to achieve 
the stated objectives and thus were not able to fulfill its mandate. In Bosnia, the UN 
and European states also failed to accomplish the key aims of their 
intervention: to 
protect UN-designated `safe areas' and to prevent mass 
killings. The fall of 
Srebrenica was evidence of the failure of their mission. As the situation 
in the 
former Yugoslavia was getting worse, the UN Security Council had to 
continuously change UNPROFOR's mandate, adopting new or revised resolutions 
on the mission. Thus, the UN strayed away from its original aims and consequently 
was unable to successfully complete their mission. 
Unlike the Somalia and Bosnia cases, in Kosovo the UN played a minor 
role of supporting NATO and the EU in terms of ending the conflict. 
NATO and its 
leading member states successfully achieved their goals in the armed interventions. 
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Blair clearly stated the five objectives of the intervention in his speech at the 
Economic Club of Chicago: `a verifiable cessation of all combat activities and 
killings; the withdrawal of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces from 
Kosovo; the deployment of an international military force; the return of all refugees 
and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid; and a political framework for Kosovo 
building on the Ramnbouillet accords' (Blair, 24 April 1999). In short, the ultimate 
aims of the NATO intervention have been clearly and unambiguously expressed by 
the leaders of the states involved: to stop Serb aggression against Kosovar 
Albanians and ensure the safe return of Kosovar refugees to their homes. 
The military campaign of the intervention in Kosovo was conducted by the 
regional military organization and highly contingent on air strike strategy with the 
minimised use of ground force. Regarding these two points, the experience in 
Kosovo has some important implications at the strategic and operational level for 
the better performance of future peacekeeping operations. The Kosovo case is 
compared with the other two cases to examine the implications in the third section 
(6.3) of Chapter 6. 
1.3 Qualitative Methods and Definitions of Key Terms 
This thesis mainly employs qualitative methods. This is a generic term that refers 
to a range of techniques including observation, participant observation, document 
analysis, individual interviews, and focus group interviews. Many qualitative case 
studies combine more than one method. Multiple methods can be a good idea since 
researchers may improve the reliability of their arguments by examining various 
sources from different methods. The two qualitative methods, elite interviews and 
the use of documents, have been conducted throughout the duration of my PhD. 
Interviewing was a method to collect qualitative data for the thesis. My 
interview strategy was semi-structured elite interviewing, which means a type of 
interview conducted within the context that an interviewer has some latitude to ask 
further questions in response to what an interviewee answers in addition to the 
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arranged sequence of questions. With the strategy I interviewed two UN officials 
during my field work in New York, and one British politician and one former 
British diplomat in London, who were deeply involved in the Yugoslav crisis: Mr 
Salman Ahmed, the Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General for 
peacekeeping operations; Mr Frederick Mallya, Coordination Officer at the 
Peacekeeping Best Practice Unit in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations; 
Lord David Owen, the former EU Co-Chairman of the International Conference on 
Former Yugoslavia from 1992 to 1995; and Lord David Hannay, the former 
Permanent Representative of the United Kingdom to the United Nations from 1990 
to 1995. 
As we know, a PhD thesis is required to form a distinct contribution to 
knowledge of the subject. To achieve this purpose PhD candidates need to discover 
new facts, or at least find evidence that supports the arguments in their thesis. In 
this sense, the interview is a useful tool for obtaining necessary data and thus a 
preferred method of social science as it allows researchers to probe deeply into 
issues or affords evidence of the originality of the discovery of new facts. Stedward 
(1997) raises two preliminary questions regarding interviewing as a research 
method: `Is an interview the best or only method available to gather the 
information required? ' and `Is it right for you concerning the techniques or 
processes of interviewing? ' (p. 152). As to my research topic, interviewing was a 
very useful method to obtain internal information about UN peacekeeping 
operations. As the actions of the UN and international community to tackle the 
enormous human suffering associated with the post-Cold War conflicts which 
erupted from 1991, especially those in Somalia, Bosnia, and Rwanda, have 
increased, UN peacekeeping operations have become a popular issue among 
scholars and students of international relations and many academic works about it 
have been produced. Thus, in order to contribute to current knowledge of 
peacekeeping, it is essential to raise new arguments supported by original proof. 
Interviewing the UN officials, the British politician, and the British diplomat who 
had been involved in the operations in Somalia and Bosnia provided an opportunity 
for that. 
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Personal and official documents which can be derived from the United 
Nations, the United States, and media outputs have been collected through archival 
works in various libraries and searching the Internet during the whole period of my 
PhD. I conducted fieldwork in the United States from March to May 2005. The 
primary purpose of the research trip was to collect empirical qualitative or 
quantitative data required through conducting interviews and archival work. The 
question, where to go for fieldwork, definitely refers to the question: `where is the 
data? ' Research fieldwork should be conducted where what researchers seek to 
obtain exists. New York and Washington D. C. fully contained what I needed for 
my research, such as UN and U. S. government officials with plenty of knowledge 
and experience about the peacekeeping operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, 
and an enormous amount of relevant documentation in archives and libraries. The 
Library of Congress was the main archive I consulted. It is one of the world's 
largest repositories of books and other printed materials. In the library I collected 
many useful primary and secondary sources as well. It was definitely the right 
choice to visit New York and Washington D. C. as a place for fieldwork. 
The development of information and communication technology has 
dramatically changed the research environment. Through the Internet researchers 
can easily obtain data required for their research. Two points, however, should be 
clearly mentioned: first, the Internet does not contain all relevant data for research; 
second, researchers cannot find out about the existence of useful documents by 
only surfing the Internet. For example, I found one document, the so-called `PDD 
25' (Presidential Decision Directive), during my archival work in Washington D. C. 
This document was very useful for my thesis because it is an internal policy review 
of the Clinton Administration about U. S. involvements in peacekeeping operations 
until 1994. While the details of the actual Secret PDD 25 are still concealed 
from 
public scrutiny, an unclassified summary of PDD 25 was released onto the 
Internet. 
I did not even know of the existence of the document before the archival work 
in 
the Library of Congress. I came to know the existence in the course of consulting a 
GAO report, which was discovered through consulting with librarians and 
directly 
visiting the Government Accountability Office in 
downtown Washington D. C. 
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Consequently, the Internet is a very useful tool for data collection. However, it may 
not be a primary repository for the archival works of academic research. 
The materials and data collected through archival work and surfing the 
Internet have been thoroughly examined and analysed to verify the hypothesis of 
this study and answer the questions posed in each chapter. I deal with various kinds 
of written records such as UN Security Council resolutions, U. S. governmental 
papers, and episodic records from autobiographies of key persons related to the 
three cases. Many excerpts and quotations are extracted from these documents to 
support my arguments. In particular, UN Security Council resolutions are a rich 
source of the document analysis of this thesis and using the resolutions is a primary 
methodological means for it. UN resolutions allow me access to the details of the 
events in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo that may be difficult or impossible to 
research through direct and personal contact. Moreover, through systemically 
analysing Security Council resolutions I could probe into how the UN and its 
member states concerned made their decisions and took actions for their 
interventions within the multilateral decision-making context. 
Defining key terms used in the thesis is an important component of the 
methodological framework because it enables me to clarify how UN peacekeeping 
and other peace operations in the post-Cold War era are different from practices 
during the Cold War period. In Chapter 2, I review the relevant literature to 
examine various definitions and ways of understanding the four key terms: 
peacekeeping operations, peace operations, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking. 
In order to define the terms in my own way, I employ Sartori (1970)'s strategy for 
conceptualisation of a term dubbed as `the ladder of abstraction'. 
A concept comprises two key elements: extension (denotation) and 
intension (connotation). The formation of a concept is to define a term by 
considering and deciding the proper level of the denotation and connotation of the 
term. Sartori (1970) describes this process of concept formation as a way of 
climbing or descending a `ladder of abstraction'. Climbing the ladder means to 
broaden the denotation of a term increasing the abstraction of its meaning, and 
conversely descending the ladder reduces the denotation and increases the 
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connotation of the term enhancing the precision of the definition (p. 1041). The 
formation of a concept is a delicate work because it can be easily distorted unless 
the process of conceptualization is conducted through the thorough consideration 
of the context of research such as its purpose, scope, and topic. Thus, in order to 
avoid the misformation of a concept it is essential to decide the appropriate level of 
abstraction maneuvering both upwards or downwards along a ladder of abstraction 
within the research context. In the thesis, I would descend the ladder to keep the 
abstraction level low in defining the terms. The practices of UN peacekeeping 
operations in the post-Cold War era have made the denotation of the definition 
extremely expanded over other peace operations. I believe this has caused the 
operational difficulties especially in Somalia and Bosnia and the conceptual 
bewilderment in academia and the field. Thus, it is necessary to reduce the 
abstraction of the meaning of the terms and enhance their specification and 
configuration as much as possible to prevent those confusions. My definitions of 
peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, and peacemaking are as follows: 
`Peacekeeping operations' means that the interposition of unarmed or lightly-armed 
UN forces, including police personnel or civilians, in an environment with the 
consent of all the parties concerned to encourage the warring parties to negotiate a 
settlement or to impartially buttress a political agreement between them through the 
means authorised by the Security Council. 
`Peace-enforcement' is basically a legal process to maintain or restore international 
peace and security under the authority of the UN Security 
Council by an escalating 
ladder of means specified in Chapter VII of the UN Charter including 
both non- 
military options under Article 41 and military actions under 
Article 42 and 43. 
Differing from peacekeeping forces, the forces of enforcement mission according to 
Article 43 do not require the consent of parties to conflict when they are deployed 
in 
troubled areas, and would partially respond to outright aggression if necessary. 
`Peacemaking' is the active involvement of the UN or UN Member States under the 
authorisation of the UN Security Council to persuade parties of the conflict 
to accept 
a pacific solution through any means based on Chapter 
VI of the UN Charter. 
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The term peace operation is a relatively new term in this field. It is a broad and 
comprehensive term without any consensus on its definition embracing various 
types of the operations of the UN and international community, such as 
peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, and peace-building (or state- 
building). In this thesis, I use the term as an umbrella word to encompass all kinds 
of UN and governmental operations to maintain international peace and security 
with humanitarian purposes. 
1.4 The Outline of the Chapters 
This research consists of six chapters, which are grouped in three parts. The first 
part is Chapter 2, which primarily outlines the challenges of post-Cold War 
peacekeeping and its various definitions. The second part establishes three case 
studies: Somalia in Chapter 3; Bosnia in Chapter 4; and Kosovo in Chapter 5. The 
analysis of each case study is conducted within the analytical framework focusing 
on both agency and structure. It is also examined how the agential and structural 
causes affected each other in each case. In the third part, Chapter 6, the case studies 
are analysed in the comparative strategy. The chapter then analyses some of the 
critical issues that have arisen for peacekeeping operations of the post-Cold War 
international order. 
Chapter 2 is designed to provide the basic background for the chapters to 
follow. It does this by first outlining the history of UN peacekeeping during both 
the Cold War and post-Cold War era. It then examines the conceptual diversity and 
practical confusion of peacekeeping operations in the 1990s through the 
examination of the relevant literature. The main purpose of the examination is to 
clarify the meaning of peacekeeping operations within the context of post-Cold 
War regional conflicts. For this, I review the various definitions and understandings 
of peacekeeping and also other peace operations, peace-enforcement and 
peacemaking, from the literature and formulate my definition of them at the end of 
this chapter. It is vital to clarify the meaning of both terms because many 
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peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War period were conducted within the 
context of peace-enforcement or along with peacemaking without clear separation 
in performing the missions. 
The aim of Chapter 3 is to examine the reason why the UN and 
international community failed in Somalia. `Black Hawk Down' was the key event, 
which caused the frustration of the UN peacekeeping mission and U. S. operation in 
Somalia. In this chapter, I examine the causation of the debacle within the agential 
and then structural framework. The end of the Cold War was a key environmental 
factor in terms of the structural perspective. It is thoroughly examined in each case 
study how the systemic change of the international order affected the decision- 
making and actions of the agents: the United Nations, the United States, major EU 
states, and/or NATO. 
The Bosnia case is studied in Chapter 4. Though the key purpose of the 
chapter is to examine the failure of the multilateral intervention in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina, other conflicts which erupted in Yugoslavia are also examined in the 
chapter because each crisis was closely linked to and affected the others. As is well 
known, the Bosnian crisis was ended by the Dayton Peace Accords in November 
1995. This was mainly achieved by the U. S. government with the support of 
NATO. Although British and French UN peacekeepers superbly conducted their 
duties and played a vital role in stabilising the situation there, the UN eventually 
undertook a minor role in the ending of the crisis. It is mainly examined in this 
chapter. 
In Chapter 5, I look at the three key issues that have arisen regarding the 
Kosovo intervention. Differing from the Bosnian crisis, the Kosovo case is 
definitely an intra-state conflict because Kosovo was a territorial part of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia. In relation to the Western 
intervention in Kosovo, the status of the crisis caused a legal dispute on 
humanitarian intervention and the principle of non-interference. The second issue 
to discuss is air strike tactics as a means of conducting a military intervention. 
The 
NATO's campaign in Kosovo was mainly conducted by high-precision air strikes 
minimising casualties of troops and civilian 
losses. The implication and meaning of 
this new way of military operation within the context of post-Cold 
War peace 
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operations are examined. The last issue of the chapter concerns the utility of 
regional and/or military organisations such as NATO in maintaining international 
peace and security, which is the UN's primary responsibility. Regarding the limits 
of the capabilities and resources of the UN system to shoulder a burgeoning 
number of security missions in the post-Cold War era, using regional and/or 
military organisations can be a useful option to reduce the burden of the UN. The 
Kosovo case has some important implications for this issue. 
As the third part of the thesis, Chapter 6 answers the key research questions 
and verifies my hypothesis. As explained in the second section (1.2), this analytical 
chapter conducts the comparative studies on the three cases to answer the questions 
and also to examine their implications for the future practice of UN peacekeeping 
operations. The comparative analysis is conduced in two different ways within the 
research strategy of inter-systemic similarities and differences respectively. The 
Somalia and Bosnia cases are compared to explain why the UN and international 
community failed in the regions by finding similarities between the cases. The 
Kosovo case study is contrasted with the two other cases to highlight differences 
between them. 
Finally, in Chapter 7, I conclude the thesis by summarising all the key 
arguments discussed in each chapter including the three case studies. The chapter 
also concludes with a set of my suggestions for the future for more reliable and 
efficient peacekeeping operations. 
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Chapter 2: The Old Paradigm and New 
Trends of Peacekeeping Operations 
The blue helmets of UN peacekeepers conducting their duties in the fields of 
conflict have become the symbol of the UN's efforts to maintain international 
peace and security. Peacekeeping has a 50-year history. Between 1945, when the 
UN was set up, and 2006, it has created sixty-one peacekeeping bodies, forty-eight 
of them since 1987. UN peacekeepers during the Cold War era played limited roles 
such as monitoring the established cease-fire between opposing factions, 
supervising government functions, or supporting aid workers in humanitarian 
assistance. These traditional peacekeeping operations were only possible to a very 
limited degree and within very limited mandates. From 1991, the mandate and 
tasks of UN peacekeeping missions changed and broke out of the traditional 
boundary of their roles. Somalia and the former Yugoslavia were the scenes of the 
change. Such interventions with expanded mandates were widely held to be an 
innovation of the post-Cold War era. However, they have left the conceptual and 
practical clarities of peacekeeping operations, which had been established through 
the practices during the Cold War, in confusion or at least in controversy. 
It is not easy to formulate a clear and concrete definition of peacekeeping 
within the context of peacekeeping practices in the early post-Cold War era. To be 
sure, there exists a great deal of confusion regarding the meaning of peacekeeping, 
as a number of scholars have defined it differently to suit their individual needs or 
analytic purposes. The range of possible meanings varies all the way from the self- 
consciously scientific attempt at a rigorous and precise definition to a rather 
flexible and also somewhat ambiguous definition. Such a variety of definitions can 
be a source of frustration, bewilderment, and disillusionment. The main purpose of 
this chapter is to examine how the international context for peacekeeping has 
changed in the post-Cold War era and to formulate a new 
definition of 
peacekeeping that is fitting for this new context. I 
believe that it is possible to 
detect behind all the conflicting definitions and assertions a convergence of similar 
and related perceptions and perspectives. 
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In addition to the search for a definition of peacekeeping within the 
changed context of the post-Cold War era, it is also essential to formulate proper 
definitions of other kinds of peace operations, such as peacemaking and peace- 
enforcement. The UN's practices of peacekeeping missions in the early and mid- 
1990s were very distinct from the traditional missions during the Cold War period 
in terms of the complexity of their operations. Peacekeeping on many occasions 
moved in step with peacemaking in a combined process of conflict resolution and 
sometimes was converted into peace-enforcement. In many of the UN's practices 
of intervention since the early 1990s, peacemaking has not been separated from 
peacekeeping operations and has been conducted within the process of 
peacekeeping missions, thus it has usually gone into `operational hibernation'. In 
Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina, UN peacekeepers had to conduct their missions 
within the context of peace-enforcement, which is a means of collective security 
system under Chapter VII of the Charter ultimately including war-fighting. In spite 
of the existence of the clear definition of peacemaking and peace-enforcement 
proclaimed by An Agenda for Peace (1992) and endorsed by the Charter, use of the 
terms in practice has been unclear and ambiguous. There are a number of different 
definitions and various ways of understanding of them. The conceptual diversity 
and practical confusion in the field during the first half of the 1990s made many 
UN peacekeeping missions less effective or even put them in danger. To scrutinise 
the features of peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War era, properly 
understanding other UN peace operations is definitely a good starting point for the 
analysis. 
This chapter comprises three sections, which are examined based on the 
literature review. The first explores the genesis of peacekeeping as a UN practice 
and its history in the Cold War period. It demonstrates how the 
international 
community coped with regional or intra-state conflicts to maintain 
international 
peace and security during this period. In the second section, 
I examine the new 
features of peacekeeping operations, especially in the early 1990s. The purpose of 
this examination is to make sure that it is necessary to rethink peacekeeping and 
other peace operations in terms of definition to escape 
from the conceptual and 
practical anarchy surrounding the terms. Finally, the third section 
defines the terms, 
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peacekeeping and peacemaking, which is the most unclear and ambiguous term 
among peace operations. In order to do this, firstly I examine various definitions 
and the understanding of many scholars, and then employ Sartori's strategy for 
conceptualisation of a term dubbed as `the ladder of abstraction' to find a proper 
definition of each term. Additionally, I clarify the meaning of peace-enforcement 
and peace operations. 
2.1 UN Peacekeeping Operations during the Cold War Era 
According to political realists, international relations have been rightly defined in 
terms of their anarchic milieu, but the fact that nation-states interact with each 
other in the so-called "state of nature" does not mean that international relations are 
uniformly disorderly or interstate conflicts always equally deadly and destructive. 
Given the anarchic condition, international relations have exhibited varying 
degrees of cooperation and efforts to develop peace. One of the strongest 
backbones for this idealist perspective is the existence of the United Nations. In 
accordance with the hope of the idealist, the first of the purposes of the UN listed in 
its Charter is `to maintain international peace and security'. To achieve this end, the 
Security Council takes `effective collective measures for the prevention and 
removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or 
other breaches of the peace' (United Nations 1945: Article 1). 
Throughout most of its history during the Cold War, the UN had faced a 
need for effective measures to cope with new conflicts. The new conflicts, which 
particularly arose during the process of decolonisation, were fundamentally 
different from the two World Wars, which had led to the foundation of the UN. 
While the Great Wars were the so-called `total war' between sovereign states, the 
new conflicts were `limited war' on a small scale between nations or 
factions in a 
state. 4 A way had to be found to stop hostilities and to control conflicts 
because 
4 Total war implies a far wider global conflict than regional conflicts in a limited climate 
and, while limited war suggests a degree of constraint, self-imposed or otherwise, total war 
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many of them could not be resolved by peaceful means listed in the Charter. The 
UN Charter contains coercive means of conflict resolution such as peace- 
enforcement under Chapter VII, but the Security Council had been unable to 
choose the use of the means due to the fierce relationship during the Cold War 
between the West and East. Out of that need, UN peacekeeping operations were 
created as `holding actions'. There was no particular legal base or theory behind 
peacekeeping. It was born of necessity, largely improvised, a practical response to 
a problem requiring action. 
Traditional UN peacekeeping operations during the Cold War era can be 
divided into two broad categories: unarmed military observer missions and armed 
peacekeeping missions. The key task of observer missions was to supervise the 
implementation of cease-fire agreements. Whereas unarmed military personnel 
conducted observer missions, armed peacekeeping missions were mainly 
performed by lightly armed infantry units to stop hostilities and eventually create 
conditions for peace. Officially, the first observer mission as a UN peacekeeping 
operation was the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO), 
which was established to tackle the crisis in Palestine in June 1948. However, some 
raise a question as to whether UNTSO was genuinely the first mission of UN 
peacekeeping operations because there was another UN mission, which was 
established in October 1947, one year ahead of UNTSO. It was the United Nations 
Special Committee on the Balkans (UNSCOB / 1947-51). The key tasks of the 
committee with 11 members were to monitor compliance with the General 
Assembly's recommendation on the issue of a state of agitation or disturbance 
around the border of Greece and investigate outside support for guerrillas in the 
region. As Durch (1993) notes, the observation function was firstly utilised in the 
Balkans (p. l ), but the UN does officially recognise UNTSO as the first observer 
mission (United Nations 1996a: 4) because the mandate of UNSCOB was closer to 
fact-finding rather than monitoring a truce or settlement of conflict. It is still in 
controversy. 
implies a lack of constraint. For more about total war and limited war, see Freedman 
(1994): Section F and G. 
23 
Armed peacekeeping missions on a large scale began when the UN 
Emergency Force (UNEF I) was set up by the General Assembly in the aftermath 
of the Suez Crisis in 1956. There were fifty-six peacekeeping bodies by 2003, 
thirteen of them existing before 1987. Through the practices for several decades 
during the Cold War, the UN has developed a clear definition of peacekeeping 
operations. A UN publication, The Blue Helmets, explicitly outlines what 
peacekeeping is as follows: 
As the United Nations practice has evolved over the years, a peacekeeping operation 
has come to be defined as an operation involving military personnel, but without 
enforcement powers, undertaken by the United Nations to help maintain or restore 
international peace and security in areas of conflict. These operations are voluntary 
and are based on the consent and cooperation. While they involve the use of military 
personnel, they achieve their objectives not by force of arms, thus contrasting them 
with the `enforcement action' of the Untied Nations under Article 42 (United 
Nations 1990: 4; quoted in White 1993: 183). 
Peacekeeping operations have been most commonly employed to supervise and 
help maintain cease-fires, to assist in troop withdrawals, and to provide a buffer 
between opposing forces. Very contrasting with UN enforcement forces, 
peacekeepers have no rights of enforcement of conflict resolution and their use of 
force is limited to self-defence, as a last resort. Their role is restricted in line with 
the Security Council's primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
Regarding the genesis of peacekeeping as a UN practice, UNEF and ONUC 
(United Nations Operation in Congo / 1960-1964) were very important in terms of 
the following two points: first, the respective legal powers of the Security Council 
and General Assembly in restoring peace and security; and second, providing the 
guidelines and principles of peacekeeping as an essential precedent. The creation of 
such peacekeeping mission is surely a matter for the Security Council these days, 
but it was not necessarily so in the early years of its genesis. UNEF I was 
established by the General Assembly in 1956 and ONUC as the second armed UN 
peacekeeping operation was formed by the Security Council in 1960. According to 
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the UN Charter, it is very certain both politically and legally that the Security 
Council is in charge of exercising peacekeeping function. Article 24 (1) of the 
Charter states that the Security Council has a primary responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and security, which is the first purpose of the UN enshrined in 
its Charter: 
Article 24 
1. In order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations, its Members 
confer on the Security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of 
international peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this 
responsibility the Security Council acts on their behalf (United Nations 1945). 
However, UNEF I was established by the General Assembly because the Security 
Council was paralysed as the United Kingdom and France used their vetoes. This 
caused a legal dispute over the General Assembly's powers and functions in 
maintaining international peace and security. In other words, regarding the 
establishment of UNEF by the General Assembly, some UN member states raised 
questions about whether the General Assembly has the legal power to carry out the 
primary purpose of the UN. 
The division of functions for the maintenance of peace and security 
between the Security Council and the General Assembly is clearly stated in the 
Charter: 
Article 11 (2): 
The General Assembly may discuss any questions relating to the maintenance of 
international peace and security brought before it by any Member of the United 
Nations, or by the Security Council, [... ], except as provided in Article 12, may 
make recommendations with regard to any such questions to the state or states 
concerned or to the Security Council or to both. Any such question on which action 
is necessary shall be referred to the Security Council by the General Assembly either 
before or after discussion. 
Article 12 (1): 
While the Security Council is exercising in respect of any dispute or situation the 
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functions assigned to it in the present Charter, the General Assembly shall not make 
any recommendation with regard to that dispute or situation unless the Security 
Council so requests (United Nations 1945). 
These provisions are designed to prevent functional and legal clashes between the 
two bodies. The restriction of the General Assembly's powers and competence 
contained in the provisions was an example of political compromise between the 
powerful Member States of the Security Council and the other smaller states in the 
Organisation. In the early period, the United Nations was dominated by the West. 
The fierce relationship between the West and East during the Cold War made the 
Security Council paralysed in exercising its functions. Especially, the Soviet Union 
frequently used its veto in the Security Council to protect its interests5 (White 
1993: 119-20). To tackle the situation that the Security Council could not play its 
role provided in the Charter the Western dominated General Assembly introduced a 
new approach that the provisions were `flexibly interpreted in such a way that there 
is no strict division of functions' (Gray 2000: 149). General Assembly Resolution 
377 (V) of 3 November 1950, Uniting for Peace, was passed in this political 
context. 
According to this resolution, the General Assembly has the right to take the 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security: 
The General Assembly, [... ] 
1. Resolves that if the Security Council, because of lack of unanimity of the 
permanent members, fails to exercise its primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security in any case where there appears to be a threat to 
the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression, the General Assembly shall 
consider the matter immediately with a view to making appropriate 
recommendations to Members for collective measures, including in the case of a 
breach of the peace or act of aggression the use of armed force when necessary, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. [... ] (United Nations General 
Assembly 1950) 
5 See Table 2.1 (p. 29) and Figure 2.1 (p. 29) 
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This resolution was the key legal base of the creation of UNEF I. Using the 
procedure stated in this resolution, the General Assembly established the first 
armed peacekeeping force in 1956 by the authorisation of such non-coercive 
military mission with the consents of parties to conflict conducted in the Suez. 
Along with Uniting for Peace Resolution, the Certain Expenses of the 
United Nations Case was also the key legal source of the construction of UN 
peacekeeping operation techniques. In relation to UNEF I and ONUC, France and 
the Soviet Union refused to contribute to the costs of these peacekeeping 
operations on the grounds that `both of these forces were unconstitutional' (Harris 
1998: 975). Their refusal to pay the financial contribution caused a legal dispute 
about whether the expenditure for the operations could be considered within the 
meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter. Article 17 states: 
Article 17 
1. The General Assembly shall consider and approve the budget of the Organization. 
2. The expenses of the Organization shall be borne by the Members as apportioned 
by the General Assembly (United Nations 1945). 
On the one hand, it was an issue of interpretation of the term `expenses of the 
Organization' as to whether certain types of expenses like those resulting from UN 
missions to maintain international peace and security, which might not be referred 
to as `regular expenses' of the Organization such as the salaries of staff, must be 
regarded as `expenses of the Organization' under Article 17. On the other hand, it 
was the continuing controversy since the creation of the UN about the relationship 
between the General Assembly and the Security Council in the maintenance of 
international peace and security. The General Assembly brought this legal issue to 
the International Court of Justice, requesting the judicial opinion of the Court on 
this issue of financing as well as the constitutionality of both of the peacekeeping 
forces. The Court concluded that the expenditures authorised by the General 
Assembly for UNEF and ONUC constitute `expenses of the United Nations' within 
the meaning of Article 17, paragraph 2, of the Charter (Harris 1998: 975-6; 
982-3). 
UN peacekeeping was created without any legal base or theory. The 
Certain Expenses case provided a concrete legal basis for the constitutionality of 
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UN peacekeeping. Furthermore, the practices of UNEF and ONUC set an essential 
precedent for later peacekeeping operations. Especially, UNEF created many of the 
guidelines and principles on which other peacekeeping operations have heavily 
relied. The Suez crisis erupted in 1956 when the forces of Israel, the UK, and 
France occupied large portions of Egyptian territory including the Suez Canal area. 
The General Assembly adopted resolutions 997 and 1000 on 2 and 5 November 
respectively to establish UNEF I. On 6 November soon after these resolutions, Dag 
Hammarskj öd submitted to the General Assembly a report on the plan for the 
emergency international United Nations Force for UNEF. In the report, he provided 
the functions and principles of the UN peacekeeping force: 
[... ] the functions of the United Nations Force would be, when a cease-fire is being 
established, to enter Egyptian territory with the consent of the Egyptian Government, 
in order to help maintain quiet during and after the withdrawal of non-Egyptian 
troops, and to secure compliance with the other terms established in the [General 
Assembly] resolution of 2 November 1956. The Force obviously should have no 
rights other than those necessary for the execution of its functions, in co-operation 
with local authorities. It would be more than an observers' corps, but in no way a 
military force temporarily controlling the territory in which it is stationed; nor, 
moreover, should the Force have military functions exceeding those necessary to 
secure peaceful conditions on the assumption that the parties to the conflict take all 
necessary steps for compliance with the recommendations of the General Assembly 
(ICJ Reports 1962, p. 171; quoted in Harris 1998: 981). 
As White (1993) argued, the principles of peacekeeping were firmly established to 
a certain extent by the International Court of Justice because the Court provided the 
concrete legality of peacekeeping techniques by quoting the paragraph of the report 
above in the Expenses case (p. 200). 
As mentioned above, during the Cold War, the Security Council could not entirely 
fulfil its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security. In 
order to undertake peace-enforcement action, the Security Council needs to link 
conflict or dispute in a specific country to `a threat to the peace' or `breach of the 
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peace', because it is the legal prerequisite for enforcement action under Chapter 
VII of the Charter that the Security Council determines the existence of the threat 
or breach. In most cases, the Security Council failed to produce the link due to a 
lack of political will or a collision of national interests between Security Council 
member states. Boutros-Ghali (1992) agrees that the adversarial rivalry between the 
United States and the former Soviet Union made the original promise of the 
Security Council impossible to fulfil (p. 470). Roberts and Kingsbury (1993) also 
state as follows: 
[... ] the UN, for over four decades in which the world had been divided between 
East and West, had been unable to act effectively; indeed, in matters relating to war 
and peace it had been almost completely powerless due to frequent threat or use of 
the veto in the Security Council (p. 4). 
The UN Security Council consists of five permanent and ten non-permanent 
members. The five permanent members are as follows: the United States, the 
United Kingdom, France, Russia (previously the Soviet Union), and China. Each 
year the General Assembly elects five non-permanent members (out of 10 in total) 
for a two-year term. The ten non-permanent seats are distributed on a regional 
basis: five for African and Asian countries; one for Eastern European countries; 
two for Latin American and Caribbean countries; two for Western European and 
other countries. The five permanent member states, which were the victors of 
World War II, have the right of veto under the UN's founding rules. 
The UN Charter does not mention the word veto. The veto power was the 
condition upon which both the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to join 
the UN. In accordance with the relevant provisions of the Charter, decisions of the 
Council are made by an affirmative vote by nine members including the concurring 
votes of the five permanent members. If a permanent member casts a negative vote, 
the draft resolution being voted on is not passed. This is the rule of "great Power 
unanimity", often referred to as the right of veto or the veto power. 
The veto system of the Security Council has been widely criticised, 
especially during the Cold War, because the heavy use of the veto by the Soviet 
Union and the United States has frequently sunk draft resolutions of the Security 
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Council. The mandate and functions of the Security Council have often been 
bogged down by the threat to use the veto. As shown in Table 2.1 and Figure 2.1, 
the Soviet Union was responsible for nearly half of all vetoes ever cast. The United 
States has invoked its veto power 82 times, usually to ward off actions against 
Israel (Kafala 2003). 
Table 2.1: The Veto Record (1945-2006) 
USSR/Russia US UK France China 
1945-1990 120 69 32 18 3 
1991-2006 3 13 0 0 2 
Total 123 82 32 18 5 
(Source: Kafala 2003 and Nahory et al. 2007) 
Figure 2.1: Veto Use in the UN Security Council (1946-2001) 
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(Sources: Holt (1999) and updated by Gya (2001)) 
Since the succession of the Soviet Union's membership of the Security 
Council in 1991, Russia has cast the veto only three times up to 2006. The first U. S. 
veto was cast in 1970 over Southern Rhodesia. Until 
1990 the United States 
invoked the veto power 69 times (Kafala 2003). In sum, the United States and 
Russia cast 189 vetoes in the Cold War era, which is more than half of the total 
vetoes (260). 
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2.2 The New Trends of Peace Operations in the Post-Cold War Era 
The end of the Cold War brought the international community new challenges 
together with opportunities in terms of two features: the increase of regional 
conflicts and the revitalization of effective UN systems, specifically the functions 
of the UN Security Council. Skidelsky (1995) states that `the collapse of the over- 
arching imperial structures of the Cold War would release not the cosmopolitan 
Utopia but the historical passions and enmities which the bipolar hegemony had 
kept under control' (p. xi). Although international tension between the superpowers 
has dramatically reduced, regional conflicts have become more threatening. As 
Gibbs (1997) states, civil wars and ethnic hatreds replaced East-West tensions as 
the principle pivot of world politics (p. 122). As the post-Cold War era commenced, 
waves of killing and destruction tended to be more within national borders, 
sometimes on ethnic lines, than between sovereign states. Civil strife, and ethnic, 
nationalistic and religious conflicts emerged on an unprecedented scale, not only in 
the former Soviet Union but also in many other parts of the world. Huntington's 
(1997) assertion has stirred up more debate than any other arguments: after the 
Cold War, `global politics began to be reconfigured along cultural lines. ' In other 
words, culture and cultural identities are shaping the patterns of cohesion, 
disintegration, and conflict in the post-Cold War world (pp. 19-20). 
These statements compel us to answer a question: why did this change 
emerge? Howard (1978) states as follows: 
The basic fact that has been recognised by every serious political thinker who has 
turned his attention to the matter - by More and Bacon, by Hobbes and Locke, by 
Montesquieu and Rousseau, by Kant and Hegel - is that war is an inherent element 
in a system of sovereign states which lacks any supreme and acknowledged arbiter 
(p. 13 2). 
The end of superpower rivalry and Cold War alignments obviously led to 
dramatically reduced international tensions between the superpowers. Indeed, the 
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end of the Cold War has made the outbreak of large-scale wars less likely. 
However, regional conflicts have become more threatening because of the 
disruption of the balance of power that resulted from the withdrawal of the Soviet 
Union from the international arena, and the enhanced ability of many regional 
powers to acquire modern military equipment and technology (Rabie 1992: 123). 
Carl Von Clausewitz (1976) defines war as follows: `war is thus an act of force to 
compel our enemy to do our will' (p. 75). The suppressed social and political `wills' 
of each nation and faction of nation-states erupted when the `supreme and 
acknowledged arbiter' was removed. The eruption turned into hostile feelings and 
hostile intentions, which was defined as the motives of war by Clausewitz (1976), 
because those states or nations lacked enough social, political, and economic 
infrastructures to contain the wills (p. 76). 
The changed environment in the post-Cold War period moved the issue of 
peacekeeping forwards on the international agenda and made the UN develop more 
effective actions and an enthusiasm for legitimate, authorised, multilateral 
intervention in order to maintain international peace and security. The United 
Nations has been in the spotlight unlike ever before. As Roberts and Kingsbury 
(1993) agree, with the end of the Cold War, it has been at last in a position to act 
more or less as its founders had intended, taking a decisive role in many crises, 
such as in the Gulf in 1991 (p. 4). Increasing numbers of UN operations in the post- 
Cold War era have also been mandated to meet emergency humanitarian needs, to 
try to ensure safe delivery of aid, and to seek to deter attacks on civilians. This has 
become possible because the end of superpower rivalry and Cold War alignments 
freed the Security Council member states, especially the permanent members, from 
the deadlock of the right of veto. Peace operations aimed at providing humanitarian 
relief are now mainly about collective response through the United Nations. 
With relation to the efforts of the international community to maintain international 
peace and security in the early post-Cold War period, there were strong trends of 
active involvement in civil wars and 
intra-state conflicts. These trends were based 
on the perception that such conflicts 
in the post-Cold War era are more prevalent, 
violent, and threatening to international peace and security than 
in previous eras. 
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The advocates of the new development of the trends contend that the protection of 
ethnic, religious, and other minorities endangered by conflict and hostile 
governments is now increasingly a recognised obligation of the international 
community. 
One of the trends is that international society has legitimised the collective 
use of force in terms of international law, specifically under the UN Charter. In the 
post-Cold War era, the widespread suffering of large numbers of victims 
increasingly involves international institutions in situations of armed conflict. 
According to Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (1998), the occurrence of humanitarian 
emergencies in recent years has increasingly provoked debate about the extent to 
which intervention to reduce human suffering should be restricted by the traditional 
rights of state sovereignty and domestic jurisdiction (p. 49-50). Some argue that 
with Article 2(7) of its Charter restraining intervention in matters within the 
domestic jurisdiction of a state, the UN has traditionally been reluctant to be 
involved in what are internal or domestic affairs. 6 The article states as follows: 
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII (United Nations 1945). 
As Franck (1999) argues, it is a mistake to cite Article 2(7) of the UN Charter as a 
ban on UN's intervention `in matters which are essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of any state', because this restraint does not apply when the Security 
Council decides to impose `enforcement measures under Chapter VII' (p. 116). 
As we know, sovereignty is the foundation of international law, which 
fundamentally came from the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. And the principle of non- 
intervention expresses the correlative duty to respect the sovereignty of other states. 
Under the terms of the Charter there are only two cases in which armed force may 
be employed: (1) self-defence from an 
illegal armed attack and (2) armed action 
6 Related to this, see Michael F. Glennon (1999) 
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authorised by the UN security Council as an enforcement measure. The strongest 
argument for an exception to the prohibition on armed force is the use of force to 
save populations that are threatened by massacres, atrocities, widespread brutality, 
and deprivation of elementary human rights. The practices of the post-Cold War 
era, especially in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Somalia, have led to a new kind of 
operation in terms of the exception of the use of force under the UN system. 
During the Cold War period, the UN had tried to stick to Article 2(4) of the 
Charter, which expresses the respect of territorial integrity or state-sovereignty. 
The article states that: 
All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
For example, when, Indian troops acted to protect Bengalis in East Pakistan in 
1971 from Pakistani troops, the UN General Assembly declined by a large majority 
to support the Indian arguments, calling on India to withdraw its force. Despite 
much sympathy for the East Pakistani Bengalis, UN member states were unwilling 
to legitimate India's armed action as a permissible exception to Article 2(4) 
(Schachter 1991: p. 83). However, as Woodhouse and Ramsbotham (1998) argue, 
`the shift to preoccupation with the possibility of collective action under aegis of 
the UN rather than self-help by states, and to focus on Article 2(7) of the UN 
Charter rather than Article 2(4), has opened the whole matter out for 
reinterpretation in the post-Cold War era' (p. 49-50). 
Sarooshi (1993) says that Security Council Resolution 751 (1992) and 794 
(1992) dealing with the situation in Somalia are significant because they link 
humanitarian issues to a threat to international peace and security. He also states 
that the Security Council firstly recognised that widespread human suffering could 
constitute a threat to international peace and security through the resolutions 
(p. 8). 
Resolution 751 (1992) states as follows: 
The Security Council, 
Deeply disturbed by the magnitude of the human suffering caused by the conflict 
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and concerned that the continuation of the situation in Somalia constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 1992g), 
Resolution 794 (1992) also states in the same way: 
The Security Council, 
Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in 
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security 
(United Nations Security Council 1992c), 
According to Wheeler (2000), the UN and U. S. intervention in Somalia is 
historic, because it was the first time that the UN Security Council authorised a 
Chapter VII intervention - without the consent of a sovereign government - for 
explicitly humanitarian reasons. He also says that this was the first time that the 
Security Council had formally recognised that widespread suffering in itself can 
constitute a threat to international peace and security (p. 173). Knudsen (1996) has 
also argued that Security Council Resolution 794 of 3 December 1992 on the 
Somalia case established the link between a humanitarian crisis and the use of force 
to restore international peace and security (p. 155). The moral legitimacy of the 
Somali operation was not in doubt. There certainly was a moral obligation for the 
UN to act. Somalia provides support for the legitimacy of peace-enforcement 
action. The overwhelming support that the operation received provides evidence of 
new attitudes and readiness to intervene on grounds of humanitarian concerns. 
Resolutions 751 (1992) and 794 (1992) are significant in terms of the direct 
link between humanitarian concern and a threat to international peace and security. 
However, these resolutions were not the first to recognise that human sufferings 
could constitute a threat to international peace and security. Resolution 688 (1991) 
on the Iraqi situation precedes the resolutions on the Somali crisis in terms of this 
link. Resolution 688 clearly states that the Security Council `condemns the 
repression of the Iraqi civilian population in many parts of Iraq, including most 
recently in Kurdish-populated areas, the consequences of which threaten 
international peace and security in the region' (United Nations Security Council 
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1991c). In other words, as Knudsen (1996) states, `the harbinger of the wave of 
post-Cold War military humanitarianism was the allied intervention in northern 
Iraq in April 1991 to save Kurdish and other Iraqi national minorities from the 
humanitarian disaster they face after their failed rebellion in the aftermath of the 
Gulf War' (p. 153). Sarooshi (1993) argues that because China specifically opposed 
any references in the resolution to action being taken under Chapter VII, the value 
of this resolution as a precedent for a link between humanitarian crises and an 
Article 39 determination is unclear (p. 8). However, though the resolution made no 
express mention of Chapter VII, the resolution's reference to the Council's 
responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security and its 
concern about the crisis amounted to an implied determination under Article 39.7 
In addition, SC Resolution 713 (1991), which recognised humanitarian 
disasters in Yugoslavia as a threat to international peace and security, was adopted 
a year before resolutions 751 (1992) and 794 (1992). The resolution states as 
follows: 
The Security Council, 
Deeply concerned by the fighting in Yugoslavia, which is causing a heavy loss of 
human life and material damage, and by the consequences for the countries of the 
region, in particular in the border areas of neighbouring countries, 
Concerned that the continuation of this situation constitutes a threat to 
international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 1991 a), 
From these arguments, we can infer the following conclusion: through the Security 
Council Resolutions 688 (1991), 713 (1991), 751 (1992), and 794 (1992), the right 
to intervene with humanitarian purpose can now be activated under Charter VII. 
The idea of linking human rights to international peace and security represents a 
significant development and departure from previous UN attitudes on the right to 
intervene. With regard to this, Higgins (1994) argues that what Article 2(4) 
7 The resolution `insists that Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian 
organisations to all those in need of assistance 
in all parts of Iraq' and `appeals to all 
Member States and to all humanitarian organisations to contribute to these humanitarian 
relief efforts. ' 
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prohibits is the use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence 
of a state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United 
Nations (p. 245). 
The other trend, which has caused the new legal and moral attitudes to active 
involvement in intra-state conflicts, is the emphasis on human rights. Ramsbotham 
and Woodhouse (1996) assert that appeals to humanitarianism have become 
increasingly common in the post-1945 period. For instance, the UN Charter 
clarifies that `the purpose of the United Nations' is the aim of achieving 
`international cooperation in solving international problems of a ... humanitarian 
character' (Article 1(3)). Since then, considerations of humanity have been 
increasingly and widely recognised in international law, with references to 
`principles or laws of humanity' proliferating in preambles to international 
conventions, in resolutions of the UN General Assembly, and, more generally, in 
recent diplomatic practice (p. 8). Especially, soon after the Second World War and 
during 1950s key legal instruments for humanity and human rights had been 
established: 
1946: Constitution of the International Refugee Organization (UNHCR) 
1948: Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
1949: Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons 
1950: European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms with 10 Additional Protocols (in 1952,1963,1966,1983,1984, 
1985,1990,1992) 
1951: Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Genocide 
1952: Convention on the Political Rights of Women; Declaration of the Rights of the 
Child 
1954: Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees; Convention on Territorial 
Asylum; Convention on Diplomatic Asylum (Weiss and Collins 2000: 19) 
Through this development, human rights in the contemporary world are almost 
universally accepted - at least in word, or as ideal standards. 
8 All states regularly 
8 Related to this, Henkin (1977) defines `universalisation' of rights as their general 
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proclaim their acceptance of and adherence to international human rights norms, 
and charges of human rights violations are among the strongest charges that can be 
made in international relations (Donnelly 1989: 1). Impetus for the universalisation 
and internationalisation of human rights was provided by the mass murders, 
concentration camps, and other forms of inhuman treatment of individuals as a part 
of the official policy of some governments prior to and during World War II 
(Bennet 1995: 395). 
According to Donnelly (1989), while we can trace multilateral human rights 
activities back over forty years to the very beginning of the United Nations, human 
rights have been an active concern of the national foreign policies of most countries 
for scarcely fifteen years. For example, U. S. legislation, which has focused on 
linking foreign aid and arms sales to human rights practices in recipient countries, 
goes back only to 1973. Even such countries as Norway and the Netherlands, who 
have gone the furthest in their efforts to pursue human rights concerns in their 
foreign policy, can trace these endeavours back not much more than a decade. And 
human rights do not appear to have had any place at all in the foreign policies of 
the Soviet bloc states (p. 259). In the Cold war era, to maintain their `ideological 
blocs' was more significant for the leaders of each bloc than to protect human 
rights. For instance, actions by the United States to protect the "free world" from 
"communism" had a devastating impact on human rights in such countries as 
Guatemala, Chile, South Korea, Indonesia, Zaire, and South Africa. 
Müllerson (1997) states that `Human rights seem to affect the post-Cold 
War international relations more than before because there is no longer an 
overwhelming security threat; instead there are multifarious threats to international 
stability, many of which have their origin in the human rights situation of a 
particular country. ' In addition, he argues that `there is less reason for the misuse or 
abuse of human rights issues in foreign policy, and there is more room for 
relatively effective diplomatic efforts with a view to promoting and protecting 
human rights' (p. 180). We can see the ideas of the universality of human rights or 
acceptance by national governments, and `internationalisation' of rights as the recognition 
that treatment of citizens in one country has become the business of other countries. See 
Louis Henkin (1977) 
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humanitarian values in the World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in June 
1993. Kopi Awoonor, Ghana's permanent representative to the UN, affirmed that 
`[h]umanitarian aid in our time springs from the universal acceptance of the 
principle of international cooperation as a necessary component and expression of 
our common humanity'(Cited in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 163). This 
emphasis on human rights in international relations today has promoted active 
involvement of the international community in intra-state conflicts of the post-Cold 
War era. 
Commenting further, Donnelly (1989) argues that since human rights are 
ultimately a profoundly national, not international, issue, the probable impact of 
international action is limited. Thus, other states are not directly harmed by a 
government's failure to respect human rights; the immediate victims are that 
government's own citizens (p. 266). However, recent practices of the international 
community show that his assertion is not wholly true in the context of post-Cold 
War human rights activities. For example, experiences in Afghanistan, Bosnia, 
Liberia, and in particular, Somalia show that the local power-holders can obstruct 
the delivery of humanitarian aid and unduly benefit by confiscating it. Moreover, 
soldiers of peacekeeping operation troops have been harmed and killed in the 
operations. The end of the Cold War has enabled the relationship between human 
rights and the efforts of the international community for maintaining international 
peace and security to be closer. 
Like many political institutions, the United Nations has been faced, virtually 
throughout its practices for maintaining international peace and security, with a 
deep gulf between theory and practice, between the principles and objectives of the 
Charter and the political realities of our time. The effort to bridge this gulf has been 
the main theme of the post-Cold War years of the United Nations. Nowhere has the 
gulf between theory and practice been so evident as 
in peacekeeping operations. 
Unlike the Cold War period, due to the changes argued in the previous section, 
peacekeepers are required to cope with more 
harsh and dangerous situations. 
Moreover, the operations have now become more a case of trying to understand 
how non-forcible military options and non-military options should 
be brought into 
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play in response to humanitarian crises. The changes have expanded the mandate of 
UN peacekeeping. Peacekeeping operations are no longer just observing cease-fire 
agreements between parties concerned. They now include forcible actions for 
human rights protection and disaster relief. Thus, we need to newly define the 
operations in terms of the changed context and climate. 
2.3 Defining Peacekeeping, Peace-enforcement, and Peacemaking 
Within the Context of the Post-Cold War Era 
Peacekeeping is a unique UN function in that it fits neither the classical patterns of 
peaceful settlement nor the model of collective security. Although Haass (1999) 
states that in contrast to Chapter VII, which addresses enforcement actions, 
peacekeeping takes place under Chapter VI of the UN Charter, which addresses 
pacific settlement of disputes, there is no statement mentioning the term in the UN 
Charter (p. 57). Peacekeeping is a UN creation without any legal support from the 
Charter. However, through the UN's peacekeeping practices for five decades, this 
technique has been clearly recognised as a significant contribution to conflict 
resolution. According to Boutros-Ghali (1992), peacekeeping is `the deployment of 
a United Nations presence in the field, hitherto with the consent of all the parties 
concerned, normally involving United Nations military and/or police personnel and 
frequently civilians as well. Peacekeeping is a technique that expands the 
possibilities for both the prevention of conflict and the making of peace' (p. 475). 
Brian Urquhart (1981), who was the Under-Secretary-General and worked in the 
Secretariat when UN peacekeeping was created, has described peacekeeping as 
follows: `the use by the United Nations of military personnel and formations not in 
a fighting or enforcement role but interposed as a mechanism to bring an end to 
hostile forces. In effect, it serves as an internationally constituted pretext for the 
parties to a conflict to stop fighting and as a mechanism to maintain a cease 
fire' 
(p. 6). Haass (1999) also defines it similarly as follows: `Peacekeeping involves the 
deployment of unarmed or at most lightly-armed forces in a peaceful environment, 
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normally to buttress a fragile or brittle political arrangement between two or more 
contending parties' (p. 57). For Evans (1993), peacekeeping is `the deployment of 
military or police personnel, and frequently civilians as well, to assist in the 
implementation of agreements reached between government or parties who have 
been engaged in conflict. ' It is `premised on cooperation, and, except for self- 
defence, its methods are inherently peaceful' (p. 99). Weiss and Collins (2000) 
define peacekeeping more specifically: `peacekeeping is the deployment of a U. N. 
presence in the field with the consent of all parties concerned, to allow contending 
forces that wish to stop fighting to separate with some confidence that they will not 
be attacked in order to create conditions conductive to a political settlement'; 
`peacekeeping normally involves U. N. military and/or police personnel, and 
frequently civilians as well' and `military mission mandates include monitoring 
existing peace arrangements. ' (p. 8). 
Though these various definitions clarify peacekeeping in their own words, 
they share common ideas on it. They agree that peacekeeping denotes the inter- 
position of armed forces in a territory with the consent of the territorial sovereign 
or internal factions. Its validity lies in the consent to their presence given by the 
competent territorial sovereigns. Thus, it will demand a fair treatment of both 
parties concerned and support neutrality. In this sense, peacekeeping is conciliatory 
not confrontational. Its purpose is usually to act as a buffer between warring states 
or factions, to supervise a peace without enforcing it or merely to observe a 
ceasefire line, for instance arranging elections, protecting aid workers, and 
monitoring the implementation of the peace accords. Based on this consensus, 
I 
formulate my own definition of peacekeeping operations (PKO): 
The interposition of unarmed or lightly-armed UN forces, including police 
personnel or civilians, in an environment with the consent of all the parties 
concerned to encourage the warring parties to negotiate a settlement or to 
imp buttress a political agreement between them through the means 
authorised by the Security Council. 
Here I need to discuss how to define a concept in political science. A word 
UNIVERSITY 
OF SHEFFIELD 
LIBRARY 41 
as a concept has two dimensions: extension (denotation) and intension 
(connotation). The extension of a term is `the class of things to which the term 
applies' and the intension of a term is `the collection of properties which determine 
the things to which the word applies'. In other words, the denotation of a term 
means `the totality of objects indicated by the term' and the connotation of a term 
is `the totality of characteristics anything must possess to be in the denotation of 
that word' (Sartori 1970: 1041). The formation of a concept is to define a term by 
considering and deciding the proper level of the denotation and connotation of the 
term. Sartori (1970) describes this process of concept formation as a way of 
climbing or descending a `ladder of abstraction'. Climbing the ladder means to 
broaden the denotation of a term reducing the connotation (p. 1041). This procedure 
provides a broad generalization of the term, but loses the precision of the concept 
increasing the abstraction of its definition. On the other hand, by descending the 
ladder concept formation can obtain a specific and precise meaning of a term, but it 
is inevitable that this will prevent universal conceptualisation of the term. For 
example, as to defining UN peacekeeping operations if I form my definition of 
PKO at the high level of abstraction by moving up the ladder, the definition will be 
a broad concept with a large denotation including various kinds of peace operations. 
However, this high level conceptualisation cannot differentiate each peace 
operation due to the vagueness and conceptual obscurity of its definition. On the 
other hand, by descending the ladder it will be a very specific and configurative 
definition with a narrow denotation. In order to avoid the misformation of a 
concept it is essential to maneuver both upwards and downwards along a ladder of 
abstraction within the context of the purpose and scope of the research for which 
the concept formation is required. In this sense, defining peacekeeping should be 
considered in the context of the changes of the post-Cold War era. 
As the experiences of some UN operations showed, peacekeeping 
operations today seem very different 
from traditional peacekeeping. As 
Ambassador Jeane K Kirkpatrick testified before the U. S. Congress, traditional 
peacekeeping is `interposing troops where peace exists' and 
`helping prevent 
further violence' between warring parties. They may `not even help negotiate 
outstanding differences' (Curtis 1994: 
178). Cerjan (1994) states that peacekeeping 
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operations in the post-Cold War era is `a term applied to a wide range of activities, 
including monitoring and supervision of cease-fires, stabilization of war zones, 
preventive military deployments, disarming of forces, monitoring of elections, 
administering transitions to new government, humanitarian aid, disaster relief, 
maintenance of civil order, state building, and peace-enforcement' (p. 4). Given the 
context of the expanded roles of UN peacekeeping in some operations the very 
meaning of the term peacekeeping has radically changed casting doubt as to its 
validity in defining peacekeeping within its traditional denotation. During the Cold 
War era, each of the peace operations within the UN system had been clearly 
distinct from the others in terms of both their conceptual definition and practices in 
the field. In the post-Cold War era, though Boutros-Ghali and the UN officially 
clarified the concept of peacekeeping operations through An Agenda for Peace and 
other UN publications, its conceptual and practical meaning have become very 
ambiguous and included many different kinds of activities. In most ways, the term 
peacekeeping has been used by the media, scholars, and government officials as an 
umbrella term encompassing peacemaking, peace-building, and even peace- 
enforcement. This is because as shown in the practices of the UN and international 
community especially in Somalia and Bosnia the roles and mandates of the 
peacekeeping operations have expanded to include peace-enforcement and peace- 
building throughout the missions there. These expanded UN operations have been 
dubbed by Ruggie (1993) in his article as `grey area missions' for which `the UN 
lacks any guiding operational concept'. According to him, the grey area that the 
UN has entered is a domain of military activity between traditional peacekeeping 
operations and war-fighting (p. 26; 28). It is obvious that the UN missions in 
Somalia and Bosnia were very distinct from traditional peacekeeping and made the 
UN itself get into serious trouble in the domain between peacekeeping and 
enforcement. As Ruggie (1993) points out, the domain is a `doctrinal void', which 
is vaguely defined (p. 29). Though since the demise of the Cold War system many 
academic works have been conducted about the new features of UN peacekeeping 
operations, we still need more efforts to avoid its conceptual confusion and 
fill the 
`doctrinal void' by clarifying the concept of post-Cold War peacekeeping. 
There are two key issues in defining UN peacekeeping operations in the 
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post-Cold War international order: first, whether to climb or descend a ladder of 
abstraction; second what are the essential elements of its definition as connotation? 
Before answering the two questions, it is very worthwhile to mention Ruggie 
(1993)'s statement on peacekeeping and peace-enforcement: 
Peacekeeping essentially attempts to overcome a coordination problem between two 
adversaries: the peacekeeper seeks to ensure that both parties to a conflict understand 
the agreed-upon rules of the game and that compliance with or deviation from these 
rules is made transparent. Enforcement, on the other hand, is akin to a game of 
chicken: the international community, through escalating measures that ultimately 
threaten war-making and military defeat, attempts to force an aggressor off its track 
(p. 29). 
Fundamentally, peacekeeping is a different kind of game with different rules from 
peace-enforcement and any other types of peace operations. I wonder whether the 
so-called grey area missions of the UN in the early post-Cold War era are a new 
kind of UN peace operation. As Ruggie argues, UN peacekeeping surely entered 
into the grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement, but it 
does not mean that the operations conducted within the grey area are very different 
from traditional peacekeeping in terms of its concept. Many believe and argue that 
UN peacekeeping has evolved and thus the UN and international community have 
created an evolved peace operation throughout the experiences in Somalia and 
Bosnia. I do not think this idea is right. Post-Cold War peacekeeping is still within 
the conceptual and practical boundary of traditional peacekeeping. The 
misperception of the evolution of peacekeeping had been caused by the fact that 
UN peacekeeping was used in the inappropriate circumstances and contexts for 
which the peacekeeping mechanism was not designed. This key argument of my 
thesis is more deeply discussed in the analytical chapter of the thesis, chapter 6. 
The denotation of the concept of peacekeeping should not be expanded by keeping 
the concept at the low abstract level of conceptualisation. 
The other issue regards the key elements of peacekeeping operations. The 
elements of the concept are undoubtedly these three principles: the consent of the 
parties, impartiality, and use of force only in self-defence. These principles have 
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been developed through the practices of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War era. 
As explained earlier, the most important operation in terms of the establishment of 
the principles was UNEF. Dag Hammarskjöd's report on the plan for the 
emergency international UN Force for UNEF explicitly provided the guidelines 
and principles of a peacekeeping operation in the Suez crisis. As the paragraphs of 
the report related to them were quoted in the Expense case, the three principles 
came to obtain a concrete legal base as the essential part of peacekeeping 
techniques (White 1993: 200). 
Some raise a question as to whether the principles are still valid and reliable 
within the context of the post-Cold War peacekeeping practices. These are not only 
the essential principles under which peacekeeping operations in the post-Cold War 
era should be conducted, but also the conceptual connotations that differentiate the 
term peacekeeping from other types of peace operations. The Peacekeeping Best 
Practice Unit (currently Peacekeeping Best Practice Section) of the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations of the UN published a handbook in December 2003 on 
peacekeeping operations regarding their multi-dimensional aspects. The key roles 
of the unit are `to capture the knowledge gained' by previous UN peacekeeping 
operations; `to disseminate best practices, at headquarters and in the field'; and `to 
promote the adaptation and use of best practices for the better conduct of UN 
peacekeeping' to solve problems and develop better policy (Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Section 2007). Thus, the handbook can be regarded as a collection of the 
lessons that the UN has learned from the practices of its peacekeeping operations 
for the last 10 years. According to the handbook, the consent of the parties to 
conflict and impartiality are critical principles for successful conduct of 
peacekeeping operations: 
Consent: Peacekeeping and progress towards a just and sustainable peace rely on the 
consent and cooperation of the parties to the conflict. In the absence of freely given 
consent, the military component and the peacekeeping operation as a whole will find 
it hard to implement its mandate. [... ] Consent, at all levels, must be encouraged by 
building confidence among the parties and enhancing their stake in and ownership of 
the peace process. Impartiality is the best guarantee that a mission will gain and 
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retain the consent of all parties. 
Impartiality: Impartiality and even-handedness should always guide the actions of a 
military component of a UN peacekeeping operation. Impartiality is understood as 
an objective and consistent execution of the mandate, regardless of provocation or 
challenge. Impartiality does not mean inaction or overlooking violations. UN 
peacekeepers should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict [... ]. 
If the peacekeeping force is perceived as being partial, people may lose confidence 
in the UN's ability to act as a neutral party, which can damage the credibility of the 
mission and threaten the peace process. At worst, a perception of UN partiality could 
lead parties to the conflict to withdraw their consent to the presence of the mission 
and return to violence as a means of resolving the conflict (Peacekeeping Best 
Practices Unit 2003: 56-7). 
The handbook does not clearly state that the principle of the use of force only in 
self-defence is an essential condition for successful peacekeeping. Rather, it says 
that the use of force by UN peacekeepers is contingent on the consideration of the 
Security Council upon the situation in the field: 
Appropriate use of force: Since peacekeeping operations need the consent of the 
parties to a conflict, military forces under UN command are not usually required to 
use force beyond that necessary for self-defence. Self-defence includes the right to 
protect oneself, other UN personnel, UN property and any other persons under UN 
protection. 
The use of force by the military component will depend on the mandate of the 
peacekeeping operations and the rules of engagement; sometimes the Security 
Council will authorize a peacekeeping operation to use armed force in situations 
other than in self-defence. The circumstances under which the operation may use 
armed force will then be spelt out in the relevant resolution of the Council. [... ] 
(Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 2003: 57). 
Thus, the application of force as a last resort and in self-defence may be a principle 
of the conduct of peacekeeping missions, 
but not a key one as the other two are. 
Regarding all the arguments so far with relation to defining the term peacekeeping 
within the context of post-Cold 
War practices, I formulated my definition of 
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peacekeeping operations earlier in this section. 
`Peace operations' is a relatively new term, which is recently being used in UN and 
governmental documents. For example, the Department of Defense of the U. S. 
Government regards that the term `encompasses peacekeeping operations and 
peace enforcement operations conducted to support diplomatic efforts to establish 
and maintain peace' (U. S. Department of Defense 2001: 404). To date the term 
peace operations has been used as an umbrella term for peacekeeping and peace- 
enforcement. There is no consensus on its definition and it is just used in many 
ways as an alternative word referring to various types of the operations of the UN 
and international community. In this thesis, I have also used the term with a more 
expanded denotation as an umbrella word to encompass all kinds of UN and 
governmental operations to maintain international peace and security with 
humanitarian purposes, such as peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement, 
and peace-building (state-building). 
Peace-enforcement and peacekeeping are distinct undertakings. Each can be 
effective in the appropriate circumstances. Whereas peacekeeping operations are 
basically the non-coercive use of military force with the consent of all the parties 
concerned to preserve a peace which is already established between the parties, 
peace-enforcement actions are almost war-fighting missions through the 
deployment of lightly- or heavily-armed forces in a hostile environment without the 
consent of the parties involved. This is how many appreciate peace-enforcement, 
and the way in which they misunderstand and misuse the term. 
Military actions by 
armed forces are the key aspect of peace-enforcement, 
but that is not all. Many 
scholars, journalists, and government officials refer only 
to military action when 
they mention peace-enforcement. For example, 
Cerj an (1994) defines it as an 
armed operation `using military 
force to complete a cessation of hostilities or to 
terminate acts of aggression by a member state' 
(p. 4). To the U. S. government, 
peace-enforcement means 
`the application of military force, or the threat of its use, 
normally pursuant to 
international authorization, to control compliance with 
resolutions or sanctions 
designed to maintain or restore peace and order' (U. S. 
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Department of Defense 2001: 403). As a part of the collective security system of 
the UN, peace-enforcement operations are conducted by both military and non- 
military measures specified in Chapter VII of the Charter. 
The collective security system of Chapter VII is twofold: non-military 
enforcement measures in Article 41 of the chapter and military enforcement 
measures in Article 42. 
Article 41 [of the UN Charter] 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the United Nations to apply such measures. These may include 
complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, 
telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of 
diplomatic relations. 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. Such action may include demonstrations, blockade, and other 
operations by air, sea, or land forces of Members of the United Nations (United 
Nations 1945). 
There are two crucial points to properly understanding peace-enforcement: first, as 
clearly stated in Article 42 military enforcement measures are employed only when 
the non-military enforcement measures have failed or more specifically the 
Security Council considers that those measures are inadequate to achieve the 
objectives of what the UN decided to 
do; second, peace-enforcement is a definitely 
a legal procedure based on the UN 
Charter escalating from non-military means to 
the use of military forces to maintain or restore 
international peace and security. As 
Ruggie (1993) states, peace-enforcement is `primarily a legal, not a military, term' 
(p. 28). 
The first step of the procedure is that the Security Council `determines the 
existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression' 
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(United Nations 1945: Article 39). Before taking any specific action according to 
Article 41 and 42, the Security Council sets up some provisional measures that are 
not enforceable at all to prevent an aggravation of the situation and recommends 
the parties concerned to comply with the measures (Article 40). If the aggressor or 
aggressors collectively identified by the Security Council and then the General 
Assembly does not act in accordance with such provisional measures, the Security 
Council will decide what non-military measures such as economic sanctions and 
diplomatic enforcement will be adequate to tackle the situation (Article 41). The 
military enforcement measures including low-level military actions to help 
humanitarian assistance and high-level use of force to intensively fight with the 
aggressor such as in the Korea War in 1950 and the Gulf War in 1991 are 
employed by the determination of the Security Council when the non-military 
options are considered to have failed to stop the aggressor (Article 42). 
Consequently, peace-enforcement is defined as follows: 
Peace-enforcement is a legal process conducted under the authority of the UN 
Security Council with or without the consent of parties to conflict to maintain 
and/or restore international peace and security by an escalating ladder of 
means including both non-military and military options until the aggression is 
ended. 
Unlike within the UN system, peacemaking in the field and academia is a relatively 
an ambiguous term lacking practical and academic consensus in defining and 
understanding it. The perceptional spectrum of peacemaking 
is very wide and its 
usage is radically various. For instance, authors such as 
Towle (2000) and 
Macmillan (2001) use the term merely to mean actions or efforts to create peace 
during conflict or after war. They recognise the term in exactly same way as 
ordinary people literally understand 
it including all kinds of action to `make peace'. 
Some definitions of ohter authors are more academic. Mingst and Karns (2000) 
define peacemaking as `all efforts to bring parties to agreements' 
(p. 76). However, 
it is still too broad. 
The UN's official definition is as follows: `peacemaking refers to the use of 
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diplomatic means to persuade parties in conflict to cease hostilities and to negotiate 
a peaceful settlement of their dispute' (United Nations 2000a: 72). Whereas this 
UN's definition places a great emphasis on non-military options of peaceful 
settlement, some authors refer to peacemaking as peace-enforcement itself (See 
Ray 1993). 
According to Haass (1999), some in the U. S. military prefer the phrase 
"aggravated peacekeeping" instead of "peacemaking" and others define it `to 
encompass a host of activities, including diplomacy and sanctions, designed to help 
bring about conditions of peace'. In his book, the term peacemaking is used `to 
cover those activities falling between peacekeeping and war-fighting, in 
environments characterized by the U. S. military as neither "permissive" nor 
"hostile" but "uncertain"'. He distinguishes it from ordinary warfare in terms of the 
goal and the scope of the combat: whereas the goal of pure war-fighting is `to 
inflict significant destruction on the adversary', peacemaking is `carried out with 
measurable restraint'. Peacemaking often involves one or more relevant local party 
that is friendly or neutral, and a geographical context in which the hostile parties 
cannot be isolated. In this context of peacemaking, war-fighting is either not 
available or brings with it severe costs (pp. 59-60). 
Weiss and Collins (2000)'s definition is more specific. They state that 
`peacemaking, also known as "conflict resolution, " is action to bring hostile parties 
to agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter 
VII9 of the U. N. Charter, i. e., through negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, 
arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other 
peaceful means. ' `Military missions include military-to-military liaison, security 
assistance, preventive deployment, and show of force. ' (p. 8) 
In terms of international law, peacemaking seems to be defined as what 
comprises both consensual peacekeeping (under the authorisation of the Security 
9 Chapter VI mentions the peaceful means for conflict resolution, not Chapter VII. It could 
be a printing fault or an authors' mistake. Article 
33 of Chapter VI: `The parties to any 
dispute, [... ], shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, enquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, 
judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or 
other peaceful means of their own choice. 
' 
50 
Council and the Secretary-General) and non-consensual enforcement action (under 
Chapter VII of the Charter). Peacemaking is action to bring hostile parties to 
agreement, essentially through such peaceful means as those foreseen in Chapter 
VI of the Charter of the United Nations. It does not include the use of military force 
(peace-enforcement) under the authorisation of the Security Council based on 
Chapter VII of the Charter. 
As Haass (1999) points out, peacemaking is an imprecise and misleading 
term. As shown above, the term peacemaking in current academia and journalism 
is used to cover all kinds of activities falling between peacekeeping and war- 
fighting (p. 59). The variation in definitions of peacemaking without consensus 
causes the conceptual confusion. For example, Evans (1993) argues that while 
peacekeeping is about ensuring that agreements are implemented, peacemaking is 
about reaching them in the first place (p. 99). This is right in terms of the context of 
the Cold War era. Traditional peacekeeping operations are actions occurring after 
conflict. However, practices since the end of the Cold War have shown that 
peacekeeping can be an option available to peacemakers to assist the parties in 
bridging the gap between the will for peace and the achievement of peace. In some 
cases, peacekeeping operations were conducted as a part of peacemaking. 
Moreover, it is unclear how peacemaking is different from other actions for 
restoring peace, such as peace-enforcement in most of its definitions. Evans (1993) 
says that non-consensual enforcement action (e. g. peace enforcement) is to achieve 
its objectives by depriving the party concerned of the military or economic means 
to maintain the offending behaviour by means which are not premised on the 
consent of all relevant sovereigns or factions (p. 133-4). 
With regard to all the arguments above, I believe that we need to stick to 
the UN's definition of peacemaking or understand it at least based on the UN's 
definition because in the current international system the UN is a key body to take 
a responsibility for maintaining 
international peace and security conducting 
peacemaking missions 
in troubled areas. Thus, I formulate a definition of 
peacemaking relying on the 
UN's definition: 
Peacemaking is the active involvement of the UN or UN Member States 
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under the authorisation of the UN Security Council to persuade parties of the 
conflict to accept a pacific solution through any means based on Chapter VI 
of the UN Charter. 
As mentioned in the introductory section, the practices of peacekeeping 
operations in the early post-Cold War era have left the conceptual and practical 
clarities of peacekeeping in confusion. Thus, it is important to formulate coherent 
definitions of the key terms related to peace operations to examine the practical and 
conceptual confusion. In the following chapters, I scrutinize each case study on 
Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo respectively based on the devised definitions. 
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Chapter 3: Peace-enforcement by the 
`Blue Helmets' in Somalia 
[... ] Then there was an explosion overhead. Waddell looked up to see a Black Hawk 
twisting oddly as it flew. `Hey that bird's going down! ' shouted one of the men across 
the street. [... ] He had seen the flash of the RPG launcher and had followed the smoke 
of trail of the grenade as it rose up at the tail of Black Hawk Super Six One, which was 
directly overhead. They all heard the thunderclap. (Bowden 1999: 117-8) 
On 3 October 1993, two U. S. helicopters were shot down, eighteen U. S. soldiers 
were killed, and eighty-four were wounded by the poorly equipped Somali militia. 
This accident was a turning point in the military intervention of the U. S. and UN in 
Somalia's civil war. Although hundreds of Somali militiamen were killed in the 
encounter, it was obvious the perception was of U. S. failure. There were 1,700 best 
combat troops of the U. S. army such as Rangers and Delta Forces in Somalia at the 
time, backed up by helicopters, gunships, and armoured vehicles. Heavy casualties 
suffered by U. S. forces in operations undermined their apparent military supremacy 
against Aidid's militia. As Haass (1999) points out, the perception was `reinforced 
by television images of a dead soldier being dragged through the streets of 
Mogadishu and pictures of a captured U. S. airman' (pp. 45-6). 
Although four days later, on 7 October, President Clinton announced his 
intentions of reinforcing the U. S. military presence in and around Somalia for a 
period of just less than six months, virtually all U. S. troops would be withdrawn at 
the end of that time (Haass 1999: 46). The U. S. began disengaging from Somalia. 
At the end of October 1993, legislative support from the U. S. Congress for the 
continuing U. S. operations in Somalia totally collapsed. 
Congress rejected a 
request of the administration 
for a proposed $175 million contingency fund to 
cover immediate UN peacekeeping costs, and also 
informed the president that the 
U. S. share of peacekeeping costs should be cut down 
from 31.7 % to 25% 
(Shawcross 2000: 102). The last units of U. S. troops left Somalia on 25 March 
1994. Remaining UNOSOM II (United Nations Operation in Somalia II) forces 
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finally withdrew under the protection of U. S. Marines at the beginning of March 
1995. 
The United Nations officially concludes in one of its documents, 
`Completed Peacekeeping Operation: Somalia - UNOSOM II' (1998), that their 
operations in Somalia were quite successful. According to this document, the major 
political achievement of the United Nations in Somalia was to help bring about a 
cease-fire, first in Mogadishu and then nationally. Additionally, it states that 
success was greatest in the humanitarian field. Millions of Somalis benefited from 
these activities, and, at a minimum, an estimated quarter of a million lives were 
saved (United Nations 1998). However, it is questionable whether the operations in 
Somalia were in fact completely successful. Academic accounts of UNOSOM II 
have been critical. Abiew (1999) argues that UN `peace management' efforts in 
Somalia had clearly failed. Since the withdrawal of U. S. and UN forces in March 
1995, the political situation in Somalia remained at a stalemate. There was no 
political solution in sight, and sporadic fighting continued (p. 166). Johansen and 
Mills (1996) argue that though UNOSOM I (United Nations Operation in Somalia I 
/ April 1992 to April 1993) was quite successful in securing the administration of 
food aid and saving as many as 350,000 to 500,000 Somalis, UNOSOM II (May 
1993 to march 1995) failed to disarm the warring clans and achieve peace (pp. 112-3). 
The UN Secretary-General (1993b) clearly stated the key objectives of UNOSOM 
II in his report: to prevent any resumption of violence; to maintain control of the 
heavy weapons of the organised factions; to seize the small arms of all 
unauthorised armed elements; and to secure or maintain security at all ports, 
airports, and lines of communications required 
for the delivery of humanitarian 
assistance (paragraph 57). The attack on 
5 June 1993 against Pakistani 
peacekeepers by Somali militiamen 
led by General Aidid was surely evidence of 
the failure of UNOSOM II. 25 Pakistani soldiers were 
killed and 54 were wounded 
in a series of ambushes and armed attacks. 
Its peacekeepers failed to achieve the 
stated objectives and consequently were not able 
to fulfill its mandate. 
My aim in this chapter is to explain why the intervention 
by the UN and 
United States in Somalia's civil war virtually 
failed. As mentioned in the 
introduction, an analytical framework 
focusing on the interrelationship between 
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agency and structure will be employed here to examine the practice of UN 
peacekeeping operations and U. S. military intervention in Somalia. For this chapter, 
I raise three research questions: Why did the accident, `Black Hawk Down', 
happen?; What were the mistakes of the UN and U. S. decision-makers in the 
Somali intervention?; and How did the end of the Cold War affect their decision- 
making and actions in the operations? 
This chapter is mainly divided into four sections. The first section 
introduces background knowledge of the Somali crisis. It is important to 
comprehend post-World War II Somalia to examine why the crisis erupted and 
how it developed. The second section answers the first and second research 
question within the analytical framework focusing on agency. It specifies the 
decisive factors of the failure. The third clarifies the effects of the structural factor 
on the actors in the Somali crisis. It draws upon the interrelationship between the 
agential and structural factors of the failure in Somalia. And finally, the last 
concludes this chapter. 
3.1. The Background of the Somali Crisis 
The Somali people are ethnically, culturally, linguistically, and religiously 
homogeneous. For a long time, Somalis have lived scattered sparsely over the 
region, which is called the Horn of Africa. Nearly all Somali people speak Somali 
and are Muslim. These facts, however, do not mean that they 
have been in unity in 
terms of political and social context. Though there is no clear consensus on the 
divisions of the clans and sub-clans, the following five are recognised as major 
clans of Somalis: Darod, Dir, Hawiye, 
Issaq, and Rahanweyn including Digillo 
These clans are divided into many sub-clans. As Shawcross 
(2000) points out, the 
main organizing units of Somali society are the clans 
(p. 67). People identify with 
their clan, not with the state. The basis of 
Somali society lies in the family, sub- 
clan, and clan system. 
Map 3.1 on the next page shows the distribution and 
10 Some recognise Digil as a sub-clan of the Rahanweyn whereas others 
list the Digil as a 
separate clan from the 
Rahanweyn. 
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boundaries of Somali clan groups during the years 1991 to 1994. 
i" 
/ERITREA 
(Mayall 1996: 96) 
Three fifths of the Somali people live as nomads or semi-nomads in harsh and dry 
desert area (Shawcross 2000: 67). Thus, family and clan are crucial units for their 
social and cultural life, and eventually the units have come to play an important 
role in Somali politics. As Figure 3.1 (p. 56) shows, all the political movements in 
Somalia are based on the divisions of the clans. It is clear that the roots of the 
conflicts and civil war since 
decolonisation definitely lie in this Somali clan system. 
Map 3.1: Somalia 
56 
Figure 3.1: Political Movements and Clans in Somalia 
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"! n August 1992 Aidid's branch of the USC and Jess's branch of the SPM joined to form the Somali National Alliance (SNA). 
(Ramsbotham and Woodhouse 1996: 194) 
Somalia became an independent state in 1960 by combining the former 
British and Italian colonial areas in the Horn of Africa. Though Somalis constitute 
a single government, three regions of Somali clan groups remained outside the 
republic: the Ogaden region of Ethiopia, the north-eastern province of Kenya, and 
Djibouti, at that time still ruled directly by France. Successive Somali governments 
failed to secure the return of the lost territories by diplomacy. It caused small-scale 
border wars in 1963 and 1967, in which Somalia was unsuccessful. In 1969, after 
nine difficult years as a Muslim republic, General Mohammed Siad Barre took 
power by coup d'etat, which temporarily stabilised the regional conflict. He began 
to establish a Marxist-Leninist dictatorship in cooperation with the Soviet Union. 
Somalis suffered a standard of living ranked as one of the lowest in world, yet their 
nation was strategically important in terms of geopolitics. The horn of Africa is 
placed at a strategic point along the route to the Suez Canal, which has been used 
as a key gate from the Indian Ocean to Europe. Barre used this to his advantage by 
receiving huge amounts of aid, arms, and military equipment from the Soviet 
Union in the early 1970s, and then from the United States after Moscow switched 
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support to his rival, Ethiopia, in 1977 (Lewis and Mayall 1996: 95-8). 
Siad Barre ruled by force for 20 years during the Cold War. He suppressed 
clan loyalty by forcing fealty to himself in a single-party structure while 
manipulating clan rivalry through the distribution of weapons and other benefits 
based on affiliation with his clan. Somalia's history and nomadic, clan-based 
society are not conducive to nation-state organization (Lewis and Mayall 1996: 
103-4). According to Kaldor (1999), there was no rule of law and no public control 
of violence because Somali society had no civil society to protect itself from social 
violence. Thus, despite the growth of humanitarian and human rights organizations, 
nothing was done to stop the tragedies in Somalia (p. 204). 
Civil war erupted during the 1980s and worsened between 1989 and 1990; 
and on January 26,1991, Barre fled Mogadishu. After a few months two Hawiye 
clan warlords, All Mahdi Mohammed and General Mohammed Farah Hassan Aidid, 
became locked in an inconclusive battle for control of Mogadishu. Struggles 
among other factions and subclans occurred elsewhere in the country. In May, 
northern Somalia declared independence. Once Barre's authoritarian rule was 
broken, the already fragile unity of Southern Somalia also collapsed, as did state 
institutions. The United Somali Congress (USC), formed in spring 1989, drove 
Siad Barre from Mogadishu in January 1991. Having ousted Siad, two USC 
Hawiye leaders, General Aidid and Ali Mahdi11, could not agree on how to share 
power. This conflict between the two factions, which were the most 
heavily armed 
and dangerous militia based on traditional and loyal clan groups, split 
Mogadishu 
into two armed camps polarised along clan lines, causing an estimated 14,000 
people to be killed, and another 30,000 to 
be wounded. During the conflict, as 
many as 300,000 people perished 
from famine, and 700,000 became refugees in 
Kenya, Ethiopia and to a lesser extent in Yemen, Europe, Scandinavia and North 
America (Wheeler 2000: 174). 
A United Nations document (1994) illustrates what happened in 1991: 
11Ali Mahdi represented the original Hawiye inhabitants of Mogadishu and 
Aidid was a 
leader of a branch of the USC (United 
Somali Congress) linked with the Issagi SNM 
(Somali National Movement) in the north 
(Lewis and Mayall 1996: 106). 
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Despite the turmoil that ensued after the overthrow of President Siad Barre [January 
1991], the United Nations continued its humanitarian efforts in Somalia, and by 
March 1991 was fully engaged in that country. Over the following months, the 
volatile security situation forced the United Nations on several occasions to 
temporarily withdraw its personnel from Somalia, but it continued its humanitarian 
activities to the fullest extent possible, in cooperation with the International 
Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. The deteriorating 
and appalling situation in Somalia led the United Nations Secretary-General, in 
cooperation with the Organization of African Unity (OAU), the League of Arab 
States (LAS) and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), to become 
actively involved in the political aspects of the crisis and to press for a peaceful 
settlement. (United Nations 1994: 98) 
The international community's full-scale intervention in Somalia began in 
April 1992 and ended in March 1995. After some difficult negotiations between 
UN Special Envoy James Jonah and Aidid and Ali Mahdi, in March 1992 a 
ceasefire was agreed at UN headquarters. The ceasefire agreement enabled the 
resumption of humanitarian relief by the international community. However, 
fighting and plundering between various factions seeking to control ports and 
distribution routes became an important factor in the political economy of the 
militia, and put the international relief agents in jeopardy greatly reducing the 
effectiveness of aid deliveries. Security became a critical issue for the humanitarian 
relief operations of the UN and NGOs (Lewis and Mayall 1996: 108; Wheeler 
2000: 175). In order to help provide the security needed to deliver food and other 
relief services and supplies the United Nations deployed peacekeeping troops 
pursuant to UN Security Council Resolution 751 (1992). But, despite the airlift and 
the presence of U. N. troops, hundreds of thousands of Somalis died. The 
international community became more eager to intervene in Somalia. Operation 
Restore Hope began on 9 December 1992, which was a largely U. S. -run and 
manned operation under UN auspices. 
By mid-January 1993, U. S. troop levels 
peaked at around 25,000. 
France, Belgium, Saudi Arabia, Canada, Pakistan, and 
other UN member states also 
deployed troops in the name of the United Task Force 
(UNITAF) following a UN Security Council request. 
59 
The turning point came on October 3,1993, when two US helicopters were 
shot down, eighteen US soldiers were killed, and eighty-four were wounded in a 
single engagement with a hostile Somali militia led by General Aidid. This debacle 
stirred up public opinion in the U. S. and the Clinton Administration eventually 
called for U. S. troop withdrawal from Somalia under the pressure from the anxious 
public and congress. UN Security Council Resolution 954 (1994) also ordered the 
complete withdrawal of all peacekeepers by March 1995. 
3.2. Black Hawk Down and the Failures of the Operation 
Many observers conclude that the failings of UN operations in Somalia were due to 
failures of leadership between both the heads of government of the permanent 
members of the Security Council, and the Secretary-General's office. According to 
Wheeler (2000), the United States was `not prepared to pay the price of nation 
building and was eager to hand over to the UN as soon as possible'. Whereas to 
U. S. leaders the efforts to bring peace to Somalia meant feeding starving people, to 
the UN Secretary-General it also included warlord hunting. In addition, the 
participants in the intervention, particularly the U. S., lacked strategic consideration 
about the short- and long-term goals of humanitarian intervention (pp. 205-7). 
Ramsbotham and Woodhouse (1996) point out that a tension between the U. S. - 
dominated headquarters of UNOSOM and European and Commonwealth 
commanders was a critical cause of the failure (pp. 213-4). In this sense, Weiss' 
(1994) argument is absolutely right: the Somali case illustrates a situation in which 
the U. S. and its Western allies `have not systematically prepared UN operations, 
with the result that symbols dwarf effective action' 
(p. 143). 
The explanations above from many observers are rationally acceptable. The 
decision-makers of the U. S. government and UN failed to systematically prepare 
the operations in Somalia, to cope with the public 
`back-draft' on the unexpected 
fatalities of their personnel, and to strategically consider their aims in Somalia. 
However, this chapter mainly argues that what they explain is not a decisive factor 
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of the failures. All the failings were fundamentally caused by the U. S. and UN 
leaders' misuse of peacekeeping techniques in circumstances that peacekeeping 
operations could not cope with and the fact that rather well-prepared peace- 
enforcement actions were required from the initial stage of the armed intervention. 
As Boutros-Ghali (1992) clearly defines in An Agenda for Peace (1992), 
peacekeeping is the deployment of a UN presence `with the consent of all the 
parties concerned' acting as a `neutral intervener' (p. 475). Neutrality and the 
consent of parties are the key conditions for successful peacekeeping operations. 
The decision-makers misconceived the nature of the mission in Somalia 
disregarding these key conditions. Consequently, soldiers in the field had to 
conduct coercive military operations within peacekeeping techniques, facilities, 
and rule of engagement. This misconception and misuse led the Somali mission 
into a hotbed of armed conflict against Somali factions and eventually caused the 
accident, the so-called `Black Hawk Down', which was a precipitating event 
causing the frustration of the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia. 
Here I raise a question: why did `Black Hawk Down' take place? Before 
answering this question, it is necessary to understand what happened beforehand. 
As mentioned earlier, the international community began to intervene in Somalia 
on a full scale from April 1992 under the UN's authority. On 24 April 1992, the 
Security Council adopted Resolution 751 (1992), establishing UNOSOM I (United 
Nations Operation in Somalia I) with a mandate to restore peace and protect 
humanitarian relief operations. The resolution states as follows: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
2. Decides to establish under its authority, and in support of the Secretary-General 
in accordance with paragraph 7 below, a 
United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM); 
3. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United 
Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu [... ]; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General as part of his continuing mission in Somalia to 
facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a 
cease-fire throughout the country 
in order to promote the process of reconciliation 
and political settlement 
in Somalia and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance; 
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13. Calls upon the international community to support, with financial and other 
resources, the implementation of the 90-day Plan of Action for Emergency 
Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia; [... ] (United Nations Security Council 1992g) 
On 23 June, the Secretary-General informed the Security Council that both 
principal factions in Mogadishu had agreed to the deployment of the unarmed 
observers (United Nations 1996b). As Tripodi (1999) points out, after Resolution 
751 (1992), international society became more eager to participate in the operations 
in Somalia (p. 140). The initial UN operation in Somalia came under the category of 
peacekeeping and partly peacemaking. With the `consent' of major factions, the 
mission conducted the monitoring of the cease-fire in Mogadishu, support for the 
humanitarian assistance of the UN and NGOs, and continued consultations with 
warring factions to restore peace in Somalia (United Nations Security Council 
1992e). 
As time passed, the mission lost neutrality, which is one of the key features 
of peacekeeping operations, and was transformed into a kind of peace-enforcement 
differing from peacekeeping. According to Wheeler (2000), `the Secretary-General 
wanted quicker results in Somalia and was pushing for a more forcible response to 
the crisis' (p. 177). For this, the UN needed stronger legal support for the 
peacekeepers based on Chapter VII of the Charter, which gives authority to the 
Security Council in deciding `necessary actions and measures' without the consent 
of the parties in conflict. On 3 December 1992, the Security Council unanimously 
adopted Resolution 794 (1992), which aimed to create a secure environment 
for the 
delivery of humanitarian aid in Somalia and authorized, under Chapter VII, the use 
of `all necessary means' to do so. Resolution 
794 (1992) asked the United States to 
provide military forces and to make contributions 
in cash or kind for the operation: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
7. Endorses the recommendation by the Secretary-General in his letter of 29 
November 1992 (S/24868) that action under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United 
Nations should be taken in order to establish a secure environment 
for humanitarian 
relief operations in Somalia as soon as possible; 
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8. Welcomes the offer by a Member State described in the Secretary-General's 
letter to the Council of 29 November 1992 (S/24868) concerning the establishment 
of an operation to create such a secure environment; [... ] 
10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the 
Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to 
in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia; 
11. Calls on all Member States which are in a position to do so to provide 
military forces and to make additional contributions, in cash or in kind, in 
accordance with paragraph 10 above [... ]; [... ] (United Nations Security Council 
1992c). 
With President-elect Bill Clinton's support, President George Bush, Sr. responded 
with a decision on 4 December 1992 to initiate Operation Restore Hope, under 
which the US would assume the unified command of the new operation in 
accordance with the resolution. 
After the adoption of Council Resolution 794 in December 1992, the 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) had deployed approximately 37,000 troops in 
southern and central Somalia, covering approximately 40 per cent of the country's 
territory. UNITAF had a positive impact on the security situation in Somalia and 
on the effective delivery of humanitarian assistance. However, despite those 
improvements, a secure environment had not yet been established, and incidents of 
violence continued. There was still no effective functioning government in the 
country, no organized civilian police and no disciplined national army. The security 
threat to personnel of the United Nations, UNITAF, and NGOs was still high in 
areas of Mogadishu and elsewhere in Somalia. Moreover, there was no deployment 
of UNITAF or UNOSOM I troops to the northeast and northwest, or along the 
Kenyan-Somali border, where security continued to be a matter of grave concern 
(United Nations 1998; Lewis and Mayall 1996: 114). 
On 19 December 1992, the Secretary-General presented to the Security 
Council a report in which he described actions taken to implement Resolution 794 
(1992) and set out his thinking on a new mandate for UNOSOM I and the transition 
of UNITAF. The 
Secretary-General thought that a more effective mandate and 
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expanded military tasks endowed with enforcement powers were needed to 
establish a secure environment throughout Somalia (United Nations 1998). To that 
end, the Security Council established UNOSOM II by Resolution 814 on 26 March 
1993, which took over from UNOSOM I and UNITAF, following 
recommendations by the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993. The responsibility of 
UNOSOM II, in broad terms, was to complete, through disarmament and 
reconciliation, the task begun by UNITAF for the restoration of peace, stability, 
law, and order in Somalia (Abiew 1999: 164). By May 1993, responsibility for 
U. S. -led Operation Restore Hope had been passed on to the UN through UNOSOM 
II as well. As Weiss and Collins (2000) point out, UNOSOM II was the `first 
armed Chapter VII humanitarian operation' under UN mandate and authority (p. 83). 
The operation took a turn for the worse with the UN mandate expanding to 
peace-enforcement, which involved disarming the factions and arresting 
uncooperative faction leaders. The mandate generated the hostility of a few clan 
leaders, fearful of losing their power, towards UNOSOM. They had not only 
refused to disarm, but they had resorted to violence in order to frustrate the efforts 
of UNOSOM II. On 5 June 1993,25 Pakistani soldiers were killed, 10 went 
missing and 54 were wounded in a series of ambushes and armed attacks against 
UNOSOM II troops throughout south Mogadishu by Somali militiamen, apparently 
belonging to the United Somali Congress/Somali National Alliance (USC/SNA) 
led by General Aidid. The bodies of the victims were mutilated and subjected to 
other forms of degrading treatment (United Nations 1998). 
Following the event of June 1993, UNOSOM II pursued a coercive 
disarmament programme in south Mogadishu. Active patrolling, weapon 
confiscations, and operations against USC/SNA militia depots were undertaken, 
together with a public information campaign to ensure that the population 
understood UNOSOM activities. In the course of this, the search for Aidid led to 
the deaths of many Somalis, UN peacekeeping forces, and even foreign journalists. 
The violence intensified until early October when U. S. forces suffered heavy 
casualties in an operation. 
Bill Clinton (2004) clearly states in his autobiography that after the accident 
of June 1993, Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and 
his representative for Somalia, 
64 
retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, decided to arrest Aidid, believing the UN mission 
could not succeed without capturing him (p. 550). At the time, the UN was not a 
peacekeeper any more, but a party of conflict warring against USC/SNA led by 
General Aidid. The UN peacekeepers would not be able to apprehend him, because 
they were not suitable to conduct such an operation requiring highly skilled and 
trained performance, and Aidid was well protected by heavily armed forces. Thus, 
the UN needed United States' help, which was then asked for. Clinton (2004) 
illustrates the situation in detail: 
Admiral Howe [the representative of the Secretary-General for Somalia] was 
convinced, [... ], that arresting Aidid and putting him on trial was the only way to 
end the clan-based conflicts [... ]. [... ] Colin Powell came to me with a 
recommendation that I approve a parallel American effort to capture Aidid, though 
he thought we had only a 50 percent chance of getting him, with a 25 percent chance 
of getting him alive. [... ] Repeated UN failures to capture Aidid had only raised his 
status and tarnished the humanitarian nature of the UN mission. I agreed (p. 550). 
To apprehend Aidid, it was essential to capture two of Aidid's top aides, 
who were suspected of complicity in the 5 June attack as well as subsequent attacks 
on United Nations personnel and facilities. The raid on 3 October 1993, with a 
code name `Irene', resulted in the `Black Hawk Down' incident. Why did it 
happen? There was no expectation that the raid would result in disaster. The raid 
team consisted of highly trained U. S. Army Rangers and Delta Forces, and their 
target was relatively poorly equipped Somali militia. The reason was that the field 
commanders of U. S. troops failed to conduct the operation with appropriate 
strategic consideration. They focused on military tactics without considering the 
political context as a peace operation. 
On 3 October 1993, Major General William 
Garrison, the American commander of the Rangers, ordered the Army Rangers and 
Delta Forces to capture Aidid's key aides. The operation was conducted in daylight, 
because the troops had carried out three previous daylight operations successfully. 
Carrying it out in the daytime meant that Garrison underestimated the military 
ability of Aidid's militia. 
It was a critical cause of the failure. One of the renowned 
military strategists 
in human history, Clausewitz (1976), says that `the act of attack 
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[in military operation], particularly in strategy, is [... ] a constant alternation and 
combination of attack and defense' (p. 524). A military operation, even if it is to 
capture some personnel of the enemy, is absolutely different from a SWAT assault 
to apprehend drug users. General Garrison and his assistant commanders should 
have prepared for the possibility that US troops would need to defend themselves 
against Aidid's militia. Without considering the possibility of aggressive 
counterattack, they commanded the mission in daylight in the expectation that the 
operation would succeed without encountering much opposition. Eventually, the 
U. S. troops were humbled by a small African militia. 
As Garrison stated in his letter to Clinton (2004), the mission was a success 
in terms of military operation because `targeted individuals were captured and 
extracted from the target... ' (p. 553). It is true in that sense. The US troops 
succeeded in apprehending twenty-four suspects, including two key aides to 
General Aidid. It was not, however, a success at all in terms of the context of a 
peace operation. During the course of the operation, two United States helicopters, 
UH-60 Black Hawk, were shot down by Somali militiamen's rocket-propelled 
grenades. While evacuating the twenty-four USC/SNA detainees, the Rangers 
came under concentrated fire. Eighteen United States soldiers lost their lives and 
eighty-four were wounded. One United States helicopter pilot was captured and 
subsequently released on 14 October 1993 (United Nations 1998). It became a 
turning point in the peace operations of the UN and U. S. because although 
hundreds of Somalis were killed in the encounter, the perception was of U. S. 
failure (Haass 1999: 45-6). There were 1,700 U. S. combat troops in Somalia at the 
time, backed up by helicopters, gunships, and armoured vehicles. Heavy casualties 
of U. S. forces in the operation definitely undermined its military supremacy against 
Aidid's militia. With regard to the supremacy of the equipment and firepower of 
the U. S. troops, the accident was almost a disaster. Clinton (2004) points out 
exactly why the operation was eventually perceived as a 
failure: 
In wartime, the risks would have been acceptable. On a peacekeeping mission, they 
were not, because the value of the prize was not worth the risk of significant 
casualties and the certain consequences of changing the nature of our mission 
in the 
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eyes of both Somalis and Americans (p. 553). 
Clinton's argument is right. Consequently, `Black Hawk Down' was a 
symbolic and decisive event, which led to the failure of the UN's peace operation 
in Somalia. The accident stirred up public opinion in the U. S. and eventually 
caused the withdrawal of U. S. troops from Somalia. Following Black Hawk Down, 
U. S. public opinion was exposed to the horrifying television images of a dead 
soldier being dragged through the streets of Mogadishu by an angry Somali crowd 
and pictures of a captured U. S. airman. U. S. Republican Senator John McCain 
received a letter from a father, who lost his son in Somalia: 
American soldiers have always been prepared to give their lives for the safety and 
security of this nation; without a higher purpose for such sacrifice, their deaths 
would be pointless and hollow (cited in Ramsbotham and Woodhouse, 1996: 213). 
The U. S. Administration decided to disengage from the difficult and hostile 
operations in Somalia. President Clinton declared his intention to withdraw U. S. 
troops within six months. On 14 October, he told a White House news conference 
that `the United States being a police officer in Somalia was turned into the waging 
of conflict and a highly personalised battle which undermined the political process. 
That is what was wrong, and that is what we attempted to correct in the last few 
days' (Friedman 1993). In the period between October 1993 and March 1994, most 
military units left Somalia. As the withdrawal accelerated, military support 
provided by UNOSOM troops to United Nations agencies, human rights 
organizations and NGOs still engaged in humanitarian activities was greatly 
reduced. At the end of 1994,18,000 UN troops were still deployed in Somalia, 
mostly from African and Asian countries. In March 1995, the last Pakistani and 
Bengali `blue helmets' left Somalia permanently (United Nations 1998). 
The next question to answer is that: what were the mistakes of the UN and U. S. 
decision-makers in the Somali intervention? First of all, UN and U. S. leaders of the 
mission had made a mistake 
by isolating Aidid from the political process and by 
becoming so obsessed with tracking him down. They did not consider Aidid to be a 
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party to their peacekeeping operation, but rather a hindrance to a successful 
mission to restore peace and security in Somalia. This had not been the case at the 
initial stage of the intervention. In early January 1992, Mr. James Jonah, the Under- 
Secretary-General for Special Political Affairs, visited Somalia with senior UN 
officials as a peacemaking mission. During the talks between the mission delegates 
and the faction leaders, most of the leaders agreed to support a cease-fire in 
Mogadishu except General Aidid (United Nations 1996a: 288). It was usual at that 
stage of a peacemaking process that some parties of conflict do not cooperate with 
the negotiator. Despite Aidid's uncooperative attitude, the UN and U. S. had 
recognised Aidid as a partner for their mission up until June 1993 when Somali 
militiamen attacked Pakistani peacekeepers. The recognition had worked in a sense. 
`Report of the Security Council Mission to Somalia on 26 and 27 October 1994' 
states as follows: 
He [the Special Representative of the UN SG in Somalia, Ambassador Gbeho] felt 
that one solution to the question of participation might be for both sides [Mahdi and 
Aidid] to agree to set up a credentials committee as is often customary with 
conferences. This idea apparently was acceptable to Mr. Ali Mahdi but not to 
General Aidid (United Nations Security Council 1994a: 3). 
After the June attack against Pakistani peacekeepers, the UN had become sceptical 
about Aidid's intentions, because they suspected that Aidid's militiamen were 
complicit in the attack. The UN had started to think that Aidid was not only being 
cooperative with the UN in order to restore peace and stability in Somalia, but also 
to gain control over Somalia through the UN's mission plan. The mission report on 
26 and 27 October 1994 continues to state: 
The Special Representative [Ambassador Gbeho] was concerned that General Aidid 
would unilaterally proceed with convening a national reconciliation conference on 1 
November and declare a Government, which in his assessment, would invite 
renewed fighting (United Nations 
Security Council 1994a: 3). 
The UN agreed that the mission had been conducted with a lack of Somali 
cooperation over security 
issues (United Nations Security Council 1994a: 10). In 
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other words, the UN decided to proceed with the Somali mission without consent 
and cooperation from Aidid. It means that the mission cannot be recognised as a 
peacekeeping operation, which essentially needs the consent of all the parties 
concerned. The idea to remove Aidid from the table of negotiation was a big 
mistake because one of the critical principles for successful peacekeeping 
operations is neutrality. In this sense, Kaplan (2002)'s argument is worthy of 
mention: 
Western policymakers believe that dictators can be defeated merely by removing 
them. The nineteenth-century Swiss historian Jacob Burckhardt writes: Like bad 
physicians, they thought to cure the disease by removing the symptoms, and fancied 
that if the tyrant were put to death, freedom would follow of itself. " [... ] But because 
the dictators themselves were manifestations of bad social and economic 
development, their removal frequently permitted the same uncivil practices to 
continue in democratic clothing; [... ] (pp. 6-7). 
If the UN and U. S. personnel believed that they were working as peacekeepers, 
they should have negotiated with Aidid even in the presence of any kind of 
difficulties, not converted their mission into a `cops-and-robbers operation' or even 
`war-fighting'. 
Then, why did they fail to keep the neutrality in the mission? An ancient 
military strategist, Sun-Tzu 12, explains that `in war the "highest excellence" is 
never having to fight, for the commencement of battle signifies a political failure'. 
He states that `the best way to avoid war - the violent result of political failure - is 
to think "strategically"' (cited in Kaplan 2002: 41-2). The transformation of the 
Somali mission of the UN and U. S. from initially peacemaking and then 
peacekeeping to peace-enforcement warring against a party of conflict poses a 
question about whether the political decision-makers and 
field commanders of the 
intervention had `strategic' consideration for their mission. To put this differently, 
12 He was a great philosopher and military strategist of ancient China 
in the late third 
century B. C. His renowned work, 
The Art of Warfare, may represent the accumulated 
wisdom of many people who experienced 
that chaotic period of ancient Chinese history. 
Kaplan (2002) states that `there is arguably no work of philosophy in which knowledge 
and experience are so pungently condensed as 
Sun-Tzu's The Art of Warfare' (p. 41). 
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they misconceived who they were and what they could and should not do as 
peacekeepers. That is why U. S. troops and UN peacekeepers had fought against 
Somali militia conducting peace-enforcement missions, which do not need to be 
neutral and do not require the consent of all the parties of conflict. 
Another question needs to be raised. What factor affected their 
misconception? My answer is clear: a structural factor that was the end of the Cold 
War. To say this more precisely, the misunderstanding was caused by a new 
paradigm of the early post-Cold War period. Regarding this new paradigm, the 
next section explores how the demise of the Cold War rivalry affected the 
perception and actions of UN and U. S. decision-makers relating to peace 
operations in the post-Cold War era. In this sense, the next section provides a 
linking explanation of the interrelation of the causal factors within the agential and 
structural perspective. 
3.3 A New Paradigm of the Early Post-Cold War Era 
The superpower rivalry of the Cold War arose in the wake of the Second World 
War, between two rigidly hostile blocs, one led by the Soviet Union, and the other 
by the United States. For more than five decades this antagonism was not only a 
competition for political and military hegemony but also a rivalry between 
communism and liberal democracy. It was evident that the international system of 
the Cold War was a bipolar system. With the disappearance of the bipolar system 
following the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Empire, at least 
two competing models have emerged. One is a unipolar system that is projected by 
the United States, the other is much more diffused and plural system, in other 
words multipolar system, in that several 
different powers or groupings of powers 
compete or coexist with each other, without any one 
being predominant in relation 
to the others. Though the debate is still in dispute in some points, it is obvious that 
the end of the Cold War and the subsequent nearly complete withdrawal of the 
Soviet Union from the international arena left the United States as the world's 
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supreme power. 
At the moment of the Cold War's end and during the few years succeeding 
it, there emerged a reaction to the implication of U. S. supremacy for the post-Cold 
War international order. It was the optimists who thought its historical significance 
lay in the new opportunity for a more liberally democratised international 
community. One of the key advocates is Francis Fukuyama. He claims in his 
controversial article, `The End of History? ' (1989), that the end of the Cold War 
stands for `the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the 
universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of human 
government' (p. 2). This does not mean that the nature of human civilisation has 
ended but does mean the triumph of the Western idea, liberal democracy, against 
`absolutism, then bolshevism and fascism, and finally an updated Marxism' (p. 1). 
Despite some academics who still raise a question about whether the triumph of 
liberal democracy against Marxism is genuine in terms of human philosophy, the 
effect of his claim on Western society was vast. Many academics and political 
leaders of the West believed that they had won the Cold War and the victory 
belonged to the idea of liberal democracy. Gorbachev's perestroika, which means 
`reform', no doubt provided a rallying point for the claim and belief. As Kissinger 
(1994) points out, perestroika was firmly based on the belief that `liberalization 
would modernize the Soviet Union' (p. 795). As even the Soviet Union accepted 
liberal democracy as their political creed, the Western world was convinced of the 
triumph of liberal democracy. The former U. S. President, George Bush, Sr., was 
assured of the idea in his address to a joint session of Congress on 6 March 1991: 
Now we can see a new world coming into view. A world in which there is the very 
real prospect of a new world order. In the words of Winston Churchill, a "world 
order" in which "the principles of justice and fair play ... protect the weak against 
the strong... " [... ] A world in which freedom and respect for human rights find a 
home among all nations (cited in Gardner 1992: 31). 
Gorbachev's successor, Boris Yeltsin, also supported the idea that post-Communist 
Russia ought to be transformed into a liberal and democratic regime. In the United 
Nations Security Council Summit Opening Addresses on 31 January 1992, he 
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stated that: 
[n]ow we must accomplish the most difficult task. That is the creation of legal, 
political, and socio-economic guarantees to make democratic changes irreversible ... Our principles are clear and simple: primacy of democracy, human rights and 
freedoms, legal and moral standards [... ] (cited in Abiew 1999: 141). 
Some academics shared with political leaders the belief in the liberal triumph. 
Chris Brown argued that `the end of Cold War' was seen as `ushering in an 
(indefinite) period of world dominance by forces which ... could be seen as 
"liberal"' (cited in Clark 2001: 19). Rabie (1992) claims that the end of the Cold 
War ought to be considered as being the result of exposing the limits of communist 
ideology and its social forces. The collapse of the communist alliance has inspired 
the former president Bush to declare the victory of democracy and liberalism 
(p. 116). 
Here I answer the third question of this chapter: How has the end of the 
Cold War affected UN and U. S. decision-making and actions in the Somalia 
operation? Understandings and attitudes toward liberal democratic victory do not 
lead to the `Western liberal order', as Clark (2001) labels it (p. 23). To design a new 
order, actual policies need to be implemented by international organization or 
superpowers, such as the UN and the United States respectively. First of all, I 
examine how the UN and U. S. had shaped their policy in terms of Western liberal 
order and then explore the effects of the new approach on the Somalia mission. 
Some U. S. presidents, such as Jimmy Carter, proclaimed the desire to 
project political democracy and the idea of liberalism into foreign policy. George 
Bush, Sr., however, was the first president who could achieve this desire 
throughout the world in terms of the changed international environment. In the 
Cold War period spreading the desire over the globe meant a total war between the 
Soviet and Western bloc or at least severe conflicts that could cause political or 
military damage to both of them. This `mutual destructive structure' had changed 
as the end of the Cold War got rid of one side. In 
his inaugural address in 1989, 
Bush strongly proclaimed that: 
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[... ] The totalitarian era is passing, its old ideas blown away like leaves from an 
ancient, lifeless tree. A new breeze is blowing, and a nation refreshed by freedom 
stands ready to push on. There is new ground to be broken, and new action to be 
taken. [... ] Great nations of the world are moving toward democracy through the 
door to freedom. Men and women of the world move toward free markets through 
the door to prosperity. The people of the world agitate for free expression and free 
thought through the door to the moral and intellectual satisfactions that only liberty 
allows. We know what works: Freedom works. We know what's right: Freedom is 
right. We know how to secure a more just and prosperous life for man on Earth: 
through free markets, free speech, free elections, and the exercise of free will 
unhampered by the state. For the first time in this century, for the first time in 
perhaps all history, man does not have to invent a system by which to live. [... ] We 
must act on what we know (Bush 1989). 
The international society positively responded to this attitude. In a Security Council 
Summit meeting at the level of Heads of States and Government on 31 January 
1992, leaders of the Security Council Member states referred to human rights as an 
issue of concern for the international community (Abiew 1999: 140). In the 
meeting they agreed that `the non-military sources of instability in the economic, 
social, humanitarian and ecological fields' also `have become threats to peace and 
security' in the age of new challenges and urged the United Nations `to play a 
central role' to make `rapid progress, in many regions of the world, towards 
democracy and responsive forms of government' and to constitute a major 
contribution `to the encouragement of respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms' (United Nations Security Council 1992b). The UN's response was more 
concrete. A Secretary-General report, An Agenda for Peace (1992), was a clear 
picture of guidance for international action outlining the UN's ideas on the issues 
of preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. It was 
an attempt to integrate the concerns of states for international order with the 
concerns of human rights and justice. In the report, Boutros-Ghali states as follows: 
81. Democracy within nations requires respect for human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, as set forth in the Charter. It requires as well a deeper understanding and 
respect for the rights of minorities and respect for the needs of the more vulnerable 
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groups of society [... ]. The social stability needed for productive growth is nurtured 
by conditions in which people can readily express their will. For this, strong 
domestic institutions of participation are essential. Promoting such institutions 
means promoting the empowerment of the unorganized, the poor, the marginalized. 
To this end, the focus of the United Nations should be on the "field", the locations 
where economic, social and political decisions take effect. In furtherance of this I am 
taking steps to rationalize and in certain cases integrate the various programmes and 
agencies of the United Nations within specific countries (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 496). 
This movement toward a liberal and democratic world order was strongly 
supported by the Clinton Administration. Clinton had pursued more ambitious 
objectives than Bush or any other international political leader in terms of shaping 
the world with democracy and human rights. The former secretary of state of the 
second Clinton term, Albright (2003), points out that since 1993 `the Clinton 
administration approved a new policy toward Central and East Europe designed to 
bolster democracy, reduce trade barriers, and reward nations undertaking economic 
reform' (p. 167). `A new policy' in her statement does not mean what it means 
literally. It is a brand-new approach opting for the changed context of the post-Cold 
War era. It is clear that Clinton not only signed up for the idea of the `new world 
order', but also added others that amounted to a considerably more ambitious 
agenda. 
Then, what does the `new world order' stand for? How is it related to the 
Somali intervention? By looking at the way in which terms are used in speeches, 
we can learn about the nature of Clinton's foreign policy and the new world order. 
Warren Christopher was the Secretary of State of the first Clinton term from 1993 
to 1997. He was also the transition chief to President-elect Clinton in 1992. He is, 
hence, one of the key persons who can tell us exactly how foreign policy of the 
Clinton Administration was. In remarks at the World Conference on Human Rights 
on 14 June 1993 at Vienna, 
he proclaimed that American foreign policy stood up 
for democracy and human rights: 
[... ] America's identity as a nation derives from out dedication to the proposition 
"that all men are created equal and endowed by their Creator with certain 
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unalienable rights". Over the course of two centuries, Americans have found that 
advancing democratic values and human rights serves our deepest values as well as 
our practical interests. That is why the United States stands with the men and women 
everywhere who are standing up for these principles. And that is why President 
Clinton has made reinforcing democracy and protecting human rights a pillar of our 
foreign policy - and a major focus of our foreign assistance programs. Democracy is 
the moral and strategic imperative for the 1990s. Democracy will build safeguards 
for human rights in every nation. Democracy is the best way to advance lasting 
peace and prosperity in the world. [... ] In this post-Cold War era, we are at a new 
moment. Our agenda for freedom must embrace every prisoner of conscience, every 
victim of torture, every individual denied basic human rights. It must also encompass 
the democratic movements that have changed the political map of our globe. The 
great new focus of our agenda for freedom is this: expanding, consolidating and 
defending democratic progress around the world. It is democracy that establishes the 
civil institutions that replace the power of oppressive regimes. Democracy is the best 
means not just to gain - but to guarantee - human rights. [... ] Today, the global 
movement from despotism to democracy is transforming entire political systems and 
opening freedom's door to whole societies. The end of the Cold War is the most 
uplifting event for human rights [... ]. [... ] President Clinton is determined to meet 
the challenge of leadership - to tip the world balance in favor of 
freedom. [... ] My 
country will pursue human rights in our bilateral relations with all governments 
[... ]. 
[... ] American foreign policy will both reflect our fundamental values and promote 
our national interests. It must take into account our national security and economic 
needs at the same time that we pursue democracy and 
human rights. [... ] And we 
will assist militaries in finding constructive new roles 
in pursuit of peace and 
security - roles that respect 
human rights and contribute to international peace. [... ] 
(Christopher 1993). 
Clinton's first inaugural address also provided clues about his foreign policy: 
[... ] Today, a generation raised in the shadows of the Cold War assumes new 
responsibilities in a world warmed 
by the sunshine of freedom but threatened still by 
ancient hatreds and new plagues. 
[... ] Today, as an old order passes, the new world 
is more free but less stable. Communism's collapse 
has called forth old animosities 
and new dangers. [... 
] Together with our friends and allies, we will work to shape 
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change, lest it engulf us. When our vital interests are challenged, or the will and 
conscience of the international community is defied, we will act with peaceful 
diplomacy when ever possible, with force when necessary. The brave Americans 
serving our nation today in the Persian Gulf, in Somalia, and wherever else they 
stand are testament to our resolve. [... ] [o]ur greatest strength is the power of our 
ideas, which are still new in many lands. Across the world, we see them embraced- 
and we rejoice. Our hopes, our hearts, our hands, are with those on every continent 
who are building democracy and freedom. Their cause is America's cause (Clinton 
1993). 
Deprived of the restraints imposed by the Cold War, the Clinton Administration 
pursued an ambitious agenda in international relations, which could be identified 
with `internationalism' or `interventionism'. The critique of this agenda is normally 
labelled as `isolationism'. The history of American foreign policy has been laid 
between these two approaches. The Clinton Administration faced new challenges 
brought about by the end of the Cold War: the massive emergence of intra-state 
armed conflicts with intense hostility and the demand for forcible massive peace 
operations to tackle the conflicts. The administration's interventionism was their 
strategic reaction to the challenges. 
The ending of the Cold War has released waves of killing and destruction 
within national borders, not between states. There are three reasons. First, the 
demise of the Soviet Union has increased the number of `failed states', or `states 
that have descended into conditions of anarchy'. The removal of economic and 
political supports from the leader of the communist 
bloc has left some states, such 
as Somalia, incapable of maintaining their 
domestic political and social order. 
Second, the end of the East-West rivalry facilitated the break-up of multinational 
countries, such as the former 
Yugoslavia. The intra-state conflicts in those states 
were caused by historical, political, and religious passions and enmities, which 
had 
been kept under control during the Cold War period. After 198913 as the political 
and economic incentive 
from the leaders of each bloc, which was a useful tool to 
13 It is broadly recognised that the post-Cold 
War era started from 1989 because there was 
a summit meeting 
in Malta in December 1989 between Gorbachev and George Bush, Sr. 
(George H. W. Bush) to officially 
declare the Cold War over. 
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suppress ethnic forces, had been removed, ethnic concerns emerged and moved to 
the forefront of political discourse (Winnefeld at al. 1995: 12-3). Finally, the 
disruption of the balance of power caused the enhanced ability of many regional 
powers to acquire modern military equipment and technology. Arms controls under 
the Cold War rivalry went out of control after the demise of the rivalry. 
Following the political changes in the international system after the demise 
of the Cold War order and the development of a more cooperative spirit between 
the permanent members in the UN Security Council, the emergence of civil strife 
and of ethnic, nationalistic, and religious conflicts on an unprecedented scale 
moved the issue of forcible massive peace operations forwards on the international 
agenda. This kind of intervention was a challenge to the international community 
because it has been rarely experienced beforehand. During the Cold War, most of 
the multilateral responses of the international community to regional conflicts were 
`non-forcible' peacekeeping operations. Due to the political stalemate in the 
Security Council, the peacekeeping missions were limited to non-coercive roles 
such as helping maintain cease-fires already set up and monitoring elections. 
Along with the emphasis on human rights and democracy, the demand 
during the early post-Cold War era for more effective and massive armed peace 
operations was a difficult challenge to the United States, especially the Clinton 
Administration, because they were not ready to cope with the new kind of intra- 
state conflicts. They lacked strategic preparations in terms of their role in the 
conflicting area, what to do as peacekeepers, and how to achieve their short- and 
long-term goals. Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) is clear evidence of 
the strategic failure of the U. S. involvement in Somalia. Just after the painful 
incident, Black Hawk Down, in October 1993, President Clinton ordered a 
comprehensive inter-agency review of 
U. S. policies and programmes for UN 
peacekeeping operations. According to 
PDD 25, the main purpose of the review 
was to `develop a comprehensive policy 
framework suited to the realities of the 
post-Cold War period' 
(U. S. Department of State 1996). One of the key issues 
raised in PDD 25 
is the problem of `choices about which peace operations to 
support'. It states that although 
`peacekeeping can be a useful tool for advancing 
U. S. national security interests 
in some circumstances, but both U. S. and UN 
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involvement in peacekeeping must be selective and more effective'. It states: 
[... ] Peace operations should not be open-ended commitments but instead linked to 
concrete political solutions; otherwise, they normally should not be undertaken. To 
the greatest extent possible, each UN peace operation should have a specified 
timeframe tied to an intermediate or final objective, an integrated political/military 
strategy well-coordinated with humanitarian assistance efforts, specified troop levels, 
and a firm budget estimate. [... ] The Administration will continue to apply even 
stricter standards when it assesses whether to recommend to the President that U. S. 
personnel participate in a given peace operation. [... ] 
It became clear that before PDD 25 the U. S. government had no overall national 
policy or operational guidelines for their involvement in peace operations. In 1993, 
the administration drafted Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13), but this 
draft document was re-evaluated as the situation in Somalia grew worse and 
consequently replaced by PDD 25. Soon after that PDD 25 was issued by President 
Clinton in May 1994, the U. S. Army was called on to make major adjustments to 
the military engagements of U. S. troops in peace operations in accordance with 
PDD 25. The result was a field manual of the Department of the Army, dubbed as 
`FM 100-23 Peace Operations' in December 1994, which provides full guidance 
for U. S. solders and decision-makers who execute peace operations (See U. S. 
Department of the Army 1994). 
The former U. S. Ambassador to Somalia from 1987 to 1990, T. Frank 
Crigler (1993) commented on the failures in Somalia: 
But traditional-style UN peacekeeping has by no means always succeeded in keeping 
the peace much less in bringing an end to fighting when the parties themselves were 
unwilling to lay down their arms. In an increasingly disorderly and chaotic world, 
scrupulous respect for national sovereignty and the consent of parties in conflict has 
grown harder to rationalize. [... ] If the United States and the United Nations are to 
avoid becoming endlessly mired in the swamp that many predicted Somalia 
represented last year, the peace-enforcement experiment must 
be reformulated to 
meet the realities of the country, its people, and their problems (cited in Curtis 1994: 
182-3). 
78 
At every turn in modern history, victorious forces have claimed the right to design 
a new world order and have done so in a manner most conductive to achieving their 
objectives. Though in terms of the emphasis on democracy and human rights 
Clinton's new world order is manifested in different way from any other old orders, 
international relations in an order are designed to serve national interests and 
interact with various domestic interest groups. James Mayall (1996) states that `the 
idea that there could be an international humanitarian order, somehow divorced 
from strategic considerations, was an illusion, as become abundantly clear when 
the state collapsed in Yugoslavia and Somalia' (p. 7). 
3.4 The Transformation of Peacekeeping Missions into Peace- 
enforcement 
This chapter has argued the reasons that the UN and U. S. intervention in Somalia 
virtually failed. In terms of the agential perspective the failure of the mission was 
decisively caused by the incident, `Black Hawk Down'. Within the structural 
analytical framework, the ending of the Cold War was an underlying factor causing 
the frustration of the mission. How were these two events, Black Hawk Down and 
the end of the Cold War, related to each other? In what way was the underlying 
structural factor connected with the precipitating event? The UN and U. S. 
intervention in Somalia on a full scale began in April 1992 by the adoption of 
Security Council Resolution 751 (1992) establishing UNOSOM I and ended in 
March 1995 with the complete withdrawal of all peacekeepers ordered by 
Resolution 954 (1994). In this time sequence the key moment occurred on 26 
March 1993, when UNOSOM II was established by Resolution 814 (1993). Put 
another way, the transition from UNOSOM I and UNITAF to UNOSOM II is the 
logical linking point between the agential and structural explanation about the 
failings in Somalia. 
It is obvious that Black Hawk Down was a decisive event, which made the 
UN and U. S. mission unable to be completed by stirring up U. S. public opinion and 
then forcing the Clinton Administration to decide upon the withdrawal of their 
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troops from Somalia. The field commanders of U. S. troops failed to conduct the 
operation with appropriate strategic consideration. They might have approached the 
operation to apprehend General Aidid and his assistants very strategically in terms 
of military tactics but their strategic consideration lacked a political rumination on 
the context of their mission as a peace operation. The UN and U. S. leaders were 
fundamentally responsible for the mistake in the field because they converted the 
peacekeeping mission into a `cops-and-robbers operations' and eventually `war- 
fighting'. The Secretary-General and other senior officials in the Department of 
Peacekeeping Operations of the UN adhered to the notion that capturing Aidid 
could dramatically improve the situation in Somalia. The U. S. leaders were 
strongly supportive of their enthusiasm and agreed on a new plan in order to 
achieve their goals. That was the establishment of UNOSOM II transited from 
UNOSOM I and UNITAF. As Weiss and Colin (2000) specify, UNOSOM II was 
the `first armed Chapter VII humanitarian operation', which was absolutely 
different from ordinary UN peacekeeping missions. A critical problem of the 
transition was that the UN and U. S. were not ready to cope with the situation in 
Somalia in terms of peace-enforcement operations. They lacked information and 
intelligence on the military capability of Aidid's militia and more importantly the 
strategic consideration of the short- and long-term goals and how to achieve them. 
For example, to conduct a peace-enforcement mission requires a more 
sophisticated strategy than a peacekeeping operation in order to win the 
international and domestic support of interest groups, political opponents, and the 
public, because it could cause significant casualties. As Clinton (2004) states, on a 
peacekeeping mission the risks of significant casualties like in Somalia were not 
acceptable (p. 553). Consequently, after the transition the UN peacekeepers and U. S. 
troops in Somalia were not peacekeepers any more in terms of mission and 
mandate, but still remained within the peacekeeping context. That is why at that 
time the UN and U. S. became a party of the conflict warring against USC/SNA led 
by General Aidid with the name of peacekeepers. 
Then, why did the UN and U. S. decide the transition without the 
appropriate preparation for a peace-enforcement mission? More precisely, why did 
they naively reach the decision without noticing that they were not ready for it and 
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by misapprehending the practical distinction between peace-enforcement and 
peacekeeping? It was the effect of the Cold War ending. As explained in section 
three, the end of the Cold War has spread widely throughout the globe the 
expectation of the new world order for a more liberally democratised international 
community along with the emphasis on human rights and freedom. World leaders, 
especially those in the UN and U. S. government, transformed the expectation in the 
early 1990s into their actual policy. The decision-making related to the Somalia 
mission including the transition to UNOSOM II was also performed in this 
optimistic environment. Regarding the Somalia intervention the UN and U. S. 
leaders were too optimistic about their aims in Somalia. In addition, this was also 
the case in terms of how to achieve their aims. The end of the Cold War has 
brought about the new challenges: the massive emergence of severe intra-state 
conflicts and the demand for coercive peace operations to tackle them. Though the 
international community lacked experience of this kind of collaborative peace- 
enforcement missions in dealing with civil warfare, the decision-makers in the UN 
and U. S. optimistically approached the Somalia case, which was a typical intra- 
state conflict of the post-Cold era. Consequently, I argue that all the failings in 
Somalia occurred within the context of the end of the Cold War. 
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Chapter 4: `Aggravated' Peacekeeping in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina 
Black Lamb and Grey Falcon drew me to Yugoslavia. [... ], travel there spelled neither 
life-threatening adventure nor an escape into the visually exotic; instead, it offered a 
collision with the most terrifying and basic issues of the century (Kaplan 1993: 8). 
The Yugoslavia crises in the early 1990s were, as Kaplan states, a mixture of `the 
most terrifying and basic issues of the century'. The beginning of their complete 
history could go back to the beginning of the 20th century or even earlier. They 
were interwoven with the basic issues of conflict: religious hostility, ethnic hatred, 
cultural differences, and economic divide. These issues have been the sources of 
war and conflict in human history. However, they do not directly trigger war or 
conflict by themselves. Agential and structural factors around the sources do that. 
In Yugoslavia, the key cause of the crises was Milosevic and his Serb 
expansionism, which was applied as a strategic means to achieve his political 
ambition. He used Serb nationalism to exploit the issues and eventually the issues 
made the conflict in Yugoslavia extremely violent and complicated to settle. In 
modern Yugoslav history, especially after the Second World War, the issues were 
under control during Tito's totalitarian regime. The structural and environmental 
changes of the post-Cold War era gave Milosevic the chance to exploit the issues. 
In this sense, the agential cause of the crises was interrelated with the structural 
contexts of the post-Cold War international order. 
The Yugoslav crises have four distinctive features: first, as explained above 
the nature of the crises were in part deeply rooted in past religious and historical 
experience and the sources of conflict have a long 
history; second, the case of 
Yugoslavia was not a crisis, but more accurately a series of crises; third, there were 
many parties involved in the crises; 
fourth, it is controversial whether the crises 
were intra-state conflicts or 
inter-state conflicts. The crises comprise several key 
conflicts between Croatia and 
Croat Serbs; Bosnia-Herzegovina (hereafter referred 
to as Bosnia) and Bosnian Serbs; 
Bosnian Croats and Bosnian Muslims; Bosnian 
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Muslims and Serbs. The abundance of parties to the conflict - that is, Croatia, 
Bosnia, Serbia, Croat Serbs, Bosnian Serbs, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Muslims 
- made the crises more complex and difficult to solve. In addition, in the early 
stage of the crises they were clearly intra-state conflicts because all six ethnic 
groups were part of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. This nature of 
the conflict changed as international society recognised the declaration of 
independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia. On 7 April 1992, the United States 
recognised the independence of Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia. Bosnia achieved the 
recognition of the EU (at that time EC) on the same day, and finally, the UN 
General Assembly accepted Bosnia, Croatia, and Slovenia as UN members on 22 
May (Mayall 1996: 167). In terms of customary international law, the formation of 
a new state is completed by achieving international recognition. Bosnia, Croatia, 
and Slovenia became obviously recognised governmental entities. Therefore, after 
May 1992 the Yugoslavia crisis was legally transformed into inter-state conflict. In 
this sense the crisis is unique. 
Although immense resources of the UN and European states were poured 
into the missions in Yugoslavia, the result of their intervention, especially in 
Bosnia, did not seem to be successful. Academic evaluation of the UN missions has 
been critical. Curtis (1994) says that in the Bosnian mission the UN could not 
adhere to essential guidelines: impartiality and non-coercion (p. 180). According to 
Ruggie (1993), in Yugoslavia the majority of the nearly 70,000 peacekeepers 
served `in contexts for which peacekeeping was not intended' (p. 26). This study 
argues that peacekeeping in Bosnia was not successful because the UN and 
European states failed to achieve even the key objectives of their intervention: to 
protect UN-designated `safe areas' 
14 and to prevent mass killings. The abundance 
of the adopted Security Council 
Resolutions related to the crisis and the continued 
expansion of the mandate of the 
key mission body UNPROFOR are evidence of the 
14 United Nations Safe Areas were established in 1993 on the territory of Bosnia- 
Herzegovina by resolutions 819 (1993) and 
824 (1993). These resolutions designated the 
towns of Tuzla, 
Zepa, Srebrenica, Gora2de, Bihac, and Sarajevo as `safe areas'. They were 
also dubbed `UN 
Safe Havens' (United Nations 1996a: 525). 
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failures of the mission. By 2003, the Security Council had passed 144 resolutions 
governing the peacekeeping mission across the former Yugoslavia. In addition, UN 
needed to establish an unusually large number of mandated bodies of the mission in 
Yugoslavia. While the UN has usually established one or two mandated bodies as 
part of a peacekeeping mission to intervene in a conflict, seven bodies of the 
mission were established in Yugoslavia: the United Nations Protection Force 
(UNPROFOR) (February 1992-March 1995), the United Nations Preventive 
Deployment Force (UNPREDEP) (March 1995-February 1999), the United 
Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia (UNCRO) (March 1995- 
January 1996), the United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina (UNMIBH) 
(December 1995-December 2002), the United Nations Transitional Administration 
for Eastern Slavonia, Baranja and Western Sirmium (UNTAES) (January 1996- 
January 1998), the United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) 
(February 1996-December 2002), and the United Nations Civilian Police Support 
Group (UNPSG) (January-October 1998). 
The initial mandate of UNPROFOR under Resolution 743 (1992) was `to 
create the conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall 
settlement of the Yugoslav crisis'. Its specific objectives were as follows: to 
monitor the work of the local administration and police forces; and to use its good 
offices to ensure that any changes to the status quo were consistent with the spirit 
of the UN peace plan (United Nations Security-General 1991: paragraph 17). After 
this resolution its mandate was repeatedly expanded to conduct more difficult 
objectives in terms of the use of force such as to protect Sarajevo airport, to 
monitor UN-protected areas in Croatia, and to secure the delivery of humanitarian 
aid. Although UNPROFOR's peacekeepers should observe the normal rules of 
engagement as UN peacekeeping forces in implementing their new mandate, they 
were allowed to broadly interpret the principle, the use of force in self-defense, as 
its mandate was gradually expanded. Resolutions 757 (1992) and 770 (1992) 
impliedly referred to Chapter VII of the Charter within the peacekeeping context. 
UNPROFOR was authorised by Resolution 776 (1992) to aggressively use its force 
to ensure the protection of UN personnel and the safe delivery of humanitarian 
relief supplies as approving the paragraph of the Secretary-General's report on 10 
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September 1992: `in this context, self-defence is deemed to include situations in 
which armed persons attempt by force to prevent United Nations troops from 
carrying out their mandate' (United Nations Secretary-General 1992a: paragraph 9). 
In order to protect the UN safe havens, Resolution 836 (1993) authorised 
UNPROFOR to take the necessary measures including the use of force `in reply to 
bombardments against the safe areas' or `to armed incursion into them' by any of 
the parties (United Nations Security Council 1993e: paragraph 9). These changes to 
UNPROFOR's mandate clearly mean that the peacekeepers there could not tackle 
the crisis in the absence of a firm cease-fire and without the cooperation of the 
parties to the conflict. Consequently, the UN was not able to play a major role in 
the ending of the Bosnian crises. What factors affected the failures of the UN 
peacekeeping in Bosnia? This key question is explored along with answers to other 
subsidiary questions. 
This chapter is divided into three main sections in the same way as the 
previous chapter on Somalia was structured. The first section introduces 
background knowledge of the Yugoslav crises. The focus of the chapter is on the 
Bosnian war. However, because the crises were very complex and the events, 
which happened during the crisis and in the course of the intervention, were 
immense it is essential to examine the entirety of the Balkans crises to thoroughly 
understand the Bosnian conflict. The second and third sections explain the failures 
of the UN peacemaking and peacekeeping operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina 
within the analytical framework of the agential and structural perspective 
respectively. In the third section, I also examine how the agential and structural 
factors affected each other. 
4.1 The Background of the Bosnian Crisis 
The former Yugoslavia (the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) consisted of 
six component republics: Bosnia-Herzegovina (BiH), Croatia, Macedonia, 
Montenegro, Serbia (including two autonomous regions within its territory: 
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Kosovo and Vojvodina), and Slovenia. Since 1991, the Socialist Federal Republic 
has split into five self-declared or internationally recognised independent states: the 
Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina, the Republic of Croatia, the Republic of Slovenia, 
the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, and the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, which changed its name to Serbia and Montenegro in February 2003. 
For the sake of convenience and to avoid confusion, the Socialist Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia is referred to here as the former Yugoslavia, Bosnia-Herzegovina as 
Bosnia or itself, and the others as themselves. 
Some recognise that the apparent beginning of the crisis came with the end 
of the Cold War. It is definitely true that the Yugoslav crisis erupted and developed 
in the structural context of the post-Cold War international order. However, it is 
arguable what event triggered the crisis. For example, Haass (1999) states that `the 
real Yugoslavia crisis began in March 1992 with the formal declaration of 
independence by Bosnia-Herzegovina' because it brought on civil war and more 
importantly ethnic cleansing in the former Yugoslavia (p. 38). I would argue that it 
was in 1991 when Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence because the 
declarations caused the break-up of the former Yugoslavia. After that, Macedonia 
and Bosnia followed in turn. The Bosnian crisis broke out in the course of that 
dissolution. Then, why did Bosnia become the `heartland' of the whole Yugoslav 
crises? Why not Slovenia or Croatia? To answer these questions, it is necessary to 
examine the modern history of the Balkans. 
Yugoslavia as a state was established after the First World War. Before the 
war, the Balkans was under control of the Ottoman Empire and Austro-Hungarian 
Empire in turn. The Ottoman Turks had ruled the region since the end of the 14th 
century. At the end of the 17th century, Austria-Hungary grew stronger in the north 
and undermined the Ottoman Empire's power in the region. The fall of the empire 
was accelerated by a rise of nationalism through the Balkans from the end of 19th 
century. Serbia, Montenegro, and Romania were the first successful challengers. 
They became independent in 1878 by the Treaty of Berlin, which was signed by 
Britain, Austria-Hungary, France, Germany, Italy, Russia, and Turkey (See Map 
4.1, p. 86). The Treaty recognised the complete independence of the principalities 
of Romania, Serbia, and Montenegro and the autonomy of Bulgaria. 
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Map 4.1: The Balkans 1900-95 
(Source: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/hi/english/static/map/yugoslavia) 
In 1912, Montenegro started a war against the Ottoman Empire and other Balkan 
nations - Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece - joined the war. They drove the Turks out 
of Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania. Unfortunately, the victory of the allies was 
the start of a new disaster. Albania gained independence, but Kosovo and 
Macedonia could not because Serbia turned against its allies and occupied Kosovo 
and Macedonia. Austria-Hungary was deeply concerned about Serb expansionism. 
To resolve the crisis and prevent Serbia from taking control of the Southern Slavs, 
in 1914 the Austro-Hungary Empire sent Archduke Franz Ferdinand who was the 
emperor's heir to Sarajevo. He was shot dead by a young Serb nationalist, Gavrilo 
Princip, in Sarajevo on 28 June. As we know, this event triggered the First World 
War (Glenny 1999: 228-36). 
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At the Paris Peace Conference in January 1919, the victors of the war - the 
United States, Britain, France, and Italy - redesigned the Balkans and the 
Versailles Peace Treaty legally confirmed this afterwards. The Austro-Hungarian 
Empire had been split into two small countries, Austria and Hungary; Bulgaria had 
to yield part of its territory to Romania and a new Kingdom; finally the `Kingdom 
of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes' was founded. In 1929 King Alexander I changed 
his Kingdom's name to `Yugoslavia', which means `land of the southern Slavs' 
(Poulton 1991: 5-6). The foundation paved the way for a new series of crises in the 
Balkans, because the Serb-dominant situation of the Yugoslav government 
provoked anti-Serb movements especially among Croats. The Second World War 
transformed the movements into atrocities by all ethnics in the land. Croatian 
nationalists welcomed the German invaders, as they could build up an independent 
`puppet state', which also incorporated Bosnians and other minor ethnic groups 
around them. Italians occupied Montenegro and Germans took control of Serbia 
(Sowards 1996). Under the Croatian nationalist regime during wartime, many 
Serbs, Jews, Muslims, gypsies, and anti-fascist Croats were killed. Nevill Forbes 
says that `the Serbs and the Croats were, as regards race and language, originally 
one people, the two names having merely geographical signification' (cited in 
Kaplan 1993: 25). It could be right in some senses, because they come from the 
same Slavic race, they speak the same language, and they shared many things as 
neighbours for a long time. However, the long history of rivalry between Croats 
and Serbs made them recognise clear distinctions in their ethnic and social 
identities. Moreover, the atrocious experiences during the war developed solid 
ethnic hatred among the ethnic groups replacing the mere distinctive perception of 
their identities. 
Yugoslavia was made a Socialist federation comprising the six republics by 
Marshal Tito in 1945. As a partisan leader and communist, Tito fought the 
Germans during the war. He had a cooperative relationship with Dragolijub 
Mihailovic, a Serb nationalist, who also fought the Germans and Croat fascists 
(BBC News). The relationship provided a solid political foundation when he 
constructed the Socialist federation of the six ethnic groups. Croats, 
Serbs, 
Bosnians, and other ethnics gathered under a national flag. Although ethnic 
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tensions still existed, Yugoslav demographic politics was balanced under the 
leadership of President Tito during the Cold War period. Tito introduced the 
collective governing system including collective leadership, regular rotation of 
personnel among posts, and the strong autonomy of each republic. The system 
enabled the federal government to integrate very different ethnic communities 
under the same roof. Regarding the ruling system, the revision of the Constitution 
in 1974 was a key institutional event because it allowed increased power for the 
republics weakening the centralised rule of the federal government. In 1979, the 
League of Communists of Yugoslavia (LCY) was launched as a federal structure to 
maintain the collective governing system of Yugoslavia. After the death of the 
charismatic Yugoslav leader in May 1980 it took over his responsibilities rotating 
the presidency and key posts of the federation (United Nations 1996a: 487). 
However, the LCY could not restore the strong leadership of Tito. The nations of 
the federal republic started to come unglued after his death. 
The LCY system had been sustained during the 1980s in spite of economic 
and political crises and increasing tensions among the country's constituent ethnic 
groups. The demise of the Soviet Union and the following the break-up of the Cold 
War structure caused the collapse of the LCY system. Yugoslavia was splintering, 
beset by strife. As Huntington (1996) points out, `the Velvet Curtain of culture has 
replaced the Iron Curtain of ideology as the most significant dividing line' and then 
turned into `a line of bloody conflict' at times (p. 28). 
During the period of 1991 and 1992, Yugoslavia had been ripped into 
independent states and this dissolution caused the bitter conflicts among the ethnic 
groups. First on 25 June 1991 Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence 
following a brief spell of fighting and then a savage war. Macedonia split off on 8 
September without violence. The declaration of independence by the Bosnian 
parliament on 15 October made its nation become engulfed in conflict with the 
Bosnian Serbs, backed by Milosevic of Serbia. Serbia formed the Federal Republic 
of Yugoslavia (FRY) with Montenegro on 27 April 1992 (Mayall 1996: 166-7). 
Why did the independence of Croatia and Bosnia cause more severe conflict than 
that of others?; why did the Bosnian conflict become the key event of the whole 
Yugoslav crisis in the course of the disintegration? 
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The Yugoslav-Slovene war started on June 27 two days after Slovenia 
declared its independence. The Yugoslav government launched a massive attack 
against Slovenia. After 10 days, this war was ended by the withdrawal of the 
Yugoslav army with under 70 dead. Why did Milosevic suddenly stop the war and 
accept Slovenian independence? Haass (1999) suggests two plausible reasons: first, 
`Slovenian strength' was stronger than Milosevic had expected, and second, `a lack 
of Serbian will' in terms of `the policy of Serbianisation' (p. 38). Both of them 
might be true, but the latter was a key reason. Serbia has a long history of 
nationalist expansionism and Milosevic was a full successor to the Serb 
expansionism. His intention in the post-Cold War Balkans was to create a stronger 
and expanded Serbia. In this sense, for Milosevic, Slovenia was less important than 
any other region, because there was only a negligible Serbian minority in Slovenia. 
The percentage of Serbs in the population of Slovenia was 2.23%, whereas it was 
32.02 % in Bosnia and 11.55 % in Croatia (See Table 4.1 and Map 4.2, p. 90). 
Holbrooke (1998) points out that `Slovenia's departure from Yugoslavia made it 
easier for Milosevic to create a Yugoslavia dominated by the Serbs, since it 
removed from the country a republic with almost no Serbs' (p. 29). 
Table 4.1: Ethnic Groups by Republic and Province 
Percentage of Population by Ethnicity 
Republic or Monte- Mace- Croat Muslim Slovene Serb Albanian Yugoslav Other 
Province negrin donian 
Yugoslavia 2.58 19.75 5.97 8.92 7.82 36.30 7.72 5.44 5.51 
Bosnia- 
_..,.. ,. 1 ., " ý ^ f% -, In All A11 17 n, 1 KA 
Herzegovina 
Montenegro 68.54 1.18 0.15 13.63 0.10 3.32 6.46 5.35 1.54 
Croatia 0.21 75.08 0.12 0.52 0.55 11.55 0.13 8.24 3.61 
Macedonia 8.21 0.17 67.01 2.07 0.03 2.33 19.76 0.75 7.67 
Slovenia 0.17 2.94 0.17 0.71 90.52 2.23 0.10 1.39 1.77 
Serbia 1.35 0.55 0.51 2.66 0.14 85.44 1.27 4.78 3.29 
Kosovo 1.71 0.55 0.07 3.70 0.02 13.22 77.42 0.17 3.14 
Vojvodina 2.13 5.37 0.93 0.24 0.17 54.42 0.19 8.22 28.33 
(Source: 1981 census; Szayna 2000: 130) 
On 17 September 1991, Macedonia declared its independence from the 
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Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. At the early stage of the dissolution, 
Map 4.2: Ethnic Distribution of the Former Yugoslavia 1991 
serbia wanted to form a federation including Macedonia and offered to join their 
new federation at the meeting in Ohrid between the Macedonian president, Kilo 
Gligorov, and Milosevic. The former president of the Macedonian Parliament, 
Stojan Andov, stated in an interview: 
The Serbian side has posed a question of whether we will join the common state 
which would consist of Serbia, Montenegro and possibly Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
[... ] Since the Serbian representatives in Ohrid have, quite naturally, asked us 
(Source: http: //www. reisenett. no/map_collection/europe/Yugoslav. jpg) 
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whether we intend to enter any other kind of state (made up of Croatia, Slovenia and 
Bosnia and Herzegovina), we have clearly stated that in the near future we can not 
enter into an association with any of the republics until the problem of Yugoslavia is 
solved (Ordanovski, 13 Jan. 1992). 
The Macedonians refused the Serb offer and went their way to create an 
independent state. Serbia did not take military action to annex Macedonia and 
rather seemed to show less interest in doing so. That was because they were 
worried about the reactions of Bulgaria and especially the regional super power of 
the Balkans, Greece. Macedonia was controlled by the Ottoman Empire until 1913 
when the Balkan War ended. Then, Greece, Serbia, and Bulgaria divided the land 
and each took a portion (See Map 4.1, p. 86). After the Second World War, 
Macedonia became a communist state named as `the Socialist Republic of 
Macedonia' and soon after, joined the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
under Tito (Panov, 22 Apr. 1993). 
The proportion of Serbs in the population of Macedonia was 2.33 %. In 
comparison with Serb populations in Croatia and Bosnia, this amount was 
negligible for Serb nationalists to create a `Greater Serbia'. Under the 
circumstances of Bulgaria and Greece accepting Macedonian independence, Serbia 
could not take the risk of confronting Bulgaria and Greece when there was such 
little significance for their political ambition. It was Bulgaria that first recognised 
the independence of the Republic of Macedonia. Greece accepted the independence, 
but opposed just the use of the state's name and flag. Greece claimed that the land 
the Republic of Macedonia occupied was only part of wider Macedonia, which was 
also part of Greece, and that they were the sole heirs of the symbol Macedonia used 
in its national flag. What really worried Greece was that the use of the name and 
symbol could imply `territorial ambitions toward the northern 
Greek region of 
Macedonia' (BBC News, 17 Dec. 2005). Due to the reason, Greece launched a 
diplomatic campaign to prevent the European Community's recognition of 
Macedonia and urged the UN to accept Macedonia as a member state with a 
temporary description, `the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia'. 
Macedonia 
joined the UN in April 1993 with the temporary description and after the 
long- 
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running dispute Greece finally ratified the recognition of Macedonia in 1995. 
A massive conflict of the Yugoslavia crisis began between Croats and Serbs. 
They are neighbours divided by religion, history, and economics. Serbs are 
Orthodox Christians; Croats are Roman Catholic. As shown in Table 4.1 (p. 89) and 
Map 4.2 (p. 90), the major ethnic groups of Croatia are Croats and Serbs. Croatia 
was under Austro-Hungarian rule until 1918 when Yugoslavia was formed. Its Serb 
minority - about 12% of the population - was introduced by the Habsburgs into 
border areas as good fighters against Ottoman incursions. The key actor of the 
crisis was the ethnic Serbs. Croatia declared itself an independent country on 25 
June 1991. This triggered massive insurgencies of the Croat Serbs waging a war 
between Croatia and Serb rebels backed by the Yugoslav army (JA)15. In the Croat 
war, ethnic hatred between Catholic Croats and Orthodox Serbs opened up with the 
murder of civilians, the burning of villages, the shelling of apartments, the 
destruction of churches and mosques, and reports of mass rape. The war lasted six 
months and over 10,000 people including civilians were killed (USA Today, Feb. 
14 1996). As the world witnessed the disaster day after day, the war brought great 
concern from the international community and UN as they regarded that it could 
have been a threat to international peace and security. In November 1991, the 
warring parties agreed to the withdrawal of the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) 
from Croatia. This tenuous cease-fire took hold in January 1992. 
As Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence in June 1991, Bosnia 
also started to prepare its independence. Other ethnic minorities in the land, 
Bosnian Muslims and ethnic Croats, supported the referendum of independence 
except Bosnian Serbs. They boycotted the referendum and passed their own 
deciding not to secede from Yugoslavia in November 1991. Bosnia declared its 
independence in March 1992 without the Bosnian Serbs' favour of secession. In 
April, ethnic Serb forces backed by JNA waged a vicious war against the Bosnian 
government. This war triggered several more armed conflicts between 
Croatians 
and Bosnian government forces; and between Croatian and Serbian 
forces. An 
15 The Yugoslav Army (JA) was the successor of the Yugoslav People's Army (YPA), 
which was also referred to as the Yugoslav National 
Army (JNA) 
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estimated 200,000 people died and millions lost their homes in the wars (United 
Nations Security Council 1992a). 
Here, I need to make clear my answers to the question of this section: why 
did Bosnia become the `heartland' of the overall Yugoslav crisis? Table 4.2 below 
shows the key points of what I have explained so far in this section. It seems 
obvious that the proportion of Serbs in the population and the ethnic distribution in 
each land were crucial factors in explaining how the conflicts in Yugoslavia took 
place, grew, and spread. The conflict map of Yugoslavia was drawn along ethnic 
lines. However, this factor does not explain completely why the conflicts erupted. 
The underlying agential cause of the Yugoslav crisis was `Serb expansionism'. 
Milosevic and his nationalist followers had a sole political ambition, creating a 
`Greater Serbia'. The concept of a Greater Serbia could be clarified in Milosevic's 
famous line, "Where ever there is a Serb, there is Serbia" (GlobalSecurity. org 
2005a). 
Table 4.2: Major Conflicts in the Yugoslav Crisis 
Serb forces ( Independence Serb o 
Duration of Notable feature Vs. population (/o) Fighting 
Slovenia Jun. 1991 2.23 10 days Powerful army 
-------------------------------------------------- 
Croatia Jun. 1991 
--------------------------------- 
11.55 
-- -------------- ---. 4 - 1 About 6 months 
------------------- --- First international 
concern 
Macedonia Sep. 1991 2.33 No fighting Bul aria 
------ =- -- -- ------------- 
g---------- 
Severer ethnic Bosnia Mar. 1992 32.02 Several years conflict than others (BiHI 
A UN Security Council report clearly states what Milosevic and his Serb people 
wanted: 
The JNA's objectives in Croatia were not force-oriented, or even terrain-oriented in 
areas not inhabited by Serbs. Rather, the JNA and the ethnic-Serbian paramilitary 
forces targeted the civilian population in areas deemed to be part of the «Greater 
Serbia, primarily centred in the Krajinas. JNA operations in Croatia underwent at 
least three phases. First, JNA forces secured key bridges over major rivers and 
neutralized Croat police forces. Second, the JNA cut the capital of Zagreb off from 
Slavonia, the Krajinas, and Dalmatia [See Map 4.3, p. 94]. Then Slavonia, Banija, 
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Krajina and Dalmatia were secured. The last phase involved an «ethnic cleansing)) 
campaign to militarily expel non-Serbs from Serb controlled territory, to which the 
Croats responded in kind (United Nations Security Council 1992a). 
In Bosnia, the strategy and aim of the Serb forces' military operations were almost 
the same as in the Croat war. Milosevic was a brutal predator who desired to make 
Serbia bigger and bigger causing atrocious disasters in the Balkans. His 
Serbianisation policy meant that Serbia and Montenegro could not achieve 
international recognition when they formed the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(FRY) in April 1992. The FRY was admitted as a member state of the UN in 2000. 
Map 4.3 The Former Yugoslavia 1993 
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(Source: http: //www. reisenett. no/map_collection/europe/Former_Yugoslavia. jpg) 
Then, why did Milosevic and Serb nationalists aspire to create a Greater 
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Serbia? Although it is a big question, which could be answered from historical, 
political, or many other perspectives, and actually out of this thesis' main theme, 
the practices of UN peacekeeping in the early post-Cold War era, I need to explain 
the reason because Serb expansionism was the decisive agential cause of the whole 
Yugoslav crisis. One reasonable explanation is that the expansionism was a 
strategic choice of the Serb nationalist elite for the survival of Serbia. The Serbian 
Academy of Arts and Sciences produced a memorandum for a new national 
programme in 1986. It shows how the elite were deeply concerned in terms of their 
national strategy about Serbia's secession from Yugoslavia and the annexation of 
ethnic Serb terrains in other republics' territories based on several presumptions: 
" That any Yugoslavia not dominated by Serbia was contrary to Serb national 
interests; 
" That the Communists had created a number of spurious nations (Montenegrins, 
Muslims and Macedonians) in order to weaken the Serb national corpus; 
" That the very federal organization of the Yugoslav state had divided up the 
Serb nation and was thus inimical to its biological survival - consequently 
republican borders were illegitimate (or merely "administrative"); 
" That Yugoslavia was a political formula imposed upon the Serbs from the 
outside, and that Serbs must decide their future on their own, irrespective of - 
and if necessary in conflict with - all other Yugoslav nations (cited in Magas 
1994). 
Maslow (1943) suggests five basic needs for human motivation: physiological, 
safety, love, esteem, and self-actualisation. Among these, the need for safety or 
survival is the most crucial cause of human behaviour, especially under the 
circumstances of competition and coercion. Throughout their history, ethnic Serbs 
had to struggle for ethnic survival against the imperialism of the Ottoman and 
Austro-Hungarian empires, fascism under the Nazis, and communism under 
socialist Yugoslavia. They also needed to compete with neighbouring ethnic groups. 
In this sense, the `strategic choice for survival' theory sounds reasonable. However, 
it did not make sense in the post-Cold War era. Neighbouring states, such as 
Austria, Hungary, Romania, and Greece, were not seeking expansion. Other 
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nations of the former Yugoslavia were weaker or smaller than Serbia (See Table 
4.3,4.4, and 4.5 p. 104). Serbia did not need to make itself bigger for survival. 
Table 4.3: Population Distribution of Yugoslavia 1981 
Serbia incl. Bosnia & Monte- Republic (Kosovo / Vojvodina) Croatia Slovenia Herzegovina Macedonia negro 
Population 9,279 4,578 1,884 4,116 1,914 583 (in 1000s) (1,585 / 2,028) 
(Source: Statistical Yearbook of the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia; Szayna 
2000: 131) 
Table 4.4: Population of Yugoslavia by Ethnicity 
Ethnic Group I Population (in thousands) 
Serbs 8,141 
Croats 4,428 
Muslim 2,000 
Albanians 1,731 
Slovenes 1,754 
Macedonians 1,342 
Montenegrins 578 
Yugoslavs 1,209 
Hungarians 427 
Others 818 
Total 22,428 
(Source: 1981 census; Szayna 2000: 129) 
Thus, the expansionism was chosen as a means for another purpose: the self- 
justification and perpetuation of Milosevic's political power. Milosevic started 
his 
political career as president of Belgrade city communist party. 
He was a little 
known politician in Yugoslavia until he gave his speech in Kosovo 
in 1987, which 
firmly made Serbian nationalism a key word of Serbian political 
discourse. The 
speech on the 600th anniversary of the Battle of 
Kosovo in 1989 before a crowd of 
hundreds of thousands made a name for him as a Serbian nationalist and 
charismatic leader for Serbia's 
future. He stirred up Serb minorities in Kosovo, 
97 
who were allegedly discriminated against there, saying "Never let anyone do this to 
you again". He resorted to Serbian nationalism and used it to establish his political 
power in Yugoslavia. Finally, he won the 1990 elections and became president of 
the Yugoslav Republic of Serbia (Szayna 2000: 105-7). The situation of the break- 
up in 1991 was a challenge to him. He chose to exploit Serb expansionism to 
maintain his leadership because it had been the backbone of his political power. 
The result was brutal conflict between the ethnic groups of Yugoslavia and ethnic 
cleansing in the Balkans. 
The Yugoslav crisis is divided into three distinctive phases: the Slovene, 
Croat, and Bosnian conflicts. As explained earlier, the conflict in Slovenia lasted 
for 10 days in June and July 1991 between the Yugoslav National Army (JNA) and 
the Slovenian army. Soon after the withdrawal of the JNA from Slovenia, a war 
waged between the Croatian army and Serb militia together with the JNA in 
Krajina and in eastern and western Slavonia. It was in the second phase of the 
Yugoslav crises. The JNA officially withdrew from Croatia in November 1991, but 
maintained its support to the Serb militia and other local Serb forces in Croatia. 
The third phase of the crises involved the conflict in Bosnia, which was caused by 
the declaration of its independence in March 1992 (United Nations Security 
Council 1992a). While international concern over the Balkans started to grow from 
the second phrase, actual armed intervention by the international community 
commenced in the third phase. 
Bosnia had been a multi-ethnic state shared between Serbs, Croats, and 
Bosnian Muslims (also called Bosniaks), all of whom held a considerable 
demographic portion of Bosnia. The Bosnian Muslims made up 39.52 per cent of 
the population; ethnic Croats, 18.38 per cent; and Bosnian Serbs, 32.02 per cent 
(See Table 4.1, p. 89). Each ethnic group has its own religious creed: Orthodoxy, 
Catholicism, and Islam respectively. Though the Bosnian conflict was caused by 
Milosevic's `Greater Serbia' project under the context of the post-Cold War 
paradigm, the factors which made the conflict 
brutal and hostile were the 
demographic and religious features. The sheer brutality of the fighting and horrific 
campaigns of ethnic cleansing drew much attention 
from the world media and 
concern and sympathy from 
international society. 
98 
The Bosnian declaration of independence in March 1992 triggered 
simultaneous fighting in the territory of Bosnia between Bosnian government 
forces and Serbian forces, Croatians and Bosnian government forces, and Croatian 
and Serbian forces. At first, the Bosnian Serbs rejected Bosnia's independence and 
immediately declared the establishment of the Republic of Serbia (Republika 
Srpska), which was based on the idea of creating a purely Serb ethnic enclave in 
northern and eastern Bosnia. To create a homogeneous Serb land in Bosnia, the 
army of the Republika Srpska led by General Ratko Mladic began a policy of 
`ethnic cleansing' against Bosniaks. This caused not only armed fighting between 
the Serbs and Bosnian Muslims but also created many refugees and massive counts 
of human rights crimes such as rape against Muslim women and girls, and mass 
executions of Muslim men and boys. 
The initial peacekeeping involvement of the United Nations in the crisis 
began in September 1991 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 713 
(1991). It was the first resolution in the UN's history, which applied the concept, `a 
threat to international peace and security', to a regional intra-state conflict: 
The Security Council, 
[... ] Concerned that the continuation of this situation [the fighting in Yugoslavia] 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security, 
[... ] 6. Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, that all 
States shall, for the purpose of establishing peace and stability in Yugoslavia, 
immediately implement a general and complete embargo on all delivery of weapons 
and military equipment to Yugoslavia [... ] (United Nations Security Council 1991b). 
The first adoption of the concept of working with Chapter VII of the UN Charter 
meant that first, the United Nations had a chance to implement its tools to maintain 
international peace and security without any of the restrictions of the Cold-War era; 
second, the UN showed an enthusiastic intention to cope with the Yugoslav crises. 
However, the result of the UN intervention in Bosnia was unsatisfactory. The UN 
exposed problems in its peacekeeping and peacemaking operations throughout their 
implementation and mandates. 
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4.2 The Failures of Peacekeeping and Peacemaking Missions 
in Bosnia 
The UN's peacekeeping operation in Bosnia was ineffective in dealing with the 
crisis. The UN has been criticised for its handling of the conflict, and rightly so. 
The campaign of ethnic cleansing was a key issue of the conflict. As Simms (2001) 
points out, it was not merely the outcome of the tension among the ethnic groups or 
`the by-product of war', but rather `the purpose of war' (p. xv). The UN 
peacekeepers could not prevent the ethnic cleansings and failed to defend UN Safe 
Havens in Bosnia. Why did the UN failed to achieve the key objectives? There are 
three reasons of this agential failure. First, the UN sent its peacekeepers where 
there was no peace to keep; second, the Bosnian crisis was almost a war waged by 
regular armies of states differing from other regional conflicts in which the UN had 
intervened; third, the UN was not ready to manage the massive military 
intervention to cope with such hostile and intense fighting as occurred in Bosnia. 
The Bosnian crisis was not a case that usual UN peacekeepers could cope 
with. As a key UN document about UN peacekeeping, Supplement to An Agenda 
for Peace, clearly states, UN peacekeeping is designed to conduct the following 
tasks: `protecting humanitarian operations', `protecting civilian populations', and 
`pressing the parties to achieve national reconciliation'. Regarding its composition, 
armament, and logistic capability, it is very dangerous for UN peacekeepers to 
require such strong use of force to tackle extremely hostile situations, as was the 
case in Yugoslavia (Boutros-Ghali 1995: Section B). That was why the 
peacekeepers in Bosnia were unable to adhere to two of the essential guidelines 
for 
traditional peacekeeping, namely impartiality and non-coercion, and the nature of 
the mission was extended to peace-enforcement without appropriate facilities and 
mandates. While UN peacekeepers were sent to Croatia in the circumstances that 
there was at least a peace to keep as they were deployed after a cease-fire was 
agreed between Croats and Serbs, in Bosnia they were 
deployed in the course of 
fighting without any of the prerequisites for successful peacekeeping operations. 
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UN peacekeepers for the Yugoslav crises were first deployed in April 1992 
in Croatia with the mandate of the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR). 
Originally, the mission of the peacekeepers was to patrol the truce in Croatia. By 
the summer of 1992, their role had broadened to include ensuring the delivery of 
humanitarian aid to millions of needy people, especially in Bosnia. As mentioned, 
the United Nations began to intervene in Yugoslavia with the adoption of Security 
Council Resolution 713 (1991). After two months, another resolution 721 (1991) 
was adopted, which asked the Secretary-General to produce a plan to intervene in 
the crises by stating as follows: 
Approves the efforts of the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, and expresses 
the hope that they will pursue their contacts with the Yugoslav parties as rapidly as 
possible so that the Secretary-General can present early recommendations to the 
Security Council including for the possible establishment of a United Nations peace- 
keeping operation in Yugoslavia; (United Nations Security Council 1991 a) 
Pursuant to the resolution, the Secretary-General submitted to the Security Council 
a report (S/23280), which contained `the United Nations Peacekeeping plan' in the 
former Yugoslavia. UNPROFOR was established by Resolution 743 (1992) in 
February based on the plan of the Secretary-General report. According to the plan 
(S/23280, annex III), the general principles of UNPROFOR's mission were: 
1. A United Nations peace-keeping operation in Yugoslavia would be an interim 
arrangement to create the conditions of peace and security required for the 
negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslavia crisis. [... ] 
4. [... ] [All members of the peace-keeping operation] would be required to be 
completely impartial between the various parties to the conflict. Those personnel 
who were armed would have standing instructions to use force to the minimum 
extent necessary and normally only in self-defence (United Nations 
Security-General 
1991). 
The peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was to create `the conditions of peace', not 
peace itself. The peacekeepers should not 
be partial to any parties to conflict and 
limit their use of force to only the purpose of self-defence. Regarding the principles 
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and the situation in Bosnia, their mission was almost impossible because 
Milosevic's Serbia, which had substantial military power, did not have any 
intention to stop the hostility. His aim was to `unite Serbs around him' (Ruggie 
1993: 29). To achieve this, he counted on war and continued to commit 
humanitarian crimes against other surrounding ethnic groups. In this sense, Ruggie 
(1993)'s argument is worthy of mention: 
There was no peace to be kept in Bosnia. [... ] Therefore, deploying a UN 
humanitarian mission to Bosnia by definition meant that its personnel would not be 
considered impartial and that they would, therefore, become potential pawns in the 
conflict. Seeking to protect them with peacekeepers only added to the number of 
potential international hostages on the ground (p. 29). 
Within the new international order, where the desire for peace is not a high priority 
on the part of warring groups, the deep-seated ethnic and historical roots of the 
conflicts could make any intervention by the international community more 
difficult. Therefore, implementing peacekeeping operations under traditional 
guidelines and rules of engagement will result in a high probability of an inevitable 
slide into coercive peace-enforcement. 
Regarding the use of force and enforcement action in Bosnia, two points 
should be clearly mentioned: first, unlike in Kosovo the UN mainly took charge of 
the use of force in Bosnia instead of NATO; second, although there was no clear 
consensus among the decision-makers of the UN and Security Council on whether 
the use of force, especially using NATO's air power against Serb targets, could be 
defined as being in `self-defence', bombing was conducted by directives to 
UNPROFOR from the Secretariat that air power could be used in self-defence. 
The Bosnian intervention was at variance with the Kosovo case in the point 
that the UN was a main player in terms of the use of force and NATO was only an 
assistant. In Bosnia, the use of NATO force was performed at the request and 
authorisation of the UN mission body established in Bosnia and then the Secretariat. 
For example, in April 1994 two NATO planes dropped three bombs on a Serbian 
artillery command post near Gorazde. This sortie was initially requested by 
General Sir Michael Rose, Commander of UN forces in Bosnia, and then Yasushi 
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Akashi, Under-Secretary-General for Peacekeeping Operations, gave his approval 
(Mayall 1996: 169). This does not mean that in Bosnia NATO was placed under 
the UN's authority in the hierarchy of the command structure. The UN and NATO 
cooperatively worked in the operations and most of air strikes against Serb targets 
were executed only with the agreement of the UNPROFOR Force Commander and 
the NATO Commander-in-Chief of Allied Forces South that was dubbed `the dual 
key arrangement' (United Nations Secretary-General 1999: 30). However, in 
contrast with the Kosovo case it was clear that the UN had a leading role in Bosnia 
in planning and executing the use of force, and NATO stepped aside supporting the 
UN's missions. NATO's stated objectives were `to provide support for 
UNPORFOR' and `to support the Geneva negotiations'. 
As the hostage crisis16 was unfolding differences of interpretation emerged 
from the Secretariat on whether using air power was in accordance with the 
principle of peacekeeping, the use of force in self-defence only, or for peace- 
enforcement action. The Secretary-General's interpretation on Security Council 
Resolution 836 (1993) and its paragraph 9 is proof of it. The paragraph states: 
9. Authorizes UNPROFOR, in addition to the mandate defined in resolutions 770 
(1992) of 13 August 1992 and 776 (1992), in carrying out the mandate defined in 
paragraph 5 above, acting in self-defence, to take the necessary measures, including 
the use of force, in reply to bombardments against the safe areas by any of the parties 
or to armed incursion into them or in the event of any deliberate obstruction in or 
around those areas to the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR or of protected 
humanitarian convoys; (United Nations Security Council 1993 e). 
The Secretary-General gives his interpretation in his report on 30 May 1995 as 
follows: 
Resolution 83 6 (1993) referred to Chapter VII, but paragraph 9 defined the 
parameters for the use of force as being `in self-defence' and the mandate given to 
UNPROFOR did not include any provision for enforcement (United Nations 
16 Thirty of the UN peacekeepers were taken hostage during the Serb attack against 
Bosniaks from May to June 1995. 
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Secretary-General 1999: 48). 
It is a legal contradiction to state that Resolution 836 (1993) referred to Chapter 
VII, but paragraph 9 was identified as being apt to the peacekeeping principle. The 
Secretary-General's stance on the use of force at that time is fully understandable 
because he may have deeply considered the practical problem of UNPROFOR 
using force. He noted that when UNPROFOR had used force against the Serbs 
other than in self-defence, `the Bosnian Serb side quickly realized that it had the 
capacity to make UNPROFOR pay an unacceptably high price', particularly by 
taking hostages, which happen in 1995 (United Nations Secretary-General 1993a: 
paragraph 63). However, his interpretation of the resolution and paragraph was not 
explicitly endorsed by the member states of the Security Council. It was apparent 
that until the hostage crisis involving UN peacekeepers UNPROFOR was 
executing the use of air power in terms of `in self-defence'. A Secretary-General's 
report on Srebrenica tells us this: 
[... ], the Secretariat engaged in serious internal debate on the matter, and soon 
thereafter communicated to UNPORFOR its view on the circumstances under which 
resolutions 836 (1993) and 844 (1993) provided for the use of air power. These 
were: 
(a) In self-defence; 
(b) In reply to bombardments against the safe areas; 
(c) In response to armed incursions into the safe areas; 
(d) To neutralize attempts to obstruct the freedom of movement of UNPROFOR 
forces or humanitarian convoys. 
112. The UNPROFOR Force Commander developed a concept for the use of air 
power within these parameters, specifying the particular criteria which would trigger 
its use in given situations (United Nations Secretary-General 1999: paragraph 111 
and 112). 
Another failing of the UN's mission in Bosnia was that the decision-makers 
of the UN peacekeeping did not clearly identify the nature of the 
Bosnian crisis, 
which was almost a war waged by regular armies of states. 
In terms of the military 
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strength of the warring parties, a peacekeeping operation was an inappropriate 
means to use. The parties were absolutely different from lightly armed Somali 
militia. They had well trained troops equipped with tanks and heavy artillery. Table 
4.5 below shows how they were as powerful as a regular force. 
Table 4.5: The Strength of each Party's Forces 
Armies Strength Men Tanks Artillery 
pieces 
Planes Helicopters 
Yugoslav (FRY) army 150,000 600 1,500 200 100 
Bosnian Serb army 80,000 330 800 40 30 
Croatian Serb army 50,000 240 500 12 6 
Croatian army 100,000 - 150,0000 170 900 50 
Bosnian Croat militia 30,000 - 50,000 75 200 - 
Bosnian government army 120,000 -- 180,000 100 1000 - 
Renegade Muslim forces 4,000 - 8,000 - - - 
(Source: USA Today, Feb. 14 1996) 
The Yugoslav army was not an official participant in the Bosnian conflict, but it 
provided air defence and other military and financial support to the Bosnian Serbs. 
Renegade Muslim forces were also supported by Serbs. Thus, pan-ethnic Serb 
forces comprised almost 290,000 men and 4,000 pieces of artillery and tanks. The 
Bosnian Croat militia was aligned with the Bosnian government, thus the strength 
of the Bosnian side reached up to 230,000. In comparison with the strength of the 
total UK regular forces - in 2004 it amounted to 213,160 (Ministry of 
Defence 
2004) -, this demonstrates that both sides 
had powerful military force. On the other 
hand, as of 1995, the strength of UNPROFOR, which was a main peacekeeping 
body in the Yugoslav intervention, amounted to just around 40,000 with light 
armaments including about 700 military observers (United 
Nations 1996a: 489). 
The relatively smaller strength of under-equipped peacekeeping 
forces was not 
sufficient to deter hostile action from the mighty armies of the parties. 
This was 
proved in Srebrenica in July 1995, in which Europe's worst massacre since 
World 
War II happened. 
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Srebrenica was one of the three areas 17 in eastern Bosnia, where Muslims 
remained. Each enclave was designated a UN safe area and was full of refugees. 
Bosnian Serb General Ratko Mladic ordered his forces to shell Srebrenica and after 
five days took the town. Then, his army expelled the women and children from the 
town and killed most of the men. Based on the ICRC figure, more than 7,000 
Bosnian Muslims and refugees were slaughtered and as of January 1997 around 
7000 people disappeared after the fall of Srebrenica. In addition, an estimated 
25,000 people were forcibly evacuated (Rohde 1997: 350; Albright 2003: 187). At 
that time the Dutch peacekeeping contingent was there in Srebrenica. Albright 
(2003) says that the Dutch peacekeepers could not stop General Mladic's full-scale 
assault: 
The Dutch peacekeeping contingent in Srebrenica lacked the firepower to stop the 
Serbs. Thirty of the peacekeepers were taken hostage during the Serb attack. 
Commanders accepted at face value General Mladic's promise not to harm the men 
of Srebrenica. By the time the killings took place, the peacekeepers had been 
withdrawn. In April 2002, an independent inquiry commissioned by the Dutch found 
their government responsible for committing the Dutch peacekeepers to an "ill- 
conceived and virtually impossible mission" of protecting Srebrenica without 
adequate preparation and support (p. 187). 
In response to the deteriorating humanitarian situation in Bosnia, the UN needed 
the enlargement of the peacekeeping mission to conduct peace-enforcement. Thus, 
the UN expanded many times the UNPROFOR's mandate and strength over the 
land of Yugoslavia, which was originally deployed in Croatia and designated to 
supervise the cease-fire between Serbs and Croats. However, UNPROFOR was 
designed by the UN to act only as a peacekeeping force, not a war-fighting force in 
terms of its facilities and the rules of engagement. This means that UNPROFOR in 
Bosnia had to conduct a peace-enforcement mission against the powerful warring 
parties accordingly to enforce their status as peacekeepers. An undesirable event 
resulted from this dissonance. In May 1995, NATO conducted air attacks against 
Bosnian Serb positions. The overwhelming Bosnian Serb forces seized over 350 
17 The others were Zepa and Gorazde. 
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French UN peacekeepers and used them as `human shields' against further NATO 
bombing (Holbrooke 1998: 63). As Owen (1995) points out, at the time of the 
initial deployment of UN forces to Bosnia in the autumn of 1992 UNPROFOR's 
mandate did not include `any element of enforcement'. However, it had been easily 
forgotten that UNPROFOR was only a peacekeeping force sent to Bosnia to secure 
Sarajevo airport by agreement with the Bosnian Serbs. And then, the UN mandate 
for its forces changed over time (p. 354). 
The other problem the UN exposed throughout its Bosnian mission was that 
the UN was not prepared to tackle massive military operations like the Bosnian 
intervention. The UN secretariat itself was not able to identify the nature of 
conflicts and the military requirements of the operation. Albright said that `if I had 
to choose a single word to evoke the problems of U. N. peace keeping, it would be 
"improvisation"'. As the U. S. ambassador to the UN, she argued that `a kind of 
programmed amateurism shows up across the board', including what she described 
as `the near total absence' of contingency planning, `hastily recruited, ill-equipped 
and often unprepared troops and civilian staff, the absence of centralized military 
command and control, and `the lack of a durable financial basis for starting and 
sustaining peacekeeping operations' (Smith and Preston, June 18 1993). For 
example, the former head of UN forces in Sarajevo, Canadian Major General 
Lewis Mackenzie, vividly described the problem of insufficient staff: `do not get 
into trouble as a commander in the field after 5 p. m. New York time, or Saturday 
and Sunday', because `there is no one to answer the phone' (Smith and Preston, 
June 18 1993). Albright (2003)'s statement supports this: 
Both Presidents Bush and Clinton understood that the UN was not equipped to 
handle its expanding responsibilities. When I first arrived in New York, there were 
only about a dozen people in UN Headquarters assigned to manage peacekeeping. 
There was no twenty-four-hour operations center and virtually no control over 
logistics. Every new operation had to start from scratch, recruiting commanders and 
troops, and procuring everything from blue helmets to pencils and trucks. I told 
audiences that the global 911 number was either busy or open only from nine to five, 
and that the Secretary General had to devote much of his time to begging for 
participants and money (p. 147). 
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In order to cope with the new type of conflict shown in Bosnia characterised by a 
bewildering diversity of ethnic and religious war, the UN needed to reorganise the 
peacekeeping staff, prepare an efficacious training programme for peacekeepers, 
and create a 24-hour command centre, not just a situation room. 
In terms of preparation for armed intervention, the UN also failed initially 
to understand the hindrances of their mission in dealing with a former Communist 
country, which had the traditions of `state-controlled media' and `dictatorial 
hierarchy in military command and control system'. Owen (1995) testifies about 
these as follows: 
Izetbegovic, Tudjman and Milosevic all simply manipulated public opinion by using 
their control over television and much of the written press, a control which made it 
very difficult to get the UN message of impartiality through. Moreover, Communist 
command and control practices meant that each commander in the former Yugoslav 
army down to a low level was a dictator in his area of responsibility who could have 
one of his soldiers taken out and shot whenever he commanded. These extremes of 
delegation explained why permits for convoys were continually blocked at a low 
level (p. 200). 
Peacemaking is a means stated in Chapter VI of the UN Charter to bring hostile 
parties to agreement through the peaceful process of diplomacy, mediation, 
negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements. This procedure could be 
accompanied by regional arrangements based on Chapter VIII of the Charter: 
Article 52 
[... ] 3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement 
of local disputes through regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either 
on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council 
(United Nations 1945). 
In the Balkans, the UN's regional counterpart was the European Community. The 
UN Secretary-General and the President of the Council of Ministers of the EC co- 
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chaired the International Conference on the Former Yugoslavia (ICFY), which was 
a key regional arrangement to resolve the crisis in the former Yugoslavia. This 
conference was firstly convened in London on 26 to 28 August 1992 and 
broadened the existing arrangement of the EC, the European Community's 
Conference on Yugoslavia. The UN also cooperated with other permanent member 
states of the Security Council, Russia and the United States, to cope with the crisis 
(United Nations 1996a: 492). 
The Co-Chairmen of ICFY appointed the Secretary-General's personal 
envoy, Cyrus Vance and Lord David Owen, as the Co-Chairmen of a Steering 
committee, which took responsibility for creating a framework for a general 
settlement and associated measures. Vance was succeeded in May 1993 by 
Thorvald Stoltenberg, and Owen by Carl Bildt in June 1995. From September 1992, 
the co-chairmen of the Steering committee commenced their work and finally 
produced a comprehensive peace plan package for Bosnia on 4 January 1993. It 
was dubbed the `Vance-Owen Peace Plan'. This comprehensive plan was divided 
into four sections comprising ten constitutional principles. Its main points were as 
follows: 
I. Constitutional Principles 
- Defines Bosnia and Herzegovina as a decentralised state, with guaranteed 
freedom 
of movement throughout. 
- Gives substantial autonomy to the provinces while 
denying them any international 
legal character. 
- Provides for democratically elected national and 
local government and a 
mechanism for resolving disputes between them. 
- Stresses strong, international monitored 
human rights provisions. 
II. Military Paper 
Requires: 
- Cessation of hostilities within seventy-two 
hours; 
- Withdrawal of heavy weapons 
from Sarajevo in five days and from remaining areas 
in fifteen days; 
- Demilitarisation of Sarajevo, and eventually the whole country; 
- Separation of 
forces followed by a return of forces to designated provinces within 
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forty-five days. 
III. The Map 
- Delineates a ten-province structure reconstituting Bosnia-Herzegovina. 
Annex: Working Paper on Interim Arrangements 
- Nine-member interim central government (three members from each party) to take 
decisions by consensus. 
- Multi-ethnic provincial governments to be set up to reflect all groups fairly, based 
on the pre-war census. 
- Reversal of ethnic cleansing to get under way immediately. 
- International Access Authority to be established to guarantee freedom of movement. 
- National authorities to be created to restore power, banking services, 
telecommunications and civil aviation (Owen 1995: 89-90). 
Through intense negotiations between ICFY and the three parties of the Bosnian 
conflict - the Bosnian government, Bosnian Croats, and Bosnian Serbs - from 
January to March 1993, President Alija Izetbegovic of Bosnia and Mate Boban, the 
leader of the Bosnian Croats signed an agreement on all the elements of the plan. 
However, the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic signed just the agreement for 
peace of Military Paper and the Constitutional Principles. He rejected the idea of 
the interim arrangements of the Annex and a revised map of provincial boundaries 
(See Map 4.4, p. 110), which were the key elements of the plan (United Nations 
1996a: 492-3). The Bosnian Serbs were the most severe opponents of the 
`cantonisation' of Bosnia. 
Although the Muslim-dominant Bosnian government was initially opposed 
to the plan because they wanted a fully unified state, they finally agreed. The 
Bosnian Serbs also accepted the plan under enormous pressure from Milosevic. 
The only remaining opponent to the plan was the U. S. government. The key reason 
the plan was discarded was that the UN and ICFY failed to acquire the support of 
the U. S. government. As the Secretary of State, Warren Christopher said `we're not 
happy with the maps' (Glenny 1999: 640) and the U. S. National Security Advisor, 
Anthony Lake, recalled that `we didn't think it was viable and made sense, it was 
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Map 4.4: A Ten-province Structure of VOPP, 2 January 1993 
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so higgledy-piggledy'. The U. S. government and Bosnians refused the plan 
because they objected to the idea of `cantonising Bosnia'. Especially for the U. S. 
leaders, the cantonisation seemed like a reward to the Serbs for their brutal ethnic 
cleansing and expansionism (Simms 2001: 147). However, the underlying reason 
for the U. S. refusal was that the success of the plan could have required at least 
50,000 ground troops (Glenny 1999: 640). According to Holbrooke (1998), there 
was no unity of opinion towards the Bosnian war within the U. S. foreign policy 
team (p. 52). Whereas the Department of Defense and Joint Chiefs of Staff were 
opposed to the involvement of the government, the NSC and some other members 
of the team such as Ambassador Albright were eager to tackle the crisis. In the 
midst of the deep division, President Clinton was reluctant to play an active role to 
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resolve the conflict and at least determined not to send U. S. ground troops in order 
to avoid the risk of casualties. This was one of the key objectives of the Clinton 
Administration's policy regarding the Bosnian intervention at that time. 
At the early stage of the crisis, the British government was also reluctant to 
massively intervene in Bosnia. The foreign minister, Douglas Hurd, told the House 
of Commons in mid-July 1993 that `I do not believe and have never used rhetoric 
that would lead anyone to believe, that it was part of Britain's interests to pretend 
that we could sort out every man-made disaster in the world, of which there are 
many at the moment... It is in our interests to do out bit, but we should not over- 
pretended, or let rhetoric get in the way of reality' (Simms 2001: 7). In contrast, 
France was eager to intervene in the Yugoslav crisis. The French government had 
contributed most of the peacekeepers to the UN mission in Bosnia. The Germans 
had historically had deep geopolitical relationships with the Balkan states. During 
the period of the conflict in the 1990s, there had been over three hundred thousand 
Bosnian refugees in Germany. Regarding the Bosnian war, the key concern of the 
German government was to reduce their political and financial burden of refugees 
(Holbrooke 1998: 275). That was why the government very quickly responded to 
the declaration of independence of Slovenia, Croatia, and Bosnia and was first 
among the Western states to recognise their independence. The diversity of views 
on what to do about Bosnia meant that the VOPP got stuck in unfriendly 
circumstances unable to be fulfilled. 
As Webb (1996) points out, the peacemaking mission in Bosnia was `an 
exercise in frustration'. The situation had not been improving and rather it 
deteriorated (p. 176). The key reason was that the leaders of the UN and ICFY were 
failed to tune the voices of each state, especially the United States, which had the 
vital capability and resources to resolve the conflict. Owen (1995) says that `I still 
believe that had the Clinton Administration supported the Vance-Owen Peace Plan, 
we would have been able to carry it out' (p. 38). This argument is quite acceptable. 
Indeed, although the Clinton Administration was pressured by the international 
society, they were very reluctant to actively involve in the UN's peace operations 
in Bosnia. Rather, they effectively sabotaged the peace process of the ICFY. To say 
this precisely, the failure of the VOPP was not due to the lack of U. S. support, but 
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due largely to the fact that Owen and other ICFY leaders failed to persuade the U. S. 
government and were eventually unable to achieve its support. Lord Owen was 
heavily criticised, even personally, by many U. S. politicians. The Republican 
Congressman, James Moran, attacked him saying that Owen `seems to be playing 
the role of Neville Chamberlain'. According to Simms (2001), in many interviews 
and talk shows on television, Owen `rubbished the doubters' of the plan and 
dismissed their objections as a `rant', uttering `you haven't got troops on the 
ground. I speak for a country that has got troops on the ground' (p. 147). He could 
get nothing from those whom he criticised. 
The critical difference between the failure of VOPP in 1993 and the success 
of Dayton in 1995 was the absence and presence of any effective means to make 
the Bosnian Serbs and Milosevic accept the plan. The economic sanction imposed 
in the former Yugoslavia at the early stage of the conflict did not effectively work. 
Military forces from the member states of the UN in the region also lost their utility 
as a `stick' because they were just lightly-armed peacekeepers sent to the place 
where required robust peace-enforcement actions. Peacemaking is not an isolated 
action between warring parties and a negotiator. As a technique for peaceful 
settlement it primarily requires a strong political will of parties involved to seek a 
solution to their differences. Thus, the impact of the dynamics of relationships 
among all actors concerned is a critical variable for success in the context of 
peacemaking. The UN and ICFY were jammed by hesitation between Europe and 
America and consequently failed to produce a more viable peace plan for the 
Bosnian crisis. 
Thus, the UN as the key actor was not prepared to deal with the military 
situation in Bosnia. It did not have the capability to react quickly and properly to a 
changing situation. Any action of an agent is the product of explicit strategic 
calculation within the structural contexts in which its action is formulated. Actors 
monitor the immediate consequences of their actions assessing success or failure of 
the actions in securing their prior objectives and then strategically learn from the 
consequences. Through this learning process within the strategically selective 
contexts, actors formulate their revised actions or reactions, which partially cause 
`direct effects' upon the structured contexts producing a partial formation of the 
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structure. Consequently, strategic action of an agent interacts with structure 
through these two functions: direct effects and strategic learning. The next section 
explores how the strategic actions of the UN and European states in Bosnia were 
formulated within the structural contexts of the post-Cold War order and the 
context of the interrelationship with the strategic actions of the U. S. towards the 
Bosnian crisis. 
4.3 The Structural Effects of the Cold War Ending 
The varying challenges the international community has confronted in the post- 
Cold War era were new to the UN and its member states. The United Nations has 
sought to expand the scope of its operations, but the problem is, as Davis (1993) 
explains, that the conflicts erupting around the world are different, and the 
conditions that made the international community's response possible and 
appropriate do not exist (p. 27). He also points out that these conflicts involve 
violence within states among ethnic and religious groups seeking autonomy and 
independence. The rival groups are often unwilling to stop fighting short of 
achieving their goals. For such conflicts, political solutions upon which to base a 
peaceful settlement are difficult even to define, and any outside intervention to 
bring peace carries high risks and low probabilities of success (p. 1). Thus, as for 
most conflicts in the post-Cold War era, the conditions that were critical to success 
in past peacekeeping operations are not likely to exist. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, the 
UN failed to thoroughly understand these features of post-Cold War regional 
conflicts. Then, how did the end of the Cold War affect this strategic failure of the 
agent in the intervention? 
The end of the Cold War brought the United Nations new challenges 
together with opportunities in terms of two features: first, the increase of intra-state 
armed conflicts and second, the revitalization of the UN system, specifically the 
functions of the Security Council in maintaining international peace and security. 
The changed environment made it possible for the UN to take a decisive role in 
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many crises as its founders had intended. The UN has been in the spotlight unlike 
ever before regarding its peacekeeping function. The state leaders convened at `the 
Security Council Summit meeting at the level of Heads of States and Government' 
on 31 January 1992 and endorsed that `all member states expect the United Nations 
to play a central role at the this crucial stage', in which the international community 
faced new challenges in terms of the search for peace (United Nations Security 
Council 1992b). 
However, in spite of the initial optimism about the UN's role and capability, 
the UN actually failed to manage and create peace in the ethnic conflicts in the 
early post-Cold War period. As explained in the previous section, the UN's failures 
were caused by the fact that the UN has entered a domain of military activity, 
which was a vaguely defined grey area between traditional peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcement mission without any operational concepts and other appropriate 
physical, financial, and organisational preparation for the transition. Presidential 
Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) of the U. S. Department of State (1996) clearly 
notes that UN peace operations need to be improved and reformed for successful 
accomplishment of its missions. The directive indicates that the UN needs 
substantial improvement to its command and control capabilities, planning and 
preparation, and organizational changes at the UN Department of Peacekeeping 
Operations. As Ruggie (1993) points out, the growing misuse of peacekeeping 
operations has caused the situation that `the majority of the nearly 70,000 blue- 
helmeted peacekeepers now out in the field serve in contexts for which 
peacekeeping was not intended' (p. 26). In short, the mission the UN conducted in 
Bosnia and other former Yugoslav land were essentially hostile military missions 
by lightly armed military personnel within the non-coercive contexts. 
The structural effect of the end of the Cold War on the UN was that the new 
international humanitarian order of the post-Cold War era compelled the UN to do 
something to tackle the increased armed conflicts. The UN was definitely under 
pressure. Boutros-Ghali (1992) states in An Agenda for Peace that in the changing 
context of the post-Cold War international order traditional peacekeeping has been 
extended to include peacemaking, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace- 
building (p. 471-4). It is obvious that the UN's intention to change its peacekeeping 
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function to a grey area mission was created and carried out within the structural 
contexts of the post-Cold War international order. An Agenda for Peace itself was 
the expression of the UN's desire for the new world order. Then, the question can 
be raised: why did the UN desire to enter the grey zone in spite of their 
unreadiness? According to the `rational decision-making' model, an agent is trying 
to conduct a `rational choice' through the process in general: situation -* analysis 
-f action. In the trend of the early post-Cold War international order, the UN 
simultaneously produced its `actions' based on the `situations' without the 
`analysis' process. It seemed to be almost a conditioned reflex action. Whenever 
regional or inter-ethnic conflicts occurred, the UN immediately sent its 
peacekeeping troops, lacking strategic consideration and attempts to clarify the 
diversity of each conflict. At the beginning of the 1990s, the UN deployed only 
around 10,000 military personnel in ten peacekeeping missions. However, in 1994 
the number was rapidly increased to over 80,000 military and police troops in 
seventeen operations. After the UN had learned from the lessons of the failures in 
Somalia and Bosnia, only about 14,000 were engaged in UN peacekeeping missions 
in 1999 (Weiss and Collins 2000: 31-2). 
The failure of the European states in Bosnia was fully predictable. As explained in 
the Somalia chapter, the structural change of the Cold War system raised 
expectations that a new world order could be constructed, which would be more 
peaceful and democratic. For many European leaders the end of the Cold War 
created an opportunity for the European Community to set itself up as a premier 
security institution within the new order in handling armed conflicts or any other 
security issues in Europe. The Bosnian crisis was a test case to take such a role. 
However, most of the existing institutions for European security at that time were 
not able to effectively tackle the crisis because they were not suitable to handle 
such a serious armed conflict. Freedman (1994b) states as follows: 
All institutions with some claim on the security affairs of the new Europe have been 
damaged through their association with the Balkan crisis. The Conference on 
Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) was just stirring as the crisis broke and 
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was immediately sidelined. The Western European Union (WEU) showed that it 
could be used for the more symbolic forms of military action (such as the monitoring 
of the trade embargo on Serbia and Montenegro in the Adriatic), but that it could not 
handle serious military operations, for which only NATO had the capacity (p. 7). 
NATO had the military capability to influence Serbian behaviour, but the military 
option of using NATO forces on the ground was not considered as it would mean 
risking NATO casualties. The crisis was regarded not so severe as to risk 
embroiling troops because it was perceived as an intra-state armed conflict though 
it was actually a war waged by regular armies of states. 
NATO is an essential institution for European security. However, its action 
to handle European security issues is not decided by European states only. It is 
explicit that America is the strongest and most influential actor in NATO. The lack 
of political will is often cited as a source of problems of international affairs. The 
reason that NATO did not consider the situation serious enough to use its ground 
force was because the key actor, the United States, did not have want to employ 
them. In the initial stage of the crisis in Yugoslavia, the insufficient political will of 
the United States to forcefully use NATO forces was a major stumbling block in 
resolving the conflict and preventing further catastrophes such as the fall of 
Srebrenica. This reluctance and the pushing of the UN into the theatre instead of 
NATO were the strategic actions of the United States towards the Bosnian crisis in 
the structural context of the post-Cold War. The early 1990s were crucial years for 
the U. S. foreign policy in terms of conflict management on a global perspective, 
regarding the Gulf War and resisting the tide of nationalist events of the post-Cold 
War order. The Bush Administration passed the Balkan issue to Europe to tackle 
the crisis by themselves. As Freedman (1994) points out, the United States might 
sense that `either this was a small enough problem to be managed using the 
Community's economic and political instruments, or else was such as a can of 
worms that it should be grateful for an excuse to keep clear' (p. 7). As soon as 
elected, President Clinton appeared to take action to lead its NATO partners for the 
crisis. Presidential Review Directive 13 (PRD 13) in 1993 was a proof of this. 
However, soon after the event Black Hawk Down in Somalia the Clinton 
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Administration was trying to minimise the involvement of U. S. troops in the 
Bosnian crisis to avoid political and military risks, though their political rhetoric 
demanded the active involvement of international society in the conflict. The 
former Danish Ambassador to the UN, Thorvald Stoltenberg states as follows 
regarding the situation of the early stage of the mission in Yugoslavia: 
[... ] the fewer people governments had on the ground, the more courageous 
statements they gave, demanding that `you must undertake military action'. 
American and German politicians were in the forefront of demanding more military 
actions while they had not a single young woman or man as a UN soldier on the 
ground. The French and the British were called cowards. But they had thousands of 
their own people there (Wolfgang Biermann, 16 October 1997: p. 6). 
The `strategic learning' from the failures in Somalia worked at this point. In 1995, 
it seemed to suddenly happen that the administration changed its pathway to active 
involvement in the crisis and taking a decisive role in restoring peace in Bosnia. It 
is clear that this sudden change of the U. S. policy broke the deadlock in Bosnia and 
eventually led to the Dayton Peace Accords in November 1995, which ended the 
Bosnian conflict. Why did Clinton decide to alter his stance and to be actively 
involved in the crisis? How did the `strategically selective context' and structural 
environment of the post-Cold War peace operations affect this decision-making of 
the key agent in the Bosnian intervention? 
Albright (2003) says `Bill Clinton's willingness' was one of the factors, 
which ended the Bosnian crisis (p. 189). Although she (2003) does not clearly 
explain why Clinton changed his mind, she alludes to the fact that the key factor of 
his turn-around was the massacre in Srebrenica: 
After Srebrenica, the President's frustration had boiled over, and Tony Lake 
[Anthony Lake, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, 1993-97] 
had asked for endgame papers focusing on the kind of post-conflict Bosnia we 
wanted to see. The papers were discussed at a key meeting in the White House 
Cabinet Room [... ]. As we had been from the beginning, the President's advisors 
were divided. I argued that U. S. troops were going to be in Bosnia sooner or later, 
[... ]. Europe has failed to resolve the crisis and, in the process, had diminished both 
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NATO and the UN. [... ] Neither the State Department nor the Defense Department 
suggested doing anything different from what we had been doing, with the Pentagon 
recommending a "realistic" approach under which we would accept the reality of 
Serb military power and seek a permanent cease-fire based on the status quo. [... ] I 
now waited tensely as Tony completed his summation and we all turned to the 
President to see his reaction. [... ] The president normally began his response to a 
presentation with a series of questions. This time it was obvious from the moment he 
started to speak that he had his mind made up. "I agree with Tony and Madeleine, " 
he said. "We should bust our ass to get a settlement within the next few months. We 
must commit to a unified Bosnia. And if we can't get that at the bargaining table, we 
have to help the Bosnians on the battlefield. " (p. 189-90) 
After the massive killing in Srebrenica, Bill Clinton decided to play an active role 
in the intervention. Clinton (2004) confirms this by saying that `after Srebrenica 
was overrun, I pressured the UN to authorize the rapid reaction force we had 
discussed at the G-7 meeting in Canada a few weeks earlier' (p. 666). However, it 
does not tell us that Srebrenica itself was the solitary motivation for the sudden 
change of the U. S stance towards the Bosnian war. It could have been a 
precipitating cause, but may not have been a decisive factor. States do not act 
without national interest, especially when there are great risks in performing their 
policies. What interest did President Clinton find in Bosnia and how did his 
administration try to secure U. S. national interest within the post-Cold War 
structural context avoiding the risks of the intervention? 
The Clinton Administration's foreign policy could be identified as 
interventionism. During his tenure Clinton and his administration, stressing human 
rights and democracy, had been eager to intervene in Yugoslavia, Somalia, North 
Korea, Haiti, and the Middle East. He said that `with a few thousand troops and 
help from our allies, even making allowances for the time it would have taken to 
deploy them, we could have saved lives [of Rwandans]. The failure to try to stop 
Rwanda's tragedies became one of the greatest regrets of my presidency' (Clinton 
2004: 593). He was keen to tackle humanitarian crises and resolve regional 
conflicts. Then, why was the administration reluctant to intervene in Bosnia and 
what changed the unwillingness? 
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The U. S. government initially viewed the Balkan wars as a European 
problem. According to Holbrooke (1998), Washington believed that, `with the Cold 
War over, it could leave Yugoslavia to Europe' (p. 29). This idea is related to 
President Clinton's view on the role of NATO in the post-Cold War era. As the 
Soviet Union collapsed, the question was raised: With no Soviet threat, why does 
the West still need NATO? According to Albright (2003), Clinton's answer was 
that `it remained the cornerstone of European security' and `other threats such as 
terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and ethnic cleansing' in 
the region had taken the place of the Soviet threat (p. 251). For Clinton, therefore, 
NATO and Europe should primarily have taken charge of the inter-ethnic wars and 
ethnic cleansings in the Balkans. 
The Yugoslav crises started in 1991. It was during the tenure of President 
Bush. George Bush was not interested in Yugoslavia because his administration 
thought that the United States had no express interests there. Moreover, at that time 
due to the Gulf War, the Middle East was a more critical region than the Balkans 
for U. S. national interest. The United States first started pressing for some form of 
military intervention in Bosnia in late 1992 when Bill Clinton was elected as the 
U. S. president. The Clinton Administration was pressured by both international and 
regional organisations, but was very reluctant to actively participate in the UN's 
peacekeeping operations in Bosnia. The very essence of the dilemma the Clinton 
Administration faced at that time consisted of two things: first, defining U. S. 
national interests in the use of military forces for intervention with humanitarian 
purpose and second, determining and developing a coherent national policy based 
on the interests concerned. The lack of a clearly articulated national policy for 
operating in the `grey zone' between peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission 
in hostile and intense inter-ethnic wars like the one in Bosnia could make the U. S. 
face another torment of the Vietnam War. The administration, thus, had sought to 
develop national policy on peace operations in drafting PRD 13, which called for 
increasing involvement of the U. S. troops in the greatly expanded UN peace 
operations around the world (Smith and Preston, June 18 1993). Though this draft 
document was not presented to President Clinton and was re-evaluated as the 
Somali crisis grew worse, the review itself implies that the active involvement of 
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the U. S. government to suppress genocide and crimes against humanity was 
congenial to American national interests. A memorandum of the State department 
to the President confirms this as follows: 
If the United States expects to retain its political leadership in the world, it must not 
be derelict when the slaughter of innocents occurs. The world looks to the United 
States for leadership when such depredations threaten. In cases such as Bosnia and 
Kosovo, the governments of Europe, which had the most immediate stake in 
stopping crimes against humanity, nonetheless refused to act without the political 
and military involvement of the United States. The United States, which leads in 
almost every other international endeavour, cannot simply exempt itself when mass 
murder of unarmed people unfolds (Frye 2000: 23). 
At a meeting of the U. S. foreign policy team in late June 1995, Albright (2003) as 
the U. S. Ambassador to the UN argued that: 
When U. S. leadership is questioned in one area, it affects our leadership in others. 
French President Chirac's recent statement that `the position of leader of the Free 
World is vacant' had been chilling my heart for weeks (p. 186). 
For the Clinton Administration, to secure U. S. leadership in the post-Cold War 
world was a vital national interest. The term national interest can be divided into 
two sub-concepts: `material interest' and `ideational interest'. The national interest 
with regard to U. S. leadership is an ideational interest. The dilemma for the 
administration related to the Bosnian conflict was that with only the ideational 
interest, Clinton and his assistants could not accept a great risk of casualties, which 
they might face if they decided to send U. S. troops in Bosnia. In the Gulf War, the 
U. S. government very quickly responded against the Iraqi invasion due to the 
material interest, oil. Bosnia was almost nothing to the U. S. in terms of material 
interest. That was why the U. S. government insisted on a casualty-free operation, 
`lift and strike', which refers to removing economic sanctions imposed on the 
former Yugoslavia and then using NATO's air force to strike the Bosnian Serbs. 
According to Woolley (1994), the determinants of military intervention are 
many: `calculations of domestic political support, legal restraints, moral arguments, 
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the importance of the target area, the interest and possible reaction of other nations 
and other military forces, available military forces, appropriateness of training for 
the mission, and the perceived value of the intervention compared to alternative 
measures' (p. 190). One of the most critical determinants among them for the 
administration was domestic political support from Congress and the public. The 
CRS Issue Brief'8 of Serafino in December 1996 on the U. S. military involvement 
in peacekeeping states that regarding the issue of involvement, the U. S. Congress 
was primarily concerned with two points: first, `when the President should consult 
with Congress and seek its approval to send U. S. troops on peacekeeping missions; 
and second, whether the Congress should restrict the placement of U. S. troops 
under U. N. control' (Serafino, December 3 1996). The massacre in Srebrenica and 
a Serb mortar attack on the main outdoor market in Sarajevo on 5 February 1994, 
which killed sixty-eight Bosnian civilians, gave President Clinton a chance to seek 
Congress' approval and the support of the public. The events evoked the deep 
concern of the U. S. public and international community over the situation in 
Bosnia. Soon after the mortar attack, the United States called an emergency 
meeting of NATO ministers; Yeltsin announced that Russia would deploy its 
troops around Sarajevo; and NATO's air strikes began. As explained earlier, just 
after the mass slaughter in Srebrenica President Clinton decided to play a decisive 
role in the Bosnian intervention. 
In some regional conflicts such as the Bosnia war, the U. S. government 
faced the difficult problem of identifying U. S. national interests with regard to the 
structural challenges of the new international order: the massive emergence of 
severe intra-state conflicts and the demand for coercive multilateral peace 
operations (Glenny 1995: 101). According to Hastedt (1991), in order to identify 
their national interests, states concern themselves with `how the international 
system provides opportunities and challenges to the realization of foreign policy 
objectives'. The international system is regarded in that consideration as 
comprising two parts: `structural constants' and trends of international order. In 
18 CRS refers to the Congressional Research Service, which is a part of the Library of 
Congress preparing its reports for the U. S. Congress. 
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terms of the structural constants, the international system, which has been in 
`ordered anarchy', is a `self-help' and `stratified' system. The self-help system 
means that states have to rely on themselves to accomplish their foreign policy 
objectives. Thus, policy-makers of each state try to make a balance between their 
goals and available power resources. The stratified system implies that agents in 
the system are born unequal. The ability of states to achieve the goals of their 
foreign policies varies from state to state (pp. 8-10). The post-Cold War 
international system is also in ordered anarchy, a self-help system, and very 
stratified as well. The United States in the anarchical order of the early post-Cold 
War system had the chance to become a genuine world leader and this was a key 
objective of its foreign policies. As the end of the Cold War removed the U. S. 's 
rival from the stratified system, it came to enable the U. S. to achieve its goal. For 
the accomplishment of this, the U. S. has tried to create a balance between the goal 
and resources it has had, and the Bosnian intervention was one of the results of this 
balancing. There is another effect of the post-Cold War structure on the agents' 
strategic actions. The `trend' of the post-Cold War international order as examined 
earlier is the expectation of the new world order for a more liberally democratised 
international community along with the emphasis on human rights and freedom. 
World leaders, especially those of the UN and U. S., transformed the expectation 
into actual policies. The ideational national interest of the U. S. meets its active 
involvement in the Bosnian crisis at this point. As the sole super power remaining 
in the post-Cold War international arena, the U. S. was expected to adopt a stance 
toward the crisis of international peace and security around the world. 
4.4 The Failure to Fill the Doctrinal Void 
This chapter has mainly explored the reasons for the debacle in Bosnia within the 
agential and structural framework in section 2 and section 3 respectively. The 
failure in Bosnia was due to the agent not being able to respond to or meet the 
military requirements in Bosnia, while the changes in the international structure 
meant that there were unrealistic expectations of what the UN could do. Hence, it 
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was a combination of both agent and structure. In terms of the agential perspective 
the failure of the UN peacekeeping mission in Bosnia was fundamentally caused by 
the fact that the UN employed peacekeeping techniques within the wrong context. 
Peacekeeping is a very useful tool to tackle small-scale and less-aggressive armed 
conflicts, but not suitable for such hostile and intensive war-fighting as occurred in 
Bosnia, which required the massive military operation of peace-enforcement action. 
The UN failed to appreciate the nature of the conflict and its own capability to 
manage it. Consequently, it sent its peacekeepers where there was no peace to keep. 
The UN has been criticised for its handling of the conflict. The UN 
peacekeepers could not prevent the ethnic cleansings and even failed to defend UN- 
designated `safe areas' in Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs seized UN peacekeepers and 
used them as a `human shield' against further attacks from NATO. Regarding the 
fact that the Bosnian crisis was almost a war waged by well-disciplined and 
heavily-armed forces differing from other regional conflicts in which the UN had 
intervened and that there was no peace to keep, the usual UN peacekeeping forces 
in terms of their mandate and facilities could not cope with the conflict. As Ruggie 
(1993) states, although the UN peacekeepers there had conducted a significant 
humanitarian role, they were unable to accomplish their mission as they were 
deployed in `a security environment for which the peacekeeping mechanism was 
not designed' (p. 26). In response to the deteriorating situation in Bosnia, the UN 
needed the enlargement of the peacekeeping mission in order to conduct peace- 
enforcement. Thus, the UN repeatedly expanded the UN Protective Force 
(UNPROFOR)'s mandate and strength, but UNPROFOR was fundamentally 
designed to act only as a peacekeeping force, not a war-fighting force in terms of 
its facilities and the rules of engagement. They also lacked adequate training and 
support from the UN for massive fighting with the mighty warring parties. The 
decision-makers of the UN mission sent the wrong type of troops to Bosnia. 
The initial involvement of the United Nations in the crisis began in 
September 1991 when the Security Council adopted Resolution 713 (1991). It was 
the first time throughout the UN's history that the UN applied the concept, `a threat 
to international peace and security', to a regional intra-state conflict. That means 
that the UN was very eager to tackle the crisis and eventually entered the domain of 
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the grey area between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission 
without any operational concepts to fill the doctrinal void and the required physical, 
financial, and organisational preparation for the transition. As Boutros-Ghali states 
in An Agenda for Peace, this shift was intentionally designed in the changing 
structural context of the post-Cold War international order. The end of the Cold 
War had widely spread the expectation of the new world order for a more peaceful 
and democratised international community, and made world leaders embody the 
expectation in their action to tackle regional and ethnic conflicts in the post-Cold 
War era like the Bosnian crisis. The UN was under the pressure of the international 
community to take such a role within this structural context. 
The Bosnian crisis was a test case for American and European leaders in 
that the European Community set itself up as a premier security institution in 
tackling armed conflicts or any other security issues in Europe. However, apart 
from NATO, European security institutions, such as CSCE and WEU, were not 
ready to cope with such a hostile and intensive armed conflict as that in Bosnia. 
Their strategic action to handle the crisis was to push the UN's way to the frontline 
of the brutal conflict, making the UN exploit the peacekeeping techniques within 
the inappropriate context. In other words, strategic considerations for the 
intervention were placed primarily on their policy stance in the structural change of 
the post-Cold War international system rather than the adequacy of established 
peacekeeping methods to cope with the new challenges with which the 
international community was confronted. As Luck (1995) states, it is crucial that 
`the right medication be applied to the right ailment at the right time' (p. 72). 
The Kosovo crisis is similar to the Bosnian conflict in terms of the brutality 
and intensity of their war-fighting, but very different in terms of the reaction of the 
international community. While peacekeeping and associated conflict management 
techniques were employed in Bosnia, the U. S. and European state chose 
multilateral armed intervention by the regional military organisation, NATO, 
heavily depending on the use of air power in Kosovo. The next chapter explores 
how this difference of the strategic action of the actors was formulated through the 
learning process of previous actions and within the structural contexts of the post- 
Cold War order. 
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Chapter 5: The New Challenges of the Old 
Issues in Kosovo 
The Security Council, 
1. Decides that a political solution to the Kosovo crisis shall be based on the general 
principles in annexl [... ]. 
Annex 1: 
Statement by the Chairman on the conclusion of the meeting of the G-8 Foreign 
Ministers held at the Petersberg Centre on 6 Ma1999 
The G-8 Foreign Ministers adopted the following general principles on the political 
solution to the Kosovo crisis: [... ] 
-A political process towards the establishment of an interim political framework 
agreement providing for a substantial self-government for Kosovo, taking full account 
of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the other countries of the region, and the 
demilitarization of the KLA; (United Nation Security Council 1999a). 
This is one of the key paragraphs of Resolution 1244 (1999) of the UN Security 
Council. Ignatieff (2003) dubs it `political science fiction' (p. 68). Why is it? The 
main reason is that the resolution contains conflicting or contradictory principles on 
the political solution to the Kosovo crisis. It reaffirmed the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) over Kosovo 
while promising substantial autonomy and self-government to the people of 
Kosovo. The two principles for the political settlement of the crisis, the territorial 
integrity of the FRY and substantial autonomy of Kosovo, do not function together 
at all, especially in the situation where Kosovars have strived to keep their 
autonomy allowed by the 1974 Constitution and Serb nationalists would remove 
the Albanians' autonomous rule over Kosovo. It is impossible that the G-8 foreign 
ministers and representatives of member states of the Security Council did not 
know that the two principles are mutually exclusive when they adopted the 
resolution. There must have been reasons why they would serve a purpose. This 
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chapter starts by seeking the reasons. 
The Kosovo crisis was different from the Bosnian conflict in terms of the 
nature of the conflict. While still controversial in a sense, the Bosnian crisis is 
identified as almost inter-state fighting; the Kosovo case is definitely an intra-state 
conflict. As the federal government of Yugoslavia collapsed at the early stage of 
the crisis, there were no legal arguments about national jurisdiction and territorial 
integrity in the way that there had been when the international community decided 
to intervene in Croatia and Bosnia. Kosovo was a territorial part of the FRY and 
the Republic of Serbia. Any problems in Kosovo were under the domestic 
jurisdiction of the FRY and sovereign states should refrain from intervening in 
matters within other state's national jurisdiction. This problem was one of the key 
issues, which the international community faced during the Kosovo intervention. 
The modern international system has been constructed based on the two universal 
concepts of `state-sovereignty' and `domestic jurisdiction'. These concepts 
established the `principle of non-interference' in domestic affairs of sovereign 
states, which was legalised as stated in the UN Charter and other key sources of 
international law. The military action of the international community against the 
Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY - Serbia and Montenegro) breached the 
sovereignty and territorial integrity of the FRY. 
This issue is linked with the claim of humanitarian purpose in the NATO 
intervention. The NATO air strike in Kosovo was conducted in the absence of 
explicit authorisation of the Security Council. However, as Morris (2005) notes 
some claim that `the action, though technically illegal, was nevertheless legitimate' 
(p. 306). Hence, the Kosovo case is very important in terms of this mutual 
exclusiveness of the two tenets: humanitarian intervention and the principle of non- 
interference. First, NATO's intervention resolved the crisis itself, but the old issue 
of the exclusiveness of the tenets still remains unresolved; second, this legal 
dispute has an explanatory connection with NATO's role in Kosovo and the 
question about Resolution 1244 mentioned above. To respond to the crisis in 
Kosovo, the Western states chose the unilateral armed intervention by NATO 
without clear UN authorisation on the use of force. This strategic action of the 
agents was different from their interventions in the Somali and Bosnian conflicts, 
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which were expressly authorised by the Security Council and conducted under the 
full auspices of the UN. The second section explores the reason why the UN did 
not authorise the NATO action and discusses legality and legitimacy of the action. 
The second issue is the mean of military intervention used in the Kosovo 
crisis. NATO's campaign in Kosovo was mainly conducted by air strikes to 
minimise casualties of the operating military persons. This new way of conducting 
a military operation implies that a new style of modern warfare emerged and 
offered the opportunity for the international community to have a new option for 
military intervention in conflict. Regarding the high risk of casualties in armed 
peace operations, states are more likely to solely rely on air power as a strategic 
and/or tactical means of their intervention in a humanitarian crisis rather than 
sending ground troops. Actually, the casualty problem has been seriously 
considered by states when they have decided to intervene in a troubled area. 
However, it is controversial whether using air power is a proper means for military 
intervention with humanitarian purpose. An air campaign using precision strike 
weapons raises these three questions: Do air strikes minimise the risk of civilian 
casualties?; Is it possible for countries other than the United States to use the 
strategy of air strikes given the military resources, technology and capabilities that 
they require?; and Are air strikes a more useful strategy than conventional ground 
operations for humanitarian intervention? I answer these questions in the second 
section. 
The last key issue to discuss in this chapter is related to the UN's role in the 
Kosovo intervention. It is explicit that the strong political will of NATO member 
states to tackle the conflict brought an end to the crisis. The intervention of the 
Western states in the Kosovo crisis comprises three different types of operation: 
first, the NATO air campaign (24 March -9 June 1999) as the unilateral use of 
force; second, peacekeeping operation by NATO force, KFOR (12 June 1999 - 
present); and third, UN peace operation, UNMIK (10 June 1999 - present). As 
soon as the crisis erupted, NATO member states quickly responded to the 
humanitarian disaster in Kosovo. Within the context of this international eagerness, 
the NATO bombing was conducted for 78 days without the explicit authorisation 
of the Security Council. In his speech at the Economic Club of Chicago, Blair (24 
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April 1999) stated the key objectives of the NATO action: 
-A verifiable cessation of all combat activities and killings 
- The withdrawal of Serb military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo 
- The deployment of an international military force 
- The return of all refugees and unimpeded access for humanitarian aid 
-A political framework for Kosovo building on the Ramnbouillet accords 
Through the air campaign and following peacekeeping operation by KFOR, NATO 
successfully achieved these objectives. The NATO action stopped Serb aggression 
against Kosovar Albanians and ensured the safe return of Kosovar refugees to their 
homes. NATO proved itself to be capable and effective in crisis management. 
The first elements of the NATO-led ground force entered Kosovo on 12 
June 1999. Its mission is to conduct peacekeeping operations under the authrisation 
of the Security Council through Resolution 1244 (1999). The mandate of the robust 
UN-authorised NATO peacekeeping force is derived from the resolution and a 
Military-Technical Agreement between NATO and the Government of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia and Serbia: `to deter renewed hostility and threats against 
Kosovo by Yugoslavia and Serb forces; to establish a secure environment and 
ensure public safety and order; to demilitarise the Kosovo Liberation Army; to 
support the international humanitarian effort; and to coordinate with and support 
the international civil presence' (NATO 2008). KFOR has been successfully 
carrying out this mandate so far. 
The UN's role in Kosovo was different from that of the operations in 
Somalia and Bosnia. Its multifunctional peace operation in Kosovo is being 
conducted by UNMIK, which was born on 10 June 1999 under the authorisation of 
Resolution 1244 (1999). This resolution has called upon UNMIK to pursue the 
objectives as follows: to perform basic civilian administrative functions; to 
promote the establishment of substantial autonomy and self-government in 
Kosovo; to facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo's future status; to 
coordinate humanitarian and disaster relief of all international agencies; to maintain 
civil law and order; to promote human rights; and to assure the safe and unimpeded 
return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes in Kosovo (UNMIK 
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2008). These multilateral burden-sharing approaches to the crisis between the UN 
and regional military organization NATO were the distinctive feature of the 
Kosovo intervention of the Western states, in particular contrasting with the Somali 
and Bosnian cases, where the UN and member states used peacekeeping techniques 
within peace-enforcement circumstances. What caused these differences of the 
strategic choice of the international community in tackling the crises in the early 
1990s and the conflict in the late 1990s? The third section answers this question. 
5.1 The Outbreak and Development of the Crisis in Kosovo 
As the Dayton Peace Accord of 21 November 1995 put an end to intense fighting 
and violence in Bosnia, the Balkans crisis seemed to end hostilities between the 
warring ethnic groups. However, differing from the expectation of the international 
society, severe open conflict resumed in the Balkans between Serbs and Kosovo 
Albanians. During the first phase of the conflict from February 1998 to March 
1999, the escalating conflict between Serbian paramilitary and police forces and 
Kosovo Albanian forces resulted in the deaths of around 1,000 civilians and over 
1,500 soldiers, and the evacuation of 400,000 people who sought or were forced 
into refuge outside Kosovo (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 
2000: 2). Why did the Kosovo crisis arise? 
It is obvious that the conflict was triggered by Serbian leader Milosevic's 
decision to remove the Kosovo Albanians' autonomy within Kosovo and take 
direct control of the region from Belgrade. His decision to alter the status of the 
region led to the Kosovo Albanians' peaceful civil disobedience until 1997 and 
then uprisings followed by intense armed conflict, which caused deep concern to 
the international community. Then, why did he decide to face the easily predictable 
risk? It was 1989 when he stripped Kosovo of a high degree of its autonomy. It 
was also the same year that he became President of Serbia. This tells us something 
about the relationship between Milosevic's grand ambition of a Greater Serbia and 
the land of Kosovo. To put it differently, historical and demographical factors 
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worked as a catalyst allowing and facilitating Milosevic to exploit them in order to 
achieve his ambition of political leadership of a Greater Serbia. 
As explained in the previous chapter, Kosovo was one of the key resources 
of political power for Milosevic. He rose to supreme power in Serbia by channeling 
Serbian nationalism, especially through his speech on the 600th anniversary of the 
Battle of Kosovo in 1989. What was the meaning of the Battle of Kosovo or 
Kosovo itself for Serb nationalists? Why would Milosevic and Serb nationalists not 
leave the Kosovo Albanians to enjoy their autonomy? Kosovo has been a land of 
long-running dispute between Serbs and Albanians. Both ethnic groups have put 
forward their own claim to the land. Albanians assert that they are Kosovo's 
original inhabitants and Serbs say that the land is a part of their medieval kingdoms. 
The Ottoman Turks had ruled the region since the end of the 14th century. Serbs 
had fought several battles against the Turks including the Battle of Kosovo. Serbia 
achieved its independence as a state in 1898, but Kosovo still remained under the 
Ottoman Turks' rule (BBC News, 5 June 1999). Nearly five centuries of Ottoman 
rule left two different key legacies to Serbs and Albanians: the Serbian ethnic 
symbolism of `the Battle of Kosovo' and the change to the balance of population in 
Kosovo. 
The Battle of Kosovo was waged in 1389. The Serbian prince, Lazar 
Hrebeljanovic, led an assembled force of mainly Serbs and some Albanians and 
Bosnians to fight the invading Ottoman Turks in Kosovo Polje. The Turks defeated 
the Serb-led allied force and Prince Lazar died in battle. As the loss of the battle 
paved the way for the Turks' control over all of the Serbian lands, Serbs have 
considered the defeat as the beginning of the oppression and degradation of the 
Serb nation. Even today, the Battle is recalled in Serbian epic songs and poems. 
The political implication of the event is that as the Battle has exercised a powerful 
grip on the Serbian imagination, Kosovo has been a significant part of the Serbian 
national consciousness (GlobalSecurity. org 2005b). In other words, the historical 
event became a cornerstone bridging the gap between Serbian nationalism and the 
land of Kosovo. The call to `avenge Kosovo' became a symbolic motto of 
awakening Serbian nationalism. As previously argued, Milosevic used the 
`symbolised Kosovo' to make himself a charismatic Serbian leader. He resorted to 
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it when he delivered his speech in Kosovo on the 600th anniversary of the Battle. 
His tactic was successful in awakening Serbian nationalism and making a name for 
himself as a nationalist leader. 
The other legacy of Ottoman rule was the demographical and religious 
changes of the inhabitants in Kosovo. According to Todorova (1997), this legacy of 
the Ottoman Empire was different from that of the Austrian-Hungarian Empire in 
the ways of dealing with minority problems. Whereas the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire allowed each ethnic group to maintain the highest degree of their own 
national consciousness and culture, the Ottoman Empire assimilated inhabitants or 
emigrants into the imperial homogeneity of the Empire (p. 176). Though it is not 
easy to fully appreciate the causes of this difference between the two imperial 
systems, it seems obvious that one of the major and crucial factors was the 
religious dissimilarity. Christianity has a tendency to coexist with ethnic identities, 
but in the Muslim sphere the national consciousness of each ethnic group survives 
less than in the Christian domain as it is dissolved into the Muslim brotherhood. Of 
course, it does not mean that Islam fully became an alternative form of national 
consciousness. In the Muslim sphere of the Balkans, Turkish, Bosnian, and 
Albanian nationalism existed. However, their national consciousnesses were 
weaker than that of Serbians and Croatians. Thus, the differentiation between 
Christianity and Islam explains why Serbs migrated to the territory of the Austro- 
Hungarian Empire during the period of Turkish rule and 70% of the Albanian 
population converted to Islam from Roman Catholicism or Orthodoxy under the 
Turkish rule. In the course of the Serbs' armed struggle against the Turks up to the 
17th century, many Serbs who had lived in Kosovo moved northwards to the land 
of the Austrian Empire. For Orthodox Serbians, it might be easier to live with 
Catholic Croatians in the Christian community in spite of the different 
denominations of Orthodoxy and Catholicism than to convert to Islam. Albanians 
who lived in the hostile mountain areas filled the demographical void of Kosovo's 
fertile land. As the number of Serb emigrants to the land of the Austrian Empire 
increased, the majority of the population of Kosovo changed from Serbians to 
Albanians. 
In 1974, Tito's Yugoslav government granted Kosovo full autonomy, which 
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was equivalent to Yugoslavia's six republics. Through the granting of the 
constitutional rights except rights for foreign affairs and military force, Kosovo 
came to have its own parliament, government and police force. Serbs were also 
worried because due to Serb emigration and a high Albanian birth rate the 
proportion of Serbs in the province had fallen to a mere one for every nine 
Albanians. As Milosevic grabbed power by manipulating these grievances, he 
needed to show Serb nationalists something strong through his `policy of 
Serbianisation' in order to transform his own image into that of a charismatic 
political leader. It was the deprivation of the constitutional rights for the Kosovo 
autonomy. Under the leadership of Ibrahim Rugova, Kosovo Albanians opted for 
the Ghandian-style peaceful resistance to Serbian rule declaring their independence 
and running a parallel state. However, over the two years till 1998 Rugova had 
come under increasing attack from radicals who claimed that this pacifism was 
tantamount to passivity. As the Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) emerged, 
Albanians increasingly turned down Rugova's non-violent movement and prepared 
to take up arms against Serbia (Wheeler 2000: 257-8). 
It was 1989 when the right of self-government was removed from the 
Kosovo Albanians. Then, why did the Kosovo crisis arise after almost 10 years? 
From 1989 to 1998 there had been continuous uprisings by Albanians and violence 
between both sides. During the first half of the 1990s, both Milosevic and the 
international community could not give their full attention to the situation in 
Kosovo because it was relatively less serious than the crisis in Croatia and Bosnia. 
In the course of the Dayton peace negotiations in 1995, Milosevic temporarily 
ditched his nationalist rhetoric for the claim of a Greater Serbia, and instead spoke 
of peace and conciliation. What was essential for him at that time was the lifting of 
the international economic sanctions, which were imposed in 1991 and seriously 
damaged the Serbian economy from then onwards. He was quite successful 
throughout the peace negotiation and was finally rewarded with a partial lifting of 
the sanctions (Judah, 9 March 1998). 
The situation in Serbia and Kosovo began to sharply deteriorate from 1996. 
Milosevic faced massive protests from Serb nationalists against his government 
due to his political gesture of peaceful relationships with other ethnic parties shown 
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during the mid-1990s. Many Kosovo Albanians were losing their patience with the 
Rugova's Ghandian-style passive resistance to Serbian rule. This was because not 
only had they been exhausted by the hopeless and painful struggle, but also the 
Dayton Peace Accord was focused only on Bosnia and there was no mention of 
Kosovo. Kosovo was not a priority at all for the international community at that 
time. This was the key motivation, which made many Kosovars feel that the 
strategy had finally failed and look to more radical and violent movements such as 
the KLA (Independent International Commission on Kosovo 2000: 50). In addition 
to the Dayton aspect, there was another external factor, which affected the 
intensification of the KLA's armed struggle against the Serbs. It was the anti- 
government uprising of 1997 in Albania. The ongoing situation of insecurity in 
Albania during the mid-1990s produced the large scale Albanian Diaspora 
spreading especially over Western Europe. The Diaspora's financial support for the 
KLA enabled it to be equipped with arms and be well organised to fight against the 
Serbs. The emergence of the KLA changed the situation dramatically because it 
meant the sharp increase in reciprocal violence and terrorism. The hit-and-run type 
of terrorist attacks by Kosovo Albanians on Serbian police or paramilitary forces 
increased and at the same time pervasive Serbian police harassment was 
proliferated and intensified. The escalating mutual violence eventually paved the 
way for open and serious armed conflicts between both sides. The fighting in the 
Drenice/Drenica region was one of the major conflicts, which mainly caused the 
deep international concern. As more than 80 civilians were killed there in late 
February 1998, it marked the end of the domestic ethnic dispute with the campaign 
of non-violent resistance and the onset of massive military conflict with deep 
international concerns. 
5.2 The Use of Force of the Key Actor, NATO 
The Dayton Agreement was half successful. It managed to stop violence and 
massive humanitarian abuses in the regions of the republics of the former 
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Yugoslavia mainly in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but also paved the way for another 
conflict in Kosovo. The outbreak of the Kosovo crisis was the proof that the 
objective of the Accord, to obtain a peaceful and secure environment in the 
Balkans, still remained out of reach. One of the key reasons was that the Accord 
refused to pay attention to the Kosovo Albanians' expectations. The `betrayal of 
Dayton', as it was dubbed by Kosovars, made the Albanians change their non- 
violent strategy performed by the Democratic League of Kosovo (DLK) under the 
leadership of Ibrahim Rugova into the hostile and aggressive movement. It resulted 
in the emergence of the KLA. The significance of the KLA's surfacing derives 
from the increase of intensified violence between Serbs and the Albanians. The 
KLA started to attack Serb targets and Serb forces responded by spreading their 
assaults against the Albanians using heavy weapons and air power. The KLA 
guerrillas' strategy was not to defeat the Serbs but force foreign intervention. They 
succeeded brilliantly. As the fighting grew more severe, the nature of the conflict in 
Kosovo had transformed from a small-scale domestic dispute to an 
internationalised humanitarian crisis in terms of the international concerns about it. 
However, the international community did not seriously consider the crisis at its 
early stage. The UN and Western governments were standing in a neutral position 
blaming both sides. The Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 (1998) on 23 
September: 
The Security Council, 
Condemning all acts of violence by any party, as well as terrorism in pursuit of 
political goals by any group or individual, and all external support for such activities 
in Kosovo, including the supply of arms and training for terrorist activities in 
Kosovo [... ], 
[... ] 
Affirming that the deterioration of the situation in Kosovo, Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia, constitutes a threat to peace and security in the region (United Nations 
Security Council 1998b), 
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However, the tone of the Security Council's voice changed during late 1998 and 
early 1999. In Resolution 1244 (1999), the Security Council confirmed that the 
crisis in Kosovo should be regarded as an international crisis, with which all the 
UN member states should be deeply concerned for international peace and security. 
The resolution states as follows: 
The Securi Council, 
Determining that the situation in the region continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security (United Nations Security Council 1999a), 
As legal terms, `a threat to peace and security in the region' mentioned in 
Resolution 1199 (1998) and `a threat to international peace and security' in 
Resolution 1244 (1999) are very different in the degree to which they express the 
`prospective response' to a threat. While the former will bring no actual action or 
limited intervention with non-military means, in the case of the declaration of the 
latter the UN would use all possible means including the use of force in order to 
prevent the threat because to maintain international peace and security is the prime 
purpose of the UN. Thus, the change of the terms implies that the member states of 
the Security Council were reluctant to intervene in Kosovo at the early stage of the 
crisis, but as the crisis was getting worse they were increasingly concerned that 
something needed to be done about the situation. However, although the UN 
referred to Kosovo as a threat to international peace and security, it did not 
authorise the NATO bombing. The key issue was domestic jurisdiction and 
territorial integrity. Chapter I of the UN Charter contains the purposes of the UN 
and principles that the UN itself and its members should follow in pursuit of the 
purposes: 
Article 2 [of Chapter I] 
[... ] 
4. All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of 
force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations. 
[... J 
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7. Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to 
intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the 
present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement 
measures under Chapter VII (United Nations 1945: 6-7). 
These principles are universal and essential to maintaining the current international 
system based on the spirit of the Westphalia Treaty in 1648. However, there are no 
laws without exceptions. The last sentence of the 7th principle means that 
international community can intervene in any matter of any state if the Security 
Council decides to do so in order to maintain international peace and security 
according to the process of Chapter VII of the Charter: 
Article 39 [of Chapter VII] 
The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, 
breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or 
decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Article 41 and 42, to 
maintain or restore international peace and security. 
[... ] 
Article 41 
The Security Council may decide what measures not involving the use of armed 
force are to be employed to give effect to its decisions, and it may call upon the 
Members of the Untied Nations to apply such measures. [... ] 
Article 42 
Should the Security Council consider that measures provided for in Article 41 
would be inadequate or have proved to be inadequate, it may take such action by 
air, sea, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international 
peace and security. [... ] (United Nations 1945: 27-8). 
Thus, in order to prevent the spread of the violence the international community 
could have intervened in Kosovo at the early stage avoiding the initial hesitation 
if 
the Security Council decided to do so. Unfortunately, the Council was unable to do 
that because of the political tension between the West and the East. The old issue 
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of the Cold War period resumed, in a different guise, in the post-Cold War era. The 
conflict between the principles in Resolution 1244 (1999) resulted from a 
compromise between America, and Russia and China. This is the reason why the 
resolution turned out to be `political science fiction' as explained in the 
introductory section. In the Bosnian crisis, Russia and China did not stand against 
the West throughout each stage of the crisis rather they were cooperative. However, 
why did they oppose the early attempt of Western governments to intervene in 
Kosovo? The reason is linked to the issue of domestic jurisdiction. 
As permanent member states of the Security Council, Russia and China did 
not vote against the early resolutions for the Kosovo crisis. However, both 
governments expressed deep reservations about the intervention in Kosovo. In the 
3868th meeting of the Security Council on 31 March 1998, Russian Ambassador 
Fedotov strongly argued that `the Russian Federation had viewed the recent events 
in Kosovo as the internal affair of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia' and `that 
autonomous region [Kosovo] must remain within Serbia on the basis of unswerving 
compliance with the principle of the territorial integrity of the FRY'. In the meeting, 
Chinese Representative Shen Guofang also stressed that the crisis in Kosovo 
should be resolved `on the basis of the principle of respect for the sovereignty and 
territorial integrity of the FRY' (United Nations Security Council 1998d: 10-11). 
Russia and China has been deeply concerned about Western intervention, 
especially by the U. S., in their own ongoing domestic disputes such as Chechnya 
and Tibet respectively. For example, the U. S. government had repeatedly expressed 
its concerns for the status of human rights in China mentioning Tibet and the Dalai 
Lama. The recognition of Taiwan as an independent state is still a hot issue for 
China. The Chinese government has been very sensitive to the claim of Taiwan. 
The Russian Federation has been also concerned about potential intervention of the 
West within the crises in autonomous republics of the federation. For Russians, the 
West seemed to be focusing unfairly on what it saw as a disproportionate use of 
force against the Muslim fighters in Chechnya. Mr. Shen Guofang revealed the 
fundamental reason for the objection, saying that `Many countries in the region are 
multi-ethnic. If the Council is to get involved in a dispute without a request from 
the country concerned, it may set a bad precedent and have a wider negative 
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implication' (United Nations Security Council 1998d: 11-12). `A precedent' was 
the reason that Russia and China strove to claim the principles and the Western 
member states needed to compromise on the resolution in order to secure the 
intervention of the international community in Kosovo. 
This political compromise has caused a legal controversy about the legality 
of the NATO bombing. As mentioned in the introductory section, the Security 
Council did not expressly authorise the NATO action. In 1998, it passed three 
resolutions in response to the situation in Kosovo: Resolution 1160 (1998), 1199 
(1998), and 1203 (1998). Gray (2000) notes that these resolutions `may justify a 
claim that NATO was acting in pursuance of the aims of the international 
community, but they cannot support any claim of implied authorisation of force 
against Yugoslavia by NATO' (p. 194). Several states such as France, the 
Netherlands, and Slovenia, tried to justify the military action by NATO, 
emphasising that the resolutions were passed under Chapter VII and NATO had 
been entitled to act in accordance with the resolutions. In the 3989 meeting on 26 
March 1999, the Security Council voted on a resolution, which affirmed that `the 
unilateral use of force by NATO constituted a violation of Article 2(4), Article 24 
(on the primacy of the Security Council), and Article 53 (on the need for Security 
Council authorization of enforcement action by regional organization)'. This draft 
resolution was rejected by three votes in favour (China, Namibia, and Russia) to 
twelve against (Gray 2000: 34). 
The Security Council referred to the situation in Kosovo as a threat to 
international peace and security in Resolution 1244 (1999), suggesting that there 
could be some basis of legitimacy to international action. Determining what 
constitute a threat to international peace and security by the Security Council is as 
Morris (2005) dubs `the trigger mechanism for the utilization of its Charter powers 
under Chapter VII' (p. 304). He argues that the NATO action in Kosovo did not 
`constitute a total rejection of UN principles': 
NATO member states insisted that they were acting pursuant to previous Security 
Council resolutions and in accordance with human rights principles enshrined in the 
UN Charter; a draft Russian-sponsored resolution condemning NATO action was 
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overwhelmingly defeated by twelve votes to three; there was widespread support for 
NATO action outside of the Council, though this was never tested in the General 
Assembly; and, following the cessation of hostilities, the United Nations assumed 
responsibility for maintaining security in the region (p. 306) 
Along with this legal controversy over the legality and legitimacy of the NATO 
action, Operation Allied Force has raised anther controversial issue, the use of air 
power as a means of military intervention with humanitarian purpose. 
The retired U. S. General Wesley Clark (2001) was the Supreme Allied Commander 
of NATO during the crisis and so he was the top field officer, who was in charge of 
all NATO operations including air strikes. He describes his dialogue with Robin 
Cook at the NATO foreign ministers meeting in the spring of 1998 in Luxembourg: 
Robin Cook, the British foreign minister, called me aside for a discussion. Could 
Milosevic's policy of increasing repression be halted by the threat of airpower? He 
asked. I related my collection of our experiences in 1995, and the conversation with 
Milosevic after the Dayton agreement. Yes, probably, I concluded. Cook and several 
others seemed determined that we would not allow another round of this Balkan 
tragedy (pp. 113-4). 
For the leaders of the NATO states, air strikes were considered the best option to 
stop Milosevic, but they were not sure how to use armed force at the beginning 
because it was the first time the international community had massively used 
airpower in a peace operation without the support of ground troops. NATO has 
experienced the use of airpower in Bosnia, but it had the limited purpose of 
supporting the mission of ground troops of the UN and NATO. One question can 
be raised: Why did the NATO leaders choose airpower as the prime means of their 
mission in Kosovo in spite of the uncertainty of its efficacy? The reason is clear: 
they wanted to minimise the risks of casualties, their own and civilian. This is 
definitely the effect of the lesson learned from the intervention in Somalia. As 
shown in Somalia, the consensus to support armed intervention for humanitarian 
purposes can be easily shaken by media coverage of the death of even a single 
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soldier. 
The risks of armed ground operations are a thorny problem for decision- 
makers of peace operations. Clinton (2004) states in his autobiography that he was 
`determined not to allow Kosovo to become anther Bosnia' and `so was Madeleine 
Albright' (p. 849). As the U. S. intervention in Kosovo was called `Albright's war' 
by the media, she was surely eager to resolve the crisis as much as Clinton was. 
According to Ignatieff (2000), Holbrooke wanted to demonstrate in Kosovo that 
American leadership could stop any crisis and secure peace if they wanted to and 
that `his own highly personalised diplomacy' could achieve the expected result as 
proven at Dayton (pp. 16-7). Despite the enthusiasm of Clinton's foreign policy 
team, the U. S. government was reluctant to intervene with armed forces at the 
beginning of the crisis. The first reason was as explained earlier that the conflict in 
Kosovo was recognised as a domestic affair under the national jurisdiction of the 
FRY; and the second was that the lessons of Somalia had made the military 
planners cautious about the risks of deploying ground troops for peace operations. 
Clinton (2004) says that `After Black Hawk Down, whenever I approved the 
deployment of forces, I knew much more about what the risks were, and made 
much clearer what operations had to be approved in Washington' (p. 554). It is a 
very harsh task for the planners to persuade and console the public including the 
families of the soldiers who had lost their lives in peace operations in foreign lands. 
Soon after Black Hawk Down, Clinton visited Walter Reed Army Hospital to meet 
several of the wounded soldiers and the families who had lost their sons in the 
event. There, he was asked tough questions by the families, `what their sons had 
died for and why we had changed course' (Clinton 2004: 554). On armed peace 
operations, the risk of significant casualties is scarcely acceptable because for 
many ordinary people the value of the prize of a successful peace mission is not 
worth the risk. 
On 23 March 1999, NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana ordered, with 
the full support of the Clinton Administration, General Clark to commence air 
strikes against Serbian targets. The air strikes lasted 78 days. In the month before 
the beginning of the bombing, the House of Representatives of the U. S. Congress 
voted 219-191 to support the deployment of U. S. ground troops in Kosovo `if there 
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was a peace agreement' (Clinton 2004: 850). It implies that the U. S. government 
would not send its troops to create peace or even conditions for peace in Kosovo. 
The only means of armed force to be used for this purpose was the use of air strikes. 
Blair initially made it clear that `We do not plan to use ground troops in order to 
fight our way into Kosovo' and also stressed that `I do not accept that land troops 
are necessary to curb repression in Kosovo. Air strikes properly targeted - directed 
against the military capability of the oppressor - can achieve the objective that we 
set ourselves' (quoted in Vickers 2000: 57). Clinton also did not consider sending 
ground troops as a possible option for Kosovo. Though Blair wanted a new stance 
on it later and had a discussion about the option with Clinton, this did not mean that 
the policy to rule out the option would be changing. They kept their initial position 
as promised (Vickers 2000: 65). Regarding the ground option, Clark (2001) states 
as follows: 
He [U. S. Secretary of State] also clarified the U. S. position, at least as far as this 
summit [NATO's fiftieth anniversary summit in Washington on 23-25 April 1999] 
was concerned: "Nothing about ground forces. We have to make this air campaign 
work, or we'll both be writing our resumes. " It was clear guidance (p. 271). 
Clinton (2004) argued against those who were uncertain about the reliability of air 
strikes as a military tactic for a peace operation saying that: 
Some people argued that our position would have been more defensible if we had 
sent in ground troops. There were two problems with that argument. First, by the 
time the soldiers were in position, in adequate numbers and with proper support, 
the Serbs would have done an enormous amount of damage. Second, the civilian 
casualties of a ground campaign would probably have been greater than the toll 
from errant bombs (p. 851). 
Are his arguments right? The first one could be political rhetoric. If a U. S. 
president decides and directs, the Department of Defense 
is able to mobilise a 
lightly armed infantry brigade to be deployed anywhere on the earth within a 
month by using large transport planes such as the C-17 
Globemaster III or C-5 
Galaxy. A GAO report said that as the U. S. army has made significant progress in 
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transformation, creating the so-called `Stryker Brigade' 19, the army is able to 
deploy the brigade to any region within two weeks20 (U. S. GAO, June 2003: 2) 
(See Figure 5.1). If they used Special Forces such as Seals or Rangers, it would not 
take a week to deliver to the target area several teams of them by submarines or C- 
130 transport aircrafts. Operation Restore Hope in Somalia in 1993 showed how 
quickly the U. S. government was able to deploy their troops `in adequate numbers' 
for peace operations if they wished. According to Clark (2003), in the Gulf War in 
1991, the planning for the huge military operation consumed only five months, but 
in Kosovo, `the planning for the ground campaign wasn't even permitted until even 
the air campaign had been under way for the better part of a month' (p. 13). 
Figure 5.1: Estimated Ranges of Stryker Brigade Air Deployment21 Times to 
Selected Global Regions 
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(Source: GAO's analysis of Military Traffic Management Command data; U. S. GAO, 
June 2003: 11) 
19 It is an infantry brigade equipped with a newly developed eight-wheeled armoured 
combat vehicle, the Stryker. The key purpose of the creation of the Stryker and Stryker 
brigade was to enhance the ability to rapidly deploy infantry brigades anywhere in the 
globe, increasing its firepower in combat. 
20 The army's original goal was the 96-hour worldwide deployment of a Stryker Brigade 
(U. S. GAO, June 2003: 3). 
21 In the figure, the star symbols stand for the locations of aerial ports, where Stryker 
brigades would embark. 
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The second of Clinton's arguments is related to the first question of the air 
strike issue mentioned in the introductory section: Do air strikes minimise the risk 
of civilian casualties? A report of the Ministry of Defence (2000) states that 
although the air campaign in Kosovo was `one of the most accurate air operations 
ever mounted, and resulted in very few instances of collateral damage', it was `not 
possible to avoid some collateral damage' in the armed conflict. `Collateral 
damage' is a military term used to describe `the unintended loss of civilian life or 
injury to civilians, or the damage to civilian property, which is caused by attacks on 
military objectives'. According to Human Rights Watch, between around 488 and 
527 Yugoslav civilians were killed by NATO air strikes. However, the Allied 
forces did not lose even a single pilot during the air campaign. NATO destroyed a 
total of 440 static and 1,067 mobile targets, such as command posts, military 
airfields, oil refineries, tanks, artillery pieces, and military vehicles, through the 
campaign (pp. 35-7). Comparing these figures to the toll of civilian casualties, the 
bombing could be assessed as a successful operation from the viewpoint of the 
military strategy. While air strike could be a very useful means to achieve `zero 
casualties of military service-persons', who were involved in operations, it is sure 
that the use of air power does not guarantee `zero casualties of civilians' in any 
armed conflict. On 14 April 1999, NATO missiles hit two civilian convoys of 
Kosovo Albanians leaving western Kosovo. The result of this mistaken bombing 
on the road between Djakovica and Prizren was that around 75 people died and 25 
were wounded (CNN. com, 15 April 1999). 
Is it possible for countries other than the United States to use the strategy of 
air strikes given the military resources, technology and capabilities that they 
require; are air strikes a more useful strategy than conventional ground operations 
for humanitarian intervention? What is an important point in air campaigns is the 
accuracy of the strike. In Kosovo, Serbian forces widely used `asymmetric tactics', 
which means non-conventional tactics in war. For example, the Yugoslav and 
Serbian forces deployed their tanks or military equipment in the middle of civilian 
villages to prevent the bombing of NATO, as it was concerned with minimising 
collateral damage (Ministry of Defence 2000: 35). In that situation, Precision 
Guided Munitions (PGM) were essential in order to achieve 100% accuracy of 
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bombing. The conventional non-guided bombs also played an effective role in 
some sorties, but NATO heavily relied on PGM, such as the Tomahawk cruise 
missile, laser guided bombs like Paveway II and III, and Global Positioning System 
(GPS)-guided Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM). Moreover, attacks against the 
tactical targets in Kosovo required the highly precise capability of searching and 
identifying targets and of protecting bombers from the threats of FRY's air defence 
capabilities like anti-aircraft guns or Surface-to-Air Missiles (SAM). For this, 
many kinds of aircrafts are required: for example E-3D, the Airborne Warning and 
Control System (AWACS); E-8C, the Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar 
System (JSTARS); and EA-6B Prowler, the Electronic Warfare (EW) and the 
Suppression of Enemy Air Defence (SEAD)-capable aircraft. As is easily predicted, 
PGM and those aircrafts are very expensive and need a high cost of management 
and maintenance. Thus, precision bombing is a costly strategy that is beyond the 
military capabilities of most countries in the world. It is estimated that NATO spent 
approximately £2.5bn on the bombing in Kosovo (BBC News, 15 October 1999). 
Regarding the Defence expenditures of major European and North American 
countries, there are only a few states, which are able to cope with such an amount 
of cost for a peace operation in a foreign land (See Table 5.1, p. 145). It could be 
possible that the United Kingdom, France, Germany or maybe Italy would solely 
conduct precision bombing as a means of humanitarian intervention, but none of 
them would do it without the United States due to the cost and efficacy of the 
campaign. 
The air campaign in Kosovo was the largest combat operation in NATO's 
history. The key objective of the bombing was to compel Milosevic to cease the 
violence in Kosovo and restore peace throughout the Balkan region. A war has 
three levels of performance: strategic, operational, and tactical. At the strategic 
level, a country sets up major and minor goals for its use of forces and formulates 
plans to use resources to achieve the objectives. At the operational level of war, 
commanders of forces make plans and conduct major campaigns and operations to 
accomplish strategic objectives within the theatre of war. The tactical level of war 
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is the level at which battles22 and engagements are planned and conducted to 
achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (U. S. GAO, July 
2001: 5). 
Table 5.1: Defence Expenditures of Major NRC23 Countries 
(in millions / US dollars) 
Country 1995 2005 
Belgium 4,449 4,769 
Canada 9,077 12,538 
Denmark 3,118 3,694 
France 47,768 54,841 
Germany 41,160 39,271 
Greece 5,056 7,081 
Italy 19,375 32,397 
Netherlands 8,012 10,268 
Norway 3,508 4,980 
Russian Federation 12,523 ... 
Spain 8,651 13,600 
Turkey 6,606 11,650 
United Kingdom 33,836 52,772 
United States 278,856 472,236 
(Source: NATO, 8 December 2005) 
At the operational and tactical levels, the objectives of the air campaign in Kosovo 
including precision strikes were not fully achieved because there were many 
22 A battle means a series of armed encounters with a force of an enemy, whilst an 
operation is an arrangement of battles to accomplish strategic objectives (U. S. GAO, July 
2001: 5). 
23 The NATO-Russia Council (NRC) was created in May 2002 to facilitate cooperation 
and inter-operability between NATO allies and Russia on various 
issues of the post-Cold 
War security environment. The creation of this body was based on the existing mutual 
cooperative organisation, `the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint 
Council', which was 
established in 1997. 
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mistakes in bombing and collateral damages. That may have been because the 
campaign was conducted in the harsh circumstances of Milosevic's strong intention 
not to move back from Kosovo; the strategic decision strictly imposed on the 
operation to minimise the risk of military casualties; and the strategic goals of the 
campaign which were to be accomplished without the support of ground troops. 
For example, on 7 May 1999, NATO bombed the Chinese embassy in Belgrade 
killing three Chinese nationals. That serious mistake put the whole peace operation 
in Kosovo in jeopardy by provoking the protest of the Chinese government against 
the campaign. It was the kind of mistake which the military in Kosovo could hardly 
avoid because they were mostly using aerial photography to identify targets 
without the assistance of ground troops for surveillance and to search for targets. In 
this sense, some may say that air strikes are not a fully reliable means for 
humanitarian intervention. As shown in Kosovo using an air campaign without the 
support of ground troops for armed intervention can remarkably reduce the 
efficiency and efficacy of the intervention at the operational and tactical levels. 
However, others would argue that that way force was used was helpful in bringing 
an end to the crisis in that it made Milosevic give up his hostile intention and it 
enabled states to more easily decide on intervening in the conflict. From this point 
of view, the air campaign could be regarded as a useful means to achieve the key 
objective of the intervention at the strategic level. Then, what is the implication of 
the performance of NATO's air power for the future of peacekeeping operation? 
The UN's failure to solve the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia does not mean a 
failure of UN peacekeeping operation itself. The key issue related to the failings 
there was the problem of casualties. An air campaign is not a perfect method of 
intervention in terms of incidental loss of civilian life, but it could be a very useful 
means to minimise the casualties of military service-persons from contributing 
countries in peace operations. This new type of peace operation may be a very 
attractive way to facilitate states' involvement in conflicts and not to repeat the 
failings. The lessons of the NATO air campaign for future peace operations will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
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5.3 Peace Operations of NATO and the UN in the Post-Cold 
War Structure 
Security Council Resolution 1203 (1998) states as follows: 
The Security Council, 
1. Endorses and supports the agreements signed in Belgrade on 16 October 1998 
between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the OSCE, and on 15 October 
1998 between the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and NATO, [... ] 
An agreement was signed on 15 October 1998 between the FRY and NATO and on 
the following day another agreement was made between the FRY and the 
Organization for Security and Co-operation (OSCE). The key object of the 
agreements was to establish the NATO Air Verification Mission in Kosovo and the 
OSCE Kosovo Verification Mission respectively. The missions aimed to verify 
compliance by all parties to the Kosovo crisis with Security Council Resolution 
1199 (1998), which calls for the cessation of all hostile and violent actions by the 
security force of all parties and international monitoring on the situation (United 
Nations Security Council 1998b). As the statement of Resolution 1203 (1998) 
above implies, the OSCE and NATO were the main actors in coping with the crisis 
from the initial stage of the intervention of the international community, but the 
UN was not. Ramet (2005) argues that the UN was marginalized and brought in 
only for the purpose of legitimating the intervention in Kosovo (p. 220). Her 
allegation is wrong. It is obvious that the UN played an important role in 
coordinating and partly running humanitarian assistance through UNMIK (UN 
Mission in Kosovo) and also in facilitating the international community's response 
to the crisis by adopting Security Council resolutions. In this sense, the UN was not 
a bystander, but it was definitely a minor player in comparison with the OSCE and 
NATO. For instance, UNPROFOR in Bosnia was under the UN's authority and 
mandate, but KFOR was the ground force of NATO. In most crises of the post- 
Cold War era, especially those which broke out before 1995, the UN positioned 
itself at the front line of the conflict resolution and at the heart of the peace 
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operations in the crises. As argued earlier in other chapters, the UN had been very 
eager to intervene in the regional conflicts as the international structure of the Cold 
War era collapsed. However, the Kosovo intervention was an exception for the UN. 
To be precise, the UN's intervention in Kosovo was a sign of the change of the 
UN's stance towards the post-Cold War regional conflicts. In order to clarify the 
change, I need to answer this question first: Why did NATO play a key role in 
Kosovo instead of the UN? 
Before discussing NATO, it is necessary to explain the OSCE's role and 
what it did in Kosovo. The OSCE was one of the key players at the early stage of 
the conflict resolution. As explained above, the OSCE established the `Kosovo 
Verification Mission' (KVM), which consisted of up to two thousand international 
civilians or unarmed military personnel to verify whether all parties to the conflict 
were in compliance with Security Council Resolutions demanding the cessation of 
any violent actions. On the point that the KVM was the first ground operation of 
the international community, the OSCE's effort as a part of the peace operation in 
Kosovo was worthwhile. However, it does not mean that the OSCE was a more 
significant actor than NATO in the Kosovo intervention. First, the KVM's mandate 
was limited to the passive mission of the verification, not actively creating peace or 
conditions for peace like NATO did afterwards; and second, the KVM faced a 
number of difficulties in pursuit of its mission and finally failed to achieve its goals. 
The key reason for the failure was that the KVM was unable to create conditions 
for the political settlement of the crisis and stop Milosevic's intention to control 
over Kosovo due to the lack of the essential facilities and support needed to 
achieve them. According to Holbrooke, the term `verification' was carefully 
selected, but it simply means `monitoring' (cited in Walker 2001: 140). Nothing of 
the mission was different from ordinary UN observer missions in conflict. Thus, it 
is obvious that NATO was a more significant actor than the OSCE in terms of their 
role and mandate. 
At the early stage of the Kosovo crisis, the Western states did not have 
specific plans to intervene in the crisis. As crimes against humanity became 
widespread over the whole region, they had an idea that they should do something, 
but there were no clear answers to the questions: what to do and how to do it. 
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General Clark (2001) describes the attitude of the states towards the crisis at the 
early stage as follows: 
At the NATO foreign ministers meeting a few weeks later in Luxembourg, Klaus 
Naumann and I briefed the situation in the Balkans and our NATO efforts. 
Subsequently, Secretary Albright and most of the foreign ministers spoke of the 
impending dangers in Kosovo. There was a common condemnation of Milosevic and 
his policies, but no call for any specific action. [... ] 
When the session resumed, Klaus Kinkel, the German foreign minister, spoke 
as strongly as any. Since he represented Germany, he was listened to very carefully. 
He wanted to halt the campaign that we could all see unfolding. "A clear red line 
must be drawn, " he said emphatically. I was impressed by the strength of his 
remarks. As he left the hall I jumped up from the side to walk out with him. "Mr. 
Minister, great statement, " I said. "But let me ask you, what is the red line you have 
in mind? " I was concerned about the implications for our forces. The fact was, at the 
moment, there were no clear ideas on how to proceed. Policy was still unformed (p. 
113-4). 
This situation had changed to something serious as the term `credibility', which 
was one of the most frequently used words in the course of the intervention, came 
to the mind of the Western leaders. According to Wheeler (2000), the argument 
that 'NATO's credibility was at stake' was one of the four key rationales24, which 
Western governments called for to justify their intervention in Kosovo (p. 265). 
Robin Cook, the British Foreign Minister, delivered his speech in the House of 
Commons on 25 March 1999 emphasising the rationale: 
[... ] reason why Britain has a national interest in the success of this military action. 
And there are others. Our confidence in our peace and security depends on the 
credibility of NATO. Last October it was NATO that guaranteed the cease-fire that 
President Milosevic signed... What possible credibility would NATO have the next 
24 The other rationales are as follows: first, `their action was aimed at averting an 
impending humanitarian catastrophe'; second, `ethnic cleansing in Kosovo could not be 
allowed to stand in a civilized Europe and it posed a 
long-term threat to European 
security'; third, 'NATO's use of force was 
in conformity with existing Security Council 
resolutions' (Wheeler 2000: 265). 
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time our security is challenged if we did not honour that guarantee? The 
consequences of NATO inaction would be far worse than the result of NATO action 
(Wheeler 2000: 266). 
Tony Blair also concurred, saying that `to walk away [from Kosovo] now would 
destroy NATO's credibility'. Throughout the crisis, the leaders of NATO member 
states continually emphasised, with agreement, that the decision of the NATO's 
bombing campaign lased from 24 March to 11 June 1999 was obligatory for two 
reasons: `(1) to stop the violent ethnic cleansing that the NATO bombing 
precipitated, as anticipated; and (2) to establish "the credibility of NATO"' 
(Chomsky 1999: 134). 
Why did NATO's credibility become a key word of the intervention? To 
what extent was it significantly considered when Western governments decided to 
be involved in the crisis? These two questions provide the answers to this question: 
Why did NATO take a prime role in resolving the crisis instead of the UN? 
Furthermore, answering the two questions tells us how the systemic change of the 
international society since the demise of the Soviet Union affected the players in 
Kosovo, such as NATO state leaders and NATO itself. The two events, the Cold 
War ending and the Kosovo crisis, have almost a 10 year-gap. NATO is bridging 
the gap. To put it differently, the end of the Cold War caused Western political 
leaders to raise a question about the credibility of NATO and this situation affected 
NATO's role and actions in Kosovo. 
NATO was created in 1949 based on the North Atlantic Treaty of April 
within the framework of Article 51 of the UN Charter. The objective of the alliance 
is `to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and 
military means in accordance with the principles of the UN Charter' (NATO 1999: 
23). As a political and military organisation, an alliance needs a key factor: a 
shared purpose. For NATO, it is to protect member states from the threats of a 
common adversary. Thus, the existence of a `common enemy' is the essential 
condition for the sustainability of an alliance. The end of the Cold War was a great 
challenge to NATO. As the Soviet Union and its alliance, the Warsaw Pact, 
collapsed together, many Western leaders posed a question: With no Soviet threat, 
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why does the West still need NATO? NATO's prime enemy was the Soviet Union 
and its allies. A NATO handbook clearly states that `at the time of the Treaty's 
signature, the immediate purpose of NATO was to defend its members against a 
potential threat resulting from the policies and growing military capacity of the 
former Soviet Union' (NATO 1999: 23). The end of the Cold War stripped NATO 
of it adversaries so that it made NATO seemingly futile and purposeless. The 
problem of its credibility came to a head. 
NATO made an effort to revitalise its credibility in the post-Cold War era 
by developing many programmes, such as the establishment of the Euro-Atlantic 
Partnership Council (EAPC)25 and the opening-up of its membership especially 
towards East Europe26. One of the remarkable programmes was creating a new 
structure of cooperation with Russia. NATO and Russia had developed a reciprocal 
commitment since 1991 including the exchange of liaison officers and 
regularisation of enhanced dialogue. It resulted in the creation of the NATO-Russia 
Permanent Joint Council27 in 1997 and the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding 
Act also in 1997, which is a body to build confidence and develop a pattern of 
regular consultations and cooperation. As NATO's Cold War adversary became it 
partner, the change seemed to be great progress for European and international 
peace and security, but it was also a signal for the crisis of NATO's credibility. To 
tackle the situation of NATO cooperating with its adversary, the U. S. government 
and its allies needed to figure out a new mission for NATO stripping it of the old 
one, defending members from the threat of the Soviet Union. 
According to Albright (2003), Clinton's view of the new role of NATO in 
25 The EAPC was established in 1997 through the long preparation since 1992. Its main 
object is to develop dialogue and cooperation between NATO and its Cooperation Partners 
to strength peace and security in the Euro-Atlantic area. The members of the EAPC meet 
twice a year at both Foreign and Defence Minister level (NATO 1999: 84). 
26 NATO enlargement was considered from the early 1990s by its member states. Through 
the intensified debates and comprehensive process of deliberation for almost a decade, the 
Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland finally became members of the alliance in March 
1999. Furthermore, another seven Eastern European states joined NATO in March 2004: 
Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. 
27 In December 2001, foreign ministers at the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council decided 
to create a new council by May 2002, which is now `the NATO-Russia Council (NRC)'. 
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the post-Cold War era was that `it remained the cornerstone of European security' 
and `other threats such as terrorism, the proliferation of weapons of mass 
destruction, and ethnic cleansing' in the region had taken the place of the Soviet 
threat (p. 251). The leaders attempted to take on the renewed central objective of the 
alliance. It was to seek to `create an environment in which no country would be 
able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through 
the threat or use of force' (NATO 1999: 24). Kosovo was a test case for the new 
role and function of NATO. That is why NATO was at the front line of the crisis. 
In this sense, the NATO-led allied forces' intervention in Kosovo aimed to save 
victims of humanitarian disaster and massive killing and also NATO itself. The 
leaders of NATO understood that to intervene in Kosovo would provide a proper 
chance to deliver NATO from the problem of its credibility. As it successfully put 
an end to the crisis, NATO could be converted from a Cold War-type military 
alliance to a regional organisation appropriate for the international security 
environment of the post-Cold War era, which takes responsibility for the regional 
security and peace in Europe. Due to this reason the UN had to step aside from the 
front line of the Kosovo intervention. 
There is another reason for NATO's active role in Kosovo. NATO is an 
organisation more suitable for that kind of military mission in Kosovo than the UN. 
As a military body NATO has C31 (Command, Control, Communication, and 
Information) capabilities and its own troops and facilities, but the UN has not. 
Under the Military Committee of the NATO Headquarters, there are five major 
divisions: Intelligence, Operations, Plans & Policy, Cooperation & Regional 
Security, and Logistics, Armaments & Resources. Although NATO does not have 
its own capacity to gather intelligence, it functions as a central body, coordinating 
and analysing intelligence from its member states. The Intelligence Division 
assesses and disseminates gathered information, and then the Plan & Policy 
Division develops strategic plans and operational policies based on the information. 
The Operations Division has responsibility for conducting operations or training in 
peacetime and the Logistics, Armaments & Resources Division supports the 
division in operations (NATO 1999: 239-41). It is a well-organised body 
appropriate for conducting massive military operations. In the UN, 
however, there 
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are no military components of being able to perform a war as took place in Kosovo. 
This is also the reason that the failings of the UN armed operations were 
unavoidable in Bosnia. 
A geographical factor affected the role of NATO in Kosovo. As for air 
strikes, the distance from air base to bombing targets is crucial due to the limited 
range and payload of bombers. In Kosovo, NATO conducted more than 30,000 
sorties. The success of these highly-frequent air combat missions was possible 
because NATO has air bases in the vicinity of the Balkans28. If NATO had had to 
use the long-range strategic bombers such as B-2 and B-52 for the air bombing, the 
campaign could have faced difficulties in terms of the cost, duration, and efficacy 
of bombing. 
The other reasons for the minor role of the UN were the lessons of Somalia 
and Bosnia. Figure 5.2 below shows that the number of UN peacekeepers had 
rapidly increased between 1992 and 1995, when the UN had been intervening in 
Somalia and Bosnia. As the UN established its mission in East Timor and Kosovo in 
1999, the figure rose again, but it was relatively lower than the numbers during the 
period between 1992 and 1995. After the agonising experience in Somalia and 
Bosnia, the UN and its member states realised that the UN was not well prepared for 
coping with such massive armed operations as in Somalia and Bosnia. 
Figure 5.2: Military and Police Personnel Deployed in UN Peacekeeping 
Operations, 1990-2000 (in thousands) 
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(Source: Weiss and Collins 2000: 32 and UN DPKO website) 
28 The nearest NATO air base from Kosovo frequently used in the air campaign is located 
in Germany. 
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The Brahimi Report on UN peace operations was produced within this regretful 
circumstance. UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan convened a high-level panel in 
March 2000 to thoroughly review the UN's peace operations, especially those of 
the 1990s. The key aim of the report was to produce a clear set of specific, concrete, 
and practical guidance and recommendations for the future peace and security 
activities of the UN. The panel of the report concurred that the UN needs to make a 
number of changes in many aspects for better peace operations in the future. Here 
are some key points regarding the need for change: 
0. The need to strengthen both the quality and quantity of support provided to the 
United Nations system to carry out that responsibility of Member States for the 
maintenance of international peace and security; 
0. The need to have more effective collection and assessment of information at 
United Nations Headquarters, including an enhanced conflict early warning system 
that can detect and recognize the threat or risk of conflict or genocide; 
0. The critical need to improve Headquarters planning (including contingency 
planning) for peace operations; 
0. [... ] [The need] to acquire the capacity needed to deploy more complex operations 
rapidly and to sustain them effectively; 
0. The necessity to provide field missions with high-quality leaders and managers 
who are granted greater flexibility and autonomy by Headquarters, within clear 
mandate parameters and with clear standards of accountability for both spending 
and results; 
0. The imperative to set and adhere to a high standard of competence and integrity 
for both Headquarters and field personnel, who must be provided the training and 
support [... ], guided by modern management practices [... ]; (United Nations 
2000c: 1-2). 
Through this report, the panel stressed many compelling needs for change in almost 
every aspect of peace operations: strategic direction, decision-making, rapid 
deployment, Headquarters resources and structure, operational planning and 
support, and the use of modern information technology. It means that without the 
changes required, the UN could not perform any successful massive armed 
155 
operation on the scale of the intervention in Somalia and Bosnia. The UN had 
recognised its problems in conducting such activities and was reviewing past 
experience and its system and structure during the Kosovo crisis. Thus, it was not 
possible for the UN to play a massive and primary military role in Kosovo. 
5.4 The Reflections of the Kosovo Intervention 
This chapter has examined three main issues prompted by the Kosovo intervention: 
to use force to intervene in an internal affair of a sovereign state; the political 
tension between the East and West in the Security Council; and the risk of 
casualties in armed peace operations. These issues are actually old ones, which 
have existed throughout the practice of the use of force by the international 
community during the Cold War and early 1990s. The states involved in the 
Kosovo crisis faced these old issues in the guise of the new challenges, which have 
been caused by the structural change of the post-Cold War international order. In 
comparison with the Somalia and Bosnia cases, the Kosovo intervention was able 
to successfully put an end to the conflict and achieve its initial objectives because it 
was a military operation conducted by a military organisation. The strategic action 
of the agents, the Western states, concerning the crisis was to employ an air 
campaign by NATO, a mighty regional military organisation suitable for such 
armed conflict in Kosovo. Soon after the bombing in the absence of the express UN 
authorisation, they deployed NATO peacekeepers and the UN began its peace- 
building mission by establishing UNMIK. This `strategically designated and 
phased' intervention of the states was an intentional reaction to cope with the issues 
formulated within the changed context of the post-Cold War structure. Hence, the 
Kosovo intervention was also a combination of both the strategic intention of 
actors and structural context, the same as the Somali and Bosnian interventions 
were. 
The use of force to interfere in a sovereign state's internal matter with 
humanitarian purpose started in the early 1970s. Wheeler (2000) argues that the 
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Indian intervention in Bangladesh in 1971 was the first case in the post-World War 
era in which humanitarian claims were raised to justify the use of force (p. 71). As 
the American historian Marc Trachtenberg has stated, `no firm legal principle 
separating `legitimate' from `illegitimate' intervention has yet emerged in the post- 
Cold War' (cited in Karns and Mingst 2001: 219). The dilemma as to whether to 
intervene claiming humanitarian purposes or keep the principle of non-interference 
is still an ongoing legal controversy. Some claim that the Kosovo intervention 
firmly showed that respect for human rights constitutes a fundamental value of the 
current international community. Wheeler (2004) states that the practice of the 
NATO bombing campaign made it clear that `legal considerations shaped the 
possibilities of action' (p. 213). Western powers have justified their military actions 
over Kosovo citing the need to prevent a humanitarian catastrophe and claiming 
that the violation of human rights is an offense against humankind as a whole. It is 
very difficult to clarify whether the military action was decided genuinely based on 
the humanitarian consideration. In the post-Cold War international order, it is 
widely believed that respect for human rights is a matter of the utmost interest to 
the international community. What can be sure is that states would not refrain from 
claiming that safeguarding human rights is not solely and exclusively a matter for 
the domestic jurisdiction of states whenever they strongly need to interfere in an 
internal affair of a state. 
Such disjuncture between legality and legitimacy is linked to the division of 
the permanent members of the Security Council in the Kosovo intervention. Even 
though the post-Cold War era began with unprecedented unity among the P5, 
future decisions over UN intervention are not likely to maintain the unity. The 
course of the Kosovo intervention clearly revealed the sharper P5 divisions 
between the East and West over intervention issues. Russia and China are jealous 
of their domestic jurisdiction and sovereignty. They are also wary of precedents for 
international interventions under UN auspices that may look to them like American 
or Western neo-imperialism. Given the dual history of colonialism and the Cold 
War, there is widespread concern about Western interventionism. The experience 
of NATO in Kosovo creates a feeling of vulnerability in other parts of the world. I 
think that the problem of division among the permanent members over 
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humanitarian intervention issues might only be solved by a return to a narrow 
interpretation of when and where the United Nations can or should intervene. 
The NATO air campaign heavily depended on high-precision bombing. 
This was a strategic action of the intervening states to reduce the risk of casualties 
among their military persons. This decision of the actors was formulated within the 
given structural context, the lessons of the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia. As 
experienced in Somalia, the casualties among soldiers during peace operations 
could seriously affect the result of the operation. An air campaign does not 
guarantee zero civilian casualties at all, but it was proved in Kosovo that that 
means is at least very successful in minimising the casualties among military 
persons. In that sense, countries contributing to UN peace operations are more 
easily willing to rely on an air campaign as a means of peace operation to avoid 
sending ground troops with the high risks of casualties. However, the strategic 
decision to use an air strike depends on geographical and military factors. For 
example, it might be difficult for Western governments to adopt only an air 
campaign without the support of ground forces as a means of peace operation in 
some regions of conflict in Africa. Thus, this strategy of intervention would not be 
suitable in all circumstances. Consequently, solely using air power would attract 
more involvement from states in armed humanitarian intervention, but it is not 
possible to successfully complete humanitarian mission without the support of 
ground troops. Using ground force would have helped prevent civilian casualties. It 
is the reason why NATO's huge military presence, KFOR, was required in Kosovo 
following the bombing. 
It is important to explore the `strategically designated and phased' 
intervention conducted to tackle the Kosovo crisis because the lessons of the 
practice will provide the way for efficient and eligible UN peace operations in the 
future. The next analytical chapter examines the meaning of the practice of the 
intervention in Kosovo in terms of future peace operations of the international 
community along with studying what we have learned from the failures of the 
interventions in Somalia and Bosnia. 
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Chapter 6: Scrutinising UN Peacekeeping 
Practices in the Early Post-Cold War Era 
12. Peacekeeping is a 50-year-old enterprise that has evolved rapidly in the past decade 
from a traditional, primarily military model of observing ceasefires and forced 
separations after inter-State wars, to incorporate a complex model of many elements, 
military and civilian, working together to build peace in the dangerous aftermath of 
civil wars (United Nations 2000c: 2). 
The UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan, convened a high-level Panel on 7 March 
2000, which was chaired by Mr. Lakhdar Brahimi, the former Foreign Minister of 
Algeria. The key task of the Panel was to thoroughly review how the UN had 
conducted all its kinds of peace and security activities during the decades since its 
foundation and to produce `a clear set of specific, concrete and practical 
recommendations' for the better future of UN peace and security actions (United 
Nations 2000c: i). This vast and comprehensive examination of the past experience 
of UN peace operations resulted in a thick report, which is dubbed `the Brahimi 
Report'. While An Agenda for Peace by Boutros-Ghali is a key reference of UN 
peace activities, proclaiming its aspiration and perspective for an active role to 
maintain international peace and security in the first decade of the post-Cold War 
period, this report is also important because it shows how the UN evaluates its 
activities and operations during the decade. 
The paragraph of the report mentioned above tells us two important points: 
first, inside the UN there was a strong belief that UN peacekeeping operations had 
evolved from their traditional missions; and second, they acknowledged that the 
changes had happened in the 1990s, especially in the first half of the decade. This 
idea about the evolution of UN peacekeeping in the 1990s is widely accepted by 
many academics, field activists, and political leaders. Schnabel and Thakur (2001) 
say that the UN has expanded the role of traditional peacekeeping during the past 
15 years (p. 238). Albright (2003) states that during the Cold War era UN 
peacekeepers conducted so-called `cook and look' missions rarely 
being involved 
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in `hot' wars. However, in the post-Cold War world the UN has attempted to make 
qualitative and quantitative changes to their missions by developing new mandates 
and roles and increasing the number of peacekeepers and missions (p. 135). 
As explained in Chapter 2, traditional UN peacekeeping is defined as an 
action not to make peace but to prevent further violence where peace exists by 
interposing troops between warring parties. Thus, its key missions were monitoring 
the established cease-fire between opposing factions, supervising government 
functions, or supporting aid workers for humanitarian assistance. It is obvious that 
in the 1990s, UN peacekeeping operations were radically changed from the 
traditional operations. Especially in the early operations of the decade, the UN 
enlarged its missions by expanding their mandate and roles. For example, in 
Somalia the UN transformed UNOSOM I and UNITAF into UNOSOM II, which 
was the `first armed Chapter VII humanitarian operation' under UN mandate and 
authority. Also, in the Former Yugoslavia the UN enlarged many times 
UNPROFOR's mandate and strength, making its peacekeepers conduct more 
hostile and aggressive missions, which were not originally intended when 
UNPROFOR was established. As well as the change in the mandate of missions the 
number of missions and peacekeepers also steeply increased during the period. 
There had been 60 peacekeeping missions up to 2005,15 during the Cold War 
period before 1989 and 45 since. 
Did these qualitative and quantitative changes to peacekeeping operations 
in the early post-Cold War period mean that UN peacekeeping evolved and 
fundamentally changed in terms of its principles, guidelines, and operational 
conception? To answer this key question of this chapter is very important because 
recommendations for the better performance of peacekeeping operations in the 
future are contingent on how the changes to the operations during the period are 
understood. In other words, the answers will provide very different types of 
solution for future peacekeeping. Additionally, it is also crucial that the answers 
have a mutually explanatory linkage with the reasons for the failure of the UN and 
international community in Somalia and Bosnia. 
The main purpose of this analytical chapter is to clarify the implications of 
the three case studies of the previous chapters through answering the question of 
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whether peacekeeping in the 1990s evolved. The studies tells us that at the 
beginning of the post-Cold War era, the United Nations had entered a domain of 
military activity that lay somewhere between traditional peacekeeping and peace- 
enforcement. In Somalia and Bosnia, UN peacekeepers were not `neutral 
peacekeepers' of the status of peace but a party to the conflicts, fighting with the 
disputants. However, many still believe that those operations were appropriate to 
peacekeeping in terms of its conception and practical guidelines. This chapter 
mainly explores the meaning of the UN's experience of entering into the so-called 
grey zone between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement in both regions 
and the lessons learned from the operations for the future of UN peacekeeping 
operations. Through this exploration, I will argue that during the early post-Cold 
War period peacekeeping did not fundamentally change in terms of its principles, 
guidelines, and operational conception so that it should be firmly understood that 
peacekeeping did not evolve in the period. The Somali and Bosnian interventions 
were only cases of the misuse of peacekeeping, not proof of the evolution of 
peacekeeping. 
This chapter is divided into four sections. In the first, I provide my answer 
with supporting arguments to the key question of this chapter: do the qualitative 
and quantitative changes to UN peacekeeping in the first half of the 1990s mean 
that UN peacekeeping evolved in operational conception and guidelines? To 
answer this question, the Somalia and Bosnia cases are compared while the 
similarities of the cases are examined. The arguments in my answer are expanded 
in the second section. Through discussion based on the findings and assertions 
from the three case studies the arguments are examined within an analytical 
framework of both agential and structural perspectives in the second section. The 
focus of the third section is on the lessons of the interventions in Somalia, Bosnia, 
and Kosovo for the future of UN peace and security activities. The Kosovo case 
study is contrasted with the other two cases to highlight differences between them. 
The fourth section concludes this chapter. 
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6.1 The Myth of the Practical and Conceptual Evolution of 
UN peacekeeping 
As mentioned in the introductory section above, many believe that UN 
peacekeeping missions in the post-Cold War period evolved as the collapse of the 
Cold War international structure triggered the explosion in the need for the UN's 
actions and increased the demands of the international community for the UN's 
role to maintain international peace and security. It is a very popular idea being 
found not only in many scholars' literature, but also in political leaders' works or 
remarks. Even in the United Nations, there is a strong belief that UN peacekeeping 
has been expanded from the traditional mission to something different. They 
understand that through the evolution in the 1990s UN peacekeeping operations 
have become a new kind of peace operation between traditional peacekeeping and 
peace-enforcement. I would pose a question against this belief: Has UN 
peacekeeping genuinely evolved? To get an answer to this question it is necessary 
to clarify the meaning of the 'evolution'. 
As a biological term, evolution means a process that results in heritable 
changes of a trait/traits in a population spread over successive generations, as 
determined by shifts in the allele frequencies of genes (Moran 1993). Put in a 
simple way, evolution is the qualitative change of genes of a species over a certain 
time through the process of `adaptation' to the changing environment, which is 
surrounding the species. The three key elements of the mechanism that produces 
evolutionary change are these: the environment for natural selection, adaptation, 
and speciation. Environmental conditions cause the change of specific genetic traits 
[natural selection]. If the change is heritable for a period of time, the traits become 
common in the next generation of species [adaptation]. Then, finally new 
biological species arise [speciation]. For those who claim that UN peacekeeping 
evolved over the early post-Cold War period, this process of biological evolution 
could seem metaphorically similar with the changes to UN peacekeeping 
operations in the first half of the 1990s. As the structure of the West-East rivalry 
was demolished, the end of the Cold War released waves of killing and 
destruction 
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through civil conflicts mainly within national borders. The increased demands 
made by the international community to the United Nations for more effective and 
massive intervention to tackle the conflicts are analogous to the process of natural 
selection of biological evolution. As a response to these demands, the UN played 
an active role in coping with many intra-state conflicts and eventually entered the 
grey zone between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement mission as a 
species [UN] adapts to change of their environment [the increased demand for the 
UN's role in the post-Cold War order]. Finally, a new kind of UN peace operation 
within the grey zone seems to have arisen in a way similar to the speciation of 
biological evolution. 
However, if this analogy would logically make sense, the alleged new kind 
of peacekeeping operation should firmly have these features: first, the grey zone 
mandate must have been genuinely common in most UN peace operations in the 
1990s; second, peacekeeping operations have to have changed in terms of not only 
their mandate but also their planning, capability, and performance; third, the grey 
zone operations ought to be definitely a different kind of peace operation from 
traditional peacekeeping operations and also peace-enforcement actions. The 
changes to the UN peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War era need to 
be examined within these three points. For this, it is essential to comparatively 
analyse the three case studies conducted in the previous chapters. As mentioned in 
the introduction to this study, this analysis is conducted within the research strategy 
of inter-systemic similarities and differences. The Somalia and Bosnia cases are 
compared to explain why the UN and international community failed in these 
regions by finding out similarities between the cases. The Kosovo case study is 
contrasted with the other two cases to highlight differences between them. 
6.1.1 The Changes in the Security Council Resolutions 
The armed interventions of the UN and international community in Somalia and 
Bosnia were representatively unsuccessful cases among the peace operations of the 
post-Cold War era. The two cases have two similarities at the strategic and 
operational level of military action: first, the mandates of each mission were 
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extended, renewed, and changed out of the original boundary of mandate and 
function; and second, the UN failed to build up or at least had great difficulty in 
constructing an adequate structure of unified command and control of the 
peacekeeping forces in the regions. 
How did the mandates of the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) and United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Yugoslavia 
change? The United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I) was established 
on 24 April 1992 by Security Council Resolution 751 (1992). Its key mission was 
to `facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the 
maintenance of a cease-fire', which were definitely the traditional functions of UN 
peacekeeping operation: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
2. Decides to establish under its authority, and in support of the Secretary-General 
in accordance with paragraph 7 below, a United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM); 
3. Requests the Secretary-General immediately to deploy a unit of 50 United 
Nations Observers to monitor the cease-fire in Mogadishu [... ]; 
4. Agrees, in principle, also to establish under the overall direction of the 
Secretary-General's Special Representative a United Nations Security force to be 
deployed as soon as possible to perform the functions described in paragraphs 27 to 
29 of the report of the Secretary-General; 
7. Requests the Secretary-General as part of his continuing mission in Somalia to 
facilitate an immediate and effective cessation of hostilities and the maintenance of a 
cease-fire throughout the country in order to promote the process of reconciliation 
and political settlement in Somalia and to provide urgent humanitarian assistance; 
[... ] (United Nations Security Council 1992e) 
The functions described in paragraphs 27 to 29 of the Secretary-General report on 
the situation in Somalia are `to provide security for United Nations personnel, 
equipment and supplies', `to convoy deliveries of humanitarian supplies with a 
sufficiently strong military escort', and `to undertake their patrol in light vehicles' 
by taking the form of infantry organised in the normal manner (United Nations 
Secretary-General 1992e). 
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These traditional peacekeeping functions were strengthened and gradually 
became coercive as the UN changed the mandate of UNOSOM I through the 
adoption of Security Council Resolution 775 (1992) and 794 (1992). The Security 
Council decided on the expansion of UNOSOM's mandate and strength in 
Resolution 775 (1992): 
The Security Council, [... ] 
3. Authorizes the increase in strength of the United Nations Operation in Somalia 
(UNOSOM) and the subsequent deployment as recommended in paragraph 37 of the 
Secretary-General's report; (United Nations Security Council 1992d). 
In the report mentioned in the paragraph above, the Secretary-General strongly 
urged that it would `be necessary for the Security Council to authorize the increases 
in UNOSOM strength' that he had recommended including `the establishment of 
the four zone headquarters of UNOSOM' and `the deployment of four additional 
security units', a total strength of up to 3,500, including members of all ranks. The 
reason for the increase in the UN strength in Somalia was that UN peacekeeping 
functions such as the delivery of humanitarian assistance and monitoring cease- 
fires did not effectively work there due to `the vicious cycle of insecurity, the 
fluidity of fighting, and hunger'. As the report states, Somali militias were very 
hostile and aggressive because they saw arms `as a means not only of personnel 
security but also of survival' (United Nations Secretary-General 1992b: paragraph 
23,32,34, and 37). 
The recommendation of the Secretary-General to cope with `the lack of an 
effective cease-fire and the fluidity of fighting' led to the adoption of Resolution 
794 (1992). This adoption was the culminating point of the whole Somali 
intervention because it provided the UN peacekeepers in Somalia with a legal basis 
to convert their mission into a more aggressive peace-enforcement operation as it 
was determined that the situation in Somalia `constitutes a threat to international 
peace and security' and legitimising `Chapter VII enforcement action' in Somalia: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
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Recognizing the unique character of the present situation in Somalia and mindful 
of its deteriorating and extraordinary nature, requiring an immediate and exceptional 
response, 
Determining that the magnitude of the human tragedy caused by the conflict in 
Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of 
humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security, [... ] 
6. Decides that the operations and the further deployment of the 3,500 personnel 
of the United Nations Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM) authorized by paragraph 3 
of resolution 775 (1992) should proceed at the discretion of the Secretary-General in 
the light of his assessment of conditions on the ground; [... ] 
10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, authorizes the 
Secretary-General and Member States cooperating to implement the offer referred to 
in paragraph 8 above to use all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a 
secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia; [... ] 
12. Authorizes the Secretary-General and the Member States concerned to make 
the necessary arrangements for the unified command and control of the forces 
involved, [... ]; [... ] (United Nations Security Council 1992c). 
Finally, in Resolution 814 (1993) the Security Council authorised the use of UN 
peacekeeping forces under Chapter VII. This was unprecedented in the UN's 
history. This resolution reaffirmed paragraph 10 of Resolution 794 (1992) and 
enabled the peacekeepers to implement the enforcement action under Chapter VII 
by establishing UNOSOM II: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
Commending the efforts of Member States acting pursuant to resolution 794 
(1992) to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in 
Somalia, 
Acknowledging the need for a prompt, smooth and phased transition from the 
Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to the expanded United Nations Operations in 
Somalia (UNOSOM II), 
Regretting the continuing incidents of violence in Somalia and the threat they 
pose to the reconciliation process, [... ] 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
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5. Decides to expand the size of the UNOSOM force and its mandate in 
accordance with the recommendations contained in paragraph 56-88 of the report of 
the Secretary-General of 3 March 1993, and the provisions of this resolution; 
6. Authorizes the mandate for the expanded UNOSOM (UNOSOM II) for an 
initial period through 31 October 1993, unless previously renewed by the Security 
Council; [... ] (United Nations Security Council 1993) 
The mandate of UNOSOM II was renewed again for a period of six months to 31 
May 1994 through Resolution 886 (1993). The fundamental review of the 
UNOSOM II mandate was continued afterwards due to the deteriorated situation 
caused first, by `deep divisions between the two main factional alliances, the Group 
12 supporting Mr. Ali Mahdi and SNA led by General Aidid'; and second, by `the 
continued rejection by USC/SNA of all political initiatives undertaken by 
UNOSOM II' (United Nations 1996a: 306). 
What we need to note with regard to the repeated renewals and changes of 
UNOSOM mandate explained so far is that the modification of the mandate meant 
that the UN peacekeeping mission could not handle the continuing incidents of 
violence and threat by the hostile parties with the functions and facilities as they 
were initially designed. Even after the repeated extensions and changes to the 
mandate, the UN mission still could not adequately deal with conditions on the 
ground. The fundamental reason why the UN could not handle the situation in 
Somalia was that as explained earlier the peacekeepers were sent to a place where 
there was no peace to keep. The increase in the number of peacekeepers and 
change of the mandate did not work as effectively as the decision makers of the UN 
and Member States had expected because UNOSOM was an inadequate tool in the 
hostile situation, which required a robust peace-enforcement action rather than a 
peacekeeping operation. 
The Bosnia case resembles the Somali intervention in terms of the repeated 
renewals and strengthening of the mission mandate. For example, the mandate of 
the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR), which was the most important body 
among the all UN missions in Yugoslavia, was extended on eight occasions from 
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February 1993 to March 1995. Of course, the mandate was not just extended, but 
renewed or strengthened on some occasions, as the situation in Yugoslavia grew 
worse. As showed in the Somali intervention, these renewals and enlargements 
could not tackle the two fundamental problems: first, the inadequate use of 
peacekeeping tools in the enforcement mission; second, the failure to establish an 
efficient and unified command and control structure of the forces in the field. 
UNPROFOR was established by Resolution 743 (1992) on 21 February 
1992 for an initial period of 12 months with the mandate only relating to Croatia: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
Concerning that the situation in Yugoslavia continues to constitute a threat to 
international peace and security as determined in resolution 713 (1991), [... ] 
2. Decides to establish, under its authority, a United Nations Protection Force in 
accordance with the above-mentioned report and the United Nation peace-keeping 
plan, and requests the Secretary-General to take measures necessary to ensure its 
earliest possible deployment; [... ]; 
5. Recalls that, in accordance with paragraph 1 of the United Nations peace- 
keeping plan, the Force should be an interim arrangement to create the conditions of 
peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the 
Yugoslav crisis; [... ] (United Nations Security Council 1992h). 
The original mandate of UNPROFOR was to ensure the existence of the United 
Nations Protected Areas (UNPAs)29 in certain areas of Croatia, in which Serbs 
constituted the majority or a substantial minority of the population and where inter- 
ethnic tensions had led to armed conflict. This mandate was first extended for an 
interim period until 31 March 1993 by Resolution 807 (1993): 
The Security Council, [... ] 
1. Demands that the parties and others concerned comply fully with the United 
Nations peace-keeping plan in Croatia [... ]; 
2. Demands further that the parties and others concerned refrain from positioning 
their forces in the proximity of UNPROFOR's units in the United Nations Protected 
29 The Report of the Secretary-General on 11 December 1991 (S/23280) designated 
Eastern Slavonia, Western Slavonia, and Krajina as UNPAs. 
168 
Areas (UNPAs) and in the pink zones"; [... ] 
5. Decides, in the context of these demands, to extend UNPROFOR's mandate 
for an interim period terminating on 31 March 1993; [... ] (United Nation Security 
Council 1993g). 
The extension of the UNPROFOR's mandate was continued after this. Resolution 
815 (1993) decided to extend it for an additional interim period terminating on 30 
June 1993. Another extension of the mandate terminating on 30 September 1993 
was approved by Resolution 847 (1993) and then, by Resolution 869 (1993) for 24 
hours; by Resolution 870 (1993) until 5 October 1993; by Resolution 871 (1993) 
until 31 March 1994; by Resolution 908 (1994) until 30 September 1994; and 
finally by Resolution 947 (1994) until 31 March 1995 (United Nations 1996a: 513- 
8). It clearly tells us that differing from the early expectations of the decision- 
makers of the UN and countries contributing to the intervention, they continually 
had difficulties in implementing their peace plan. The original mandate of 
UNPROFOR established by resolution 743 (1992) underwent continuing 
enlargements. 
The Secretary-General submitted a report (S/23836) to the Security Council 
on 24 April 1992. In the report, he decided to `advance the dispatch of unarmed 
military observers to Bosnia-Herzegovina' (United Nations Secretary-General 
1992c: para. 20). On 30 April, forty military observers were deployed in the Mostar 
region. It was the key moment when the mission of UNPROFOR was extended 
over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Afterwards, the responsibility and roles of UNPROFOR 
in Bosnia-Herzegovina were increased and strengthened by many resolutions such 
as Resolution 769 (1992) on 7 August, which firstly authorised the `enlargements 
of UNPROFOR's mandate and strength' recommended by the Secretary-General in 
his report (S/24353) on 27 July 1992 and Resolution 776 (1992) that enlarged the 
mandate of UNPROFOR to facilitate delivery of humanitarian aid in Bosnia and 
30 `Pink zones' mean the areas outside UNPAs, but inside the Republic of Serbian Krajina 
(RSK), which was a self-proclaimed Serbian entity in Krajina and the western area of 
Slavonia along the Croatian/Bosnian border. The RSK was established on 19 December 
1991 by nationalist Serbs in Krajina and ended by the military campaign by Croatian 
forces in 1995. 
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Herzegovina. 
Resolution 757 (1992) of 30 May and 770 (1992) of 13 August were very 
important resolutions throughout the whole of the UN missions in Yugoslavia 
because the resolutions initiated actions under Chapter VII of the Charter. They 
meant that the peacekeeping mission of UNPROFOR became peace-enforcement 
action as the transition from UNOSOM I and UNITAF to UNOSOM II converted 
the UN peacekeeping mission in Somalia into peace-enforcement. Resolution 757 
(1992) imposed wide-ranging sanctions on the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia 
(Serbia and Montenegro), which were the non-military measures of the 
enforcement actions under Article 41 of Chapter VII: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
Dismayed that the conditions have not yet been established for the effective and 
unhindered delivery of humanitarian assistance, [... ], 
Deeply concerned that those United Nations Protection Force personnel 
remaining in Sarajevo have been subjected to deliberate mortar and small-arms fire, 
[... ], 
Deploring the tragic incident on 18 May 1992 which caused the death of a 
member of the International committee of the Red Cross team in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina, [... ] 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, [... ] 
4. Decides also that all states shall prevent: 
(a) The import into their territories of all commodities and products originating 
in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro) exported there from 
after the date of the present resolution; [... ] 
(c) The sale or supply by their nationals or from their territories or using their 
flag vessels or aircraft of any commodities or products, [... ]; [... ] 
7. Decides that all States shall; 
(a) Deny permission to any aircraft to take off from, land in or overfly their 
territory if it is destined to land in or has taken off from the territory of the Federal 
Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia and Montenegro), [... ]; [... ] (United Nations 
Security Council 1992f). 
Resolution 770 (1992) called on UN members states to take `all measures 
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necessary' to ensure delivery of humanitarian aid to Sarajevo and wherever needed 
in other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina: 
The Security Council, [... ] 
Deeply disturbed by the situation that now prevails in Sarajevo, which has severely 
complicated UNPROFOR's efforts to fulfil its mandate to ensure the security and 
functioning of Sarajevo airport and the delivery of humanitarian assistance in 
Sarajevo and other parts of Bosnia and Herzegovina [... ], [... ] 
Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, 
2. Calls upon States to take nationally or through regional agencies or 
arrangements all measures necessary to facilitate in coordination with the United 
Nations the delivery by relevant United Nations humanitarian organizations and 
others of humanitarian assistance to Sarajevo and wherever needed in other parts of 
Bosnia and Herzegovina; [... ] (United Nations Security Council 1992e). 
The situation and process of the conversion to peace-enforcement actions in 
Yugoslavia resemble those of the UN mission in Somalia. As the two resolutions 
above show, in both regions UN and participating states were deeply concerned 
about the rapid deterioration of the situation caused by the hostile parties who did 
not have any intention to abandon their ultimate objectives. Soon after they realised 
that they could not control the parties and cope with the situation, especially 
regarding the delivery of humanitarian aid, with the initial mandate and strength of 
the missions, the Security Council repeatedly renewed the mandate and enlarged 
the strength of the missions there. However, the renewals and enlargements rather 
caused practical confusion and difficulties in the fields because the military 
components of the peace-enforcement actions in the regions were conducted by 
peacekeeping forces, which were not designed to undertake such coercive military 
action in terms of capability, facilities, and rules of engagement. In this sense, it 
was obvious that peacekeepers in Somalia and Bosnia-Herzegovina could not be 
successful in their imposed peace-enforcement missions. 
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6.1.2 Command and Control Issue in the Missions 
The second similarity between the Somalia and Bosnia cases is the lack of a unified 
command and control structure. As stated in paragraph 4 of Resolution 751 (1992) 
notwithstanding the resolutions above which urged the establishment of a unified 
command structure under UN authority, the reality in the field was that the UN 
mission had great difficulty in Somalia in constructing an adequate structure of the 
unified command and control of the UN force. In his report submitted to the 
Security Council on 3 March 1993, the Secretary-General recommended 
establishing UNOSOM II to replace UNITAF, which had dispatched around 
37,000 troops in Southern and central Somalia. He pointed out in the report that 
though the presence and operations of UNITAF had a positive impact on the 
security situation in Somalia, a secure environment had not yet been established 
and incidents of violence continued (United Nations Secretary-General 1993b: 
paragraph 21 and 55). The transition of UNITAF and UNOSOM I to the twenty- 
nine-nation UNOSOM II meant that a coercive operation that was nearly 
enforcement action started. 
As the Security Council agreed to deploy a military component of 20,000 
UN peacekeepers of all ranks and civilian staff of 2,800 individuals to replace 
UNITAF by 1 May 1993, the U. S. contributed to UNOSOM II forces 8,000 
logistical troops and a Quick Reaction Force (QFR) of 1,200 men (United Nations 
1996a: 296; Wheeler 2000: 194). The logistical force of the U. S. army and air force 
came within the formal UN command and control structure, but the QFR with the 
Delta Forces and Army Rangers that arrived in Somalia in August 1993 were not 
under UN command and control. Clarke and Herbst (1996) claim as follows: 
It is not true, as some have charged and the president has implied, that U. S. troops, 
including the Quick Reaction Force and the Rangers involved in the fatal firefight, 
were under UN command. Those soldiers were outside the formal UN command 
structure. The Rangers were commanded by Major General William Garrison, a U. S. 
Special Forces Officer who reported directly to U. S. Central Command at MacDill 
Air Force Base in Florida. The searches for Aideed, including the one that led to the 
Ranger casualties, were all approved by senior American authorities in Washington 
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(p. 73). 
The operation of the Rangers and Delta Forces against Aidid was arranged and 
approved solely by senior military officials in Washington, not by the UN officials 
or commanders in the field. This became a decisive factor, which caused Black 
Hawk Down and eventually made the whole mission in Somalia unsuccessful. 
The peace operations in Bosnia also failed to establish an efficient and unified 
command and control structure of the forces in the field as happened in Somalia. 
Enforcement action on a large scale essentially requires a unified command and 
control structure because it becomes war-fighting in most occasions. The 
peacekeepers in Bosnia suffered the absence of a centralized military command and 
control system. There are two levels of headquarters in a command and control 
system well-structured to conduct a war: strategic-level and operational-level 
headquarters. As to the Somalia and Bosnia cases, the Secretariat, specifically the 
Department of Peacekeeping Operations within it, in the UN's New York 
headquarters was the strategic-level headquarters, and UMOSOM I& II and 
UNPROFOR had operational-level headquarters in Somalia and Yugoslavia 
respectively. In both regions, the strategic-level headquarters failed to accomplish 
its two primary roles: to anticipate envisaged situations in the missions and to 
prepare for them. It was due to a simple fact that unlike NATO, the UN is not an 
organisation designed to conduct massive military actions, including war-fighting, 
by its own capabilities and facilities. As quoted in the Bosnia chapter, Albright - 
the former U. S. ambassador to the UN - pointed out many problems such as `the 
near total absence' of contingency planning, `hastily recruited, ill-equipped and 
often unprepared troops and civilian staff, the absence of centralized military 
command and control, and `the lack of a durable financial basis for starting and 
sustaining peacekeeping operations'. It is also revealed in the statement of the 
former head of UN forces in Sarajevo, Canadian Maj. Gen. Lewis Mackenzie. 
According to Smith and Preston (18 June 1993), he vividly described the 
insufficient staff problem: `do not get into trouble as a commander in the field after 
5 p. m. New York time, or Saturday and Sunday' because `there is no one to answer 
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the phone'. 
Shimura (2001) who worked primarily in the field of peacekeeping in the 
Secretariat for 24 years describes the procedure of establishing a peacekeeping 
operation as follows: 
Once a new operation is formally authorized, the Secretariat plunges into a period of 
intense activity. Consultations are held with the representatives of the parties 
concerned on the detailed implementation of the operations, and on the facilities and 
services they will provide. A list of potential countries to provide troops and other 
personnel is drawn up, in consideration of factors such as geographical balance, 
political neutrality, and past peacekeeping record. This is followed by consultations 
with each potential contributor. [... ] The overall selection of countries to provide the 
needed personnel to a given operation is essentially made by the Secretariat in 
consultation with member states. At the end of exercise, the Secretary-General 
presents the Council with a proposed list of countries that will contribute troops and 
civilian police forces. The council customarily replies that it "agrees" with the 
Secretary-General's choice. This exchange is not, however, regarded as the 
Council's formal approval of the Secretary-General's decision. [... ] As soon as all 
this procedure is completed, peacekeepers are deployed into the region of conflict by 
the logistic supports of the concerned states (p. 50-51). 
An operational-level headquarters of a peacekeeping mission is designed in the 
course of the consultation with member states. During the Cold War period the five 
permanent members of the Security Council, especially the two superpowers, were 
not eager to provide military personnel to peacekeeping missions due to the rigid 
relationship of rivalry between the U. S. and USSR in the Cold War system. Thus, 
so-called `middle powers' among member states such as Canada, the Nordic 
Countries, and Austria were needed to contribute to the operations. With the 
demise of the Cold War rivalry, the five members became eager to participate in 
peacekeeping operations, for example as was done by France and the UK 
in 
UNPROFOR and the USA in UNOSOM (Shimura 2001: 51). A significant 
problem in the post-Cold War era related to the construction of a unified command 
and control structure in the operational-level headquarters arose from this active 
participation of the permanent members. Unlike the middle power states, they - 
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especially the United States - would not put their troops under UN officials' charge, 
and the command and control structure of the UN. As the procedure of forming a 
peacekeeping mission above shows if at least one of the permanent member states 
opposes the proposal of the Secretary-General in the course of the consultation, the 
UN cannot construct a headquarters in the way that they intend. This may cause the 
operational-level headquarters of a peacekeeping mission in the field to undermine 
the unity and efficacy of its own command and control structure. UNPROFOR was 
the case in point. The `shared responsibilities' between the UN and the European 
Community and the separated command and control systems, that is, one in the UN 
headquarters in New York and the other in NATO, made UNPROFOR inefficient 
and unsatisfactory in conducting its missions. Regarding this, Nambiar (2001)'s 
statement is worthy of mention: 
UNPROFOR's experience showed that when situations emerged where positive 
results appeared likely, the European Community came on the scene in the hope of 
drawing credit, but the moment things went wrong, UNPROFOR was left to pick up 
the pieces; [... ] In due course, with the rather dubious arrangements that were put in 
place for Bosnia-Herzegovina, it was inevitable that copies of reports, analyses, and 
recommendations emanating from UNPROFOR headquarters began finding their 
way to Brussels, some national capitals, and the office of the European Community 
negotiator. The irritating and unacceptable part of this development was that, using 
such information, attempts were made to arrive at arrangements with the belligerents 
without consulting UNPROFOR; in most cases with disastrous results (p. 173). 
Then, why do the superpower states want to avoid putting their troops under 
the UN's command and control structure? General Bernard E. Trainor of the U. S. 
Marine Corps testified before the Congress that `[... ] the entire structure of the UN 
military arm is for peacekeeping not peace-enforcement. [... ] The UN military 
representation is not organized, trained, equipped for peace-enforcement 
operations' (Curtis 1994: 178). It seems obvious that the Clinton Administration 
believed that in order to encourage U. S. national interests whenever and wherever 
they wanted to do it, it was critical to retain U. S. forces under the president's 
command authority. A volume of the collection of Clinton's articulations to the 
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U. S. Congress of American strategic objectives, A National Security Strategy of 
Engagement and Enlargement: 1995-1996, clearly states as follows: 
Multilateral peace operations are an important component of our strategy. [... ] Peace 
operations often have served, and continued to serve, important U. S. national 
interests. [... ] 
In order to maximize the benefits of UN peace operations, the United States 
must take highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to 
support or participate in them. [... ] Far from handing a blank check to the UN, [... ] 
[it is required] to undertake a rigorous analysis of requirements and capabilities 
before voting to support or participate in peace operations. The United States has not 
hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to ensure that the UN authorizes 
only those peace operations that meet these standards. 
[... ] On those occasions when we consider contributing U. S. forces to a UN 
peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that 
would guide any decision to employ U. S. forces. [... ] 
The question of command and control is particularly critical. There may be times 
when it is in our interest to place U. S. troops under the temporary operational control 
of a component UN or allied commander. The United States has done so many times 
in the past - from the siege of Yorktown in the Revolutionary War to the 
battles of 
Desert Storm. However, under no circumstances will the President ever relinquish 
his command authority over U. S. forces. 
[... ] The lesson we must take away from our first ventures in peace operations is 
not that we should forswear such operations but that we should employ this tool 
selectively and more effectively. In short, the United States views peace operations 
as a means to support our national security strategy, not as a strategy unto itself 
(Clinton 1995: 69-72). 
6.1.3 The Misuse of UN Peacekeeping 
The repeated enlargements and extensions of the mission mandate and the 
failure 
to construct a unified and effective command and control structure 
in the field were 
fundamentally caused by the simple fact that UN peacekeepers were sent where 
there was no peace to keep. This obviously implies that neither had peacekeeping 
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techniques evolved in terms of their nature and characteristics, nor had the 
experiences in Somalia and Bosnia created a new kind of peace operation defined 
between traditional peacekeeping and peace-enforcement. In both regions, 
peacekeeping was just employed in inappropriate circumstances. Then, why should 
we understand the performance of UN peacekeepers in Somalia and Bosnia as a 
misuse of peacekeeping? As argued at the beginning of this section, the answers to 
this question must be regarded within the three points: first, whether the grey zone 
mandate of the Somali and Bosnian missions had genuinely been common in most 
UN peace operations in the early and mid-1990s; second, whether UN 
peacekeeping operations after the Somali and Bosnian crises essentially changed in 
terms of not only their mandate but also in planning, capabilities, and performance; 
and third, whether the grey zone missions in Somalia and Bosnia were definitely 
different kinds of peace operation from traditional peacekeeping and peace- 
enforcement operations. 
The peacekeeping operations in Somalia and Bosnia were extraordinary 
cases in terms of their mandates. Between 1948 when the first peacekeeping 
mission UNTSO (United Nations Truce Supervision Organization) was established, 
and 2006, sixty-one peacekeeping missions were conducted. For almost 60 years, 
there were only three cases of peacekeeping mission with enforcement mandates. 
In the post-Cold War era, two peacekeeping bodies were established: UNPROFOR 
and UNOSOM II. There is just one precedent during the Cold War period: the 
United Nations Operation in Congo (ONUC). Differing from the usual traditional 
peacekeeping operations during the period, the UN under the Secretary-General 
Dag Hammarskjöd did eagerly intervene in the Congo crisis of 1960-64. Thus, 
indeed it was not until 1992 when UN peacekeepers were sent to Somalia and 
Bosnia-Herzegovina that the UN again became involved in operations at all 
comparable to that in the Congo. Except for only these three cases, no 
peacekeeping operations in the UN's history have ever been authorised under 
Chapter VII of the Charter. Table 6.1 on the next page shows the details of the 
UN's peace operations conducted during the early 1990s. The table tells us that the 
UN's multifunctional peacekeeping operations began since 1989 as the West-East 
confrontation eased and also that even in the post-Cold War period traditional 
(or 
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classic) peacekeeping operations are being still used by the UN. It means that the 
new experiences in Somalia and Bosnia have not removed traditional peacekeeping 
from the list of the UN's counter-measures against intra-state conflicts and civil 
wars. As to the peacekeeping operations of 1994, out of eight multifunctional 
peacekeeping operations only two operations were conducted as peace-enforcement 
actions: in Somalia and Bosnia. Then, a question can be posed: Are traditional 
operations and multifunctional (or multidimensional 31) operations genuinely 
different? 
Table 6.1: Some Statistics on United Nations activities 
related to peace and security, 1988 to 1994 
Asat31 Asat31 Asatl6 
January January December 
1988 1992 1994 
Security Council resolutions adopted in the 
preceding 12 months 15 53 78 
Disputes and conflicts in which the UN was 
actively involved in preventive diplomacy 11 13 28 
or peacemaking in the preceding 12 months 
Peacekeeping operations deployed 
Total 5 11 17 
Classic 5 7 9 
Multifunctional - 4 8 
Military personnel deployed 9,570 11,495 73,393 
Civilian police deployed 35 155 2130 
International civilian personnel deployed 1,516 2,206 2,260 
Countries contributing military and police 
personnel 26 56 76 
UN budget for peacekeeping operations (on 230.4 1,689.6 3,610.0 
an annual basis) (millions of U. S. dollars) 
(Source: Boutros-Ghali 1995: 32) 
31 From the late 1990s UN documents have been using the term `multidimensional', 
instead of `multifunctional'. 
178 
Peacekeeping operations in the 1990s have dissimilarities to traditional 
peacekeeping conducted during the Cold War period in some points. The number 
of operations has sharply increased and their role has expanded from supervision of 
cease-fire and monitoring the agreements between warring parties to 
multidimensional operations including peace-building with various components, 
such as civilian police, political affairs, rule of law, human rights, and so on. 
However, it is doubtful whether peacekeeping operations have fundamentally 
changed in terms of planning, performance, and capabilities. The Clinton 
Administration's PDD 25 was partly released in 1996, but it was signed in May 
1994 soon after Black Hawk Down happened. The directive was the examination 
of the failure in Somalia and also a review of UN peace operations up to early 1994 
and of U. S. involvement in them. One of the major issues of reform and 
improvement, which the policy directive addressed, was the 'UN's capability to 
manage peace operations'. In order to reform and improve the capability and 
efficacy of its operations, PDD 25 strongly recommended the UN to create: 
- Plans Division to conduct adequate advance planning and preparation for new and 
on-going operation; 
- Information and Research Division linked to field operations to obtain and provide 
current information, manage a 24-hour watch center, and monitor open source 
material and non-sensitive information submitted by governments; 
- Operations Division with a modern command, control and communications (C3) 
architecture based on commercial systems; 
- Logistics Division to manage both competitive commercial contracts (which should 
be re-bid regularly on the basis of price and performance) and a cost-effective 
logistics computer network to link the UN DPKO with logistics offices in 
participating member nations. [... ] 
- Small Public Affairs cell dedicated to supporting on-going peace operations and 
disseminating information within host countries in order to reduce the risks to UN 
personnel and increase the potential for mission success; 
- Small Civilian Police cell to manage police missions, plan for the establishment of 
police and judicial institutions, and develop standard procedures, doctrine and 
training; 
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-A rapidly deployable headquarters team, a composite initial logistics support unit, 
and open, pre-negotiated commercial contracts for logistics support in new mission; 
- Data base of specific, potentially available forces or capabilities that nations could 
provide for the full range of peacekeeping and humanitarian operations; 
- Trained civilian reserve corps to serve as a ready, external talent pool to assist in 
the administration, management, and execution of UN peace operations; 
- Modest airlift capability available through pre-negotiated contracts with 
commercial firms or member states to support urgent deployments; 
-A professional Peace Operation Training Program for commanders and other 
military and civilian personnel (U. S. Department of State 1996). 
Six years later, the UN produced a report that was a specific and practical review of 
UN peace operations in the 1990s. The so-called Brahimi report demonstrated that 
the UN still has almost same problems, which the PDD 25 had stated needed to be 
improved and reformed: 
The panel [of the report] recommends that a new information-gathering and analysis 
entity be created to support the informational and analytical needs of the Secretary- 
General and the members of the Executive Committee on Peace and Security 
(ECPS). [... ] 
The Panel's proposed ECPS Information and Strategic Analysis Secretariat 
(EISAS) would create and maintain integrated databases on peace and security issues, 
distribute that knowledge efficiently within the United Nations system, generate 
policy analyses, formulate long-term strategies for ECPS [... ]. [... ] 
The Panel recommends that the United Nations standby arrangements system 
(UNSAS) be developed further to include several coherent, multinational, brigade- 
size forces and the necessary enabling forces, [... ]. The Panel also recommends that 
the Secretariat send a team to confirm the readiness of each potential troop 
contributor to meet the requisite United Nations training and equipment 
requirements for peacekeeping operations, prior to deployment. Units that do not 
meet the requirements must not be deployed. [... ] 
The Secretariat should also address, on an urgent basis, the needs: to put in place 
a transparent and decentralized recruitment mechanism for civilian field personnel; 
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to improve the retention of the civilian specialists that are needed in every complex 
peace operation; and to create standby arrangements for their rapid deployment. [... ] 
[The Panel] also believes that staff shortages in certain areas are plainly obvious. 
For example, it is clearly not enough to have 32 officers providing military planning 
and guidance to 27,000 troops in the field, [... ]. 
The Panel recommends that Integrated Mission Task Forces (IMTFs) be created, 
[... ], to plan new missions and help them reach full deployment, significantly 
enhancing the support that Headquarters provides to the field. There is currently no 
integrated planning or support cell in the Secretariat that brings together those 
responsible for political analysis, military operations, civilian police, electoral 
assistance, human rights, development, humanitarian assistance, refugees and 
displaced persons, public information, logistics, finance and recruitment. 
Structural adjustments are also required in other elements of DPKO, in particular 
to the Military and Civilian Police Division, which should be reorganized into two 
separate divisions, and the Field Administration and Logistics Division (FALD), 
which should be split into two divisions. [... ] (United Nations 2000c: x-xiii) 
The UN had learned many lessons from the failures in Somalia and Bosnia and 
tried to fix the problems based on the lessons. However, as the Brahimi report tells 
us, the UN's capabilities of planning, performing, and managing peacekeeping still 
needed to be more improved and reformed. In this sense, UN peacekeeping in the 
1990s had little changed. 
Supplement to an Agenda for Peace by Boutros-Ghali in 1995 argued that 
the Somali and Bosnian interventions were a new kind of peace operation: 
This [the environmental changes of peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold 
War] has led, in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in Somalia, to a new kind of United 
Nations operation. Even though the use of force is authorized under Chapter VII of 
the Charter, the United Nations remains neutral and impartial between warring 
parties, without a mandate to stop the aggressor (if one can be identified) or impose a 
cessation of hostilities. Nor is this peace-keeping as practised hitherto, because the 
hostilities continue and there is often no agreement between the warring parties on 
which a peace-keeping mandate can be based (Boutros-Ghali 1995: paragraph 19). 
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Is it correct that as the statement argues the operations in Somalia and Bosnia were 
a new kind of peace operation? It is obvious that the environment of UN 
peacekeeping and the nature of intra-state conflict in the post-Cold War era were 
very new as it says, but the peacekeeping operations in both regions were not of a 
new kind at all. They were the kind of peacekeeping operation, which the UN had 
conducted since 1948. The only differences from other peacekeeping practices 
were that the operations were placed within the context of enforcement action by 
the authorisation of the use of force under Chapter VII. 
In the third section (2.3) of Chapter 2, I have defined a peacekeeping 
operation as follows: 
The interposition of unarmed or lightly-armed UN forces, including police 
personnel or civilians, in an environment with the consent of all the parties 
concerned to encourage the warring parties to negotiate a settlement or to 
impartially buttress a political agreement between them through the means 
authorised by the Security Council. 
Authorisation by the Security Council, light armaments, and the three principles are 
the essential elements of UN peacekeeping operations. Especially, the three 
principles, the consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force except in 
self-defence, are the key guidelines, which distinguish peacekeeping from other 
peace operations. The peacekeepers who were sent to Somalia and Bosnia had to 
stick to the principles because the Security Council authorised to send them as 
peacekeepers. The difficulties they faced in the regions were caused by the fact that 
they had to conduct missions within the principles of peacekeeping, in 
circumstances, which required enforcement action. In this sense, multifunctional 
peacekeeping operations in the 1990s except the two extraordinary cases, Somalia 
and Bosnia, were fundamentally the same as traditional peacekeeping. As 
traditional peacekeepers the peacekeepers with the mandate of multifunction were 
also lightly armed and conducted their missions based on the three principles 
within the limited rules of engagement. Even the facilities they use had not much 
changed. The only key differences were that they had got more missions to conduct 
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as UN peacekeepers and that the number of multifunctional operations had 
increased. 
As mentioned earlier, many believe that the experiences in Somalia and 
Bosnia were some of the most important developments for the evolution of UN 
peacekeeping operations. For example, Thakur and Schnabel (2001) regard the 
interventions as the `fourth generation' of peacekeeping operations, which was 
characterised by `peace enforcement'. They insist that `Somalia most clearly 
represented the birth (and death) of the fourth generation of UN peacekeeping' 
(p. 13). With regard to my arguments so far, the Somali and Bosnian interventions 
are not evidence of the evolution of peacekeeping in the 1990s. The operations in 
both regions were just exceptional cases, which demonstrate that peacekeeping 
techniques were applied in inappropriate circumstances according to their growing 
popularity as the international community's tool of choice for conflict containment 
in the early post-Cold War era. Such operations had not been common at all among 
most UN peace operations in the 1990s. The grey zone missions in the regions 
were just conducted within the context of enforcement action by the authorisation 
of the use of force under Chapter VII. 
6.2 Agential and Structural Causes of the Misuse of Peacekeeping 
The UN and international community learned many lessons from the experiences in 
Somalia and Bosnia. One of the key lessons was that UN peacekeeping should be 
used in a proper environment in which there is at least a cease-fire or peace 
agreement. It must not be mixed with war-fighting operations to conduct a mission 
of making peace. The handbook on multidimensional peacekeeping published by 
the Peacekeeping Best Practices Units of the DPKO confirms these as follows: 
In the mid-1990s, following the peacekeeping experiences in Somalia, the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda, it became obvious that UN forces could not keep the peace 
when there was no peace to keep. In such circumstances, the Security Council judges 
it wiser to authorize an enforcement action by a coalition of willing States, directed 
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by a lead mission, that had both the military capability and political will to bring an 
end to the conflict using all necessary means. These interventions, although 
authorized by the Council, are not conducted under UN command (Peacekeeping 
Best Practices Unit 2003: 56). 
This statement definitely agrees that peacekeeping operations were 
employed in inappropriate circumstances in Somalia and Bosnia. Then, who was 
responsible for this flawed decision-making? Many would easily come up with the 
Secretary-General of the UN at that time, Boutros-Ghali. Of course it is unfair to 
blame him alone. The UN system for planning and manoeuvring peacekeeping 
missions worked using a collective decision-making mechanism under the 
authority of the Security Council. However, many academics, commentators, and 
politicians lay a heavy burden of responsibility on him. Curtis (1994) argues that 
`Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali sought to counter the increasing international 
instabilities by expanding the role of the United Nations from peacekeeping to 
peacemaking, peace-enforcement and post-conflict peace-building'. In short, he 
insists that Boutros-Ghali `moved the United Nations into the gray zone' (p. 180). 
Schnabel and Thakur (2001) assert that `Boutros-Ghali had great hopes for a 
fundamental restructuring of the tasks of, and approaches to, post-Cold War UN 
peacekeeping' (p. 240). 
However, my findings through interviews pose a question about whether he 
was genuinely enthusiastic to call for a new and active role for the UN in 
maintaining international peace and security. Lord Owen stated that `during his 
tenure, the role of UN peacekeeping was stretched not because he wanted it', but 
because he had to do it due to the increasing demands of the international 
community for the UN's role in the post-Cold War order (Interview on 16 October 
2006). Lord Hannay made a similar statement on Boutros-Ghali's attitude. 
According to him, the assertion that Boutros-Ghali tried to expand traditional 
peacekeeping and had a great hope for restructuring UN peace operations 
is correct 
in terms of his general views, which were set out in An Agenda for Peace. However, 
he had different and specific views on the actual cases. For example, `as far as 
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Yugoslavia is concerned, he [Boutros-Ghali] was always trying to do less, not to do 
more'. Hannay continued to state: 
He was very reluctant in the first place for the UN to be involved [in Yugoslavia] 
[... ] And, he couldn't really prevent being involved. He was very reluctant. He was 
continually dragging his feet. He was not trying to go in further in Yugoslavia. He 
was trying to go in less far (Interview on 24 April 2006). 
On account of An Agenda for Peace, many academics perceive that Boutros-Ghali 
was very enthusiastic to enter the grey-zone and greatly expand peacekeeping 
missions. As Schnabel and Thakur (2001) note, in the report he seemed to make `a 
bold attempt to expand traditional peacekeeping' calling for `a new and 
comprehensive way of thinking about global peacekeeping responsibilities'. They 
argue that Boutros-Ghali's An Agenda for Peace `envisioned peacekeeping as an 
institutionalized instrument for global security patterns and structures, which serve 
two primary purposes: to enhance the political and military position of the UN 
system, and to promote the political and legal status of individuals and subnational 
groups' (p. 241). These assertions are fully based on Boutros-Ghali's statements set 
out in An Agenda for Peace: 
15. [... ] [The UN's] security arm, once disabled by circumstances it was not created 
or equipped to control, had emerged as a central instrument for the prevention and 
resolution of conflicts and for the preservation of peace. Our aims must be: 
- To seek to identify at the earliest possible state situations that could produce 
conflict, and to try through diplomacy to remove the sources of danger before 
violence results; 
- Where conflict erupts, to engage in peacemaking aimed at resolving the 
issues that 
have led to conflict; 
- Through peace-keeping, to work to preserve peace, however fragile, where 
fighting 
has been halted and to assist in implementing agreements achieved by the 
peacemakers; 
- To stand ready to assist in peace-building in its differing contexts: rebuilding the 
institutions and infrastructures of nations torn by civil war and strife; and building 
bonds of peaceful mutual benefit among nations formerly at war; 
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- And in the largest sense, to address the deepest causes of conflict: economic 
despair, social injustice and political oppression. It is possible to discern an 
increasingly common moral perception that spans the world's nations and peoples, 
and which is finding expression in international laws, many owing their genesis to 
the work of this organization (Boutros-Ghali 1992: 473). 
According to these statements only, it seems true that Boutros-Ghali had a great 
aspiration to tackle various problems in the post-Cold War order by expanding the 
UN's roles into vaguely defined zone of its missions. Then, why did Boutros-Ghali 
proclaim his or the organisational desire for its more expanded roles and 
responsibilities in an age of growing violence while he had specifically different 
views on the actual cases of regional conflicts, being very reluctant to intervene in 
some? Hannay gave an answer to this question: 
First of all, An Agenda for Peace was not an initiative by Boutros-Ghali. It was 
called for by the Security Council Summit in 1992. They asked him to write a paper 
about all ways to use [to tackle the crises in the post-Cold War era] including 
enforcement. He didn't invent it. He explained it. [... ] Boutros-Ghali therefore put 
forward his ideas in An Agenda for Peace, but they were not followed up. He was 
then pushed into a quasi-enforcement role in Bosnia (Interview on 24 April 2006). 
Consequently I would say that, Boutros-Ghali was broadly misunderstood as 
having great hope for a fundamental restructuring of UN peace operations. It seems 
right that he had ideas in general for the expanded roles and responsibilities, but he 
was actually not enthusiastic for the expansion rather reluctant in some cases. His 
An Agenda for Peace was just a reflection of the expectation and demands of UN 
member states for the UN's active role in the post-Cold War era. Weiss and Collins 
(2000) confirm this argument with the statement below: 
This new structure of power relations [which emerged by the end of the Cold War] 
among states needed new ideas, and the Security Council asked the newly elected 
UN secretary-general, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to offer suggestions for an enhanced 
UN role in international peace and security. In response, the secretary-general wrote 
An Agenda for Peace, outlining his ideas on issues of preventive diplomacy, 
186 
peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace-building. An Agenda for Peace was an 
attempt to integrate the concerns of states for international order [... ] (p. 31). 
In this sense, it is reasonable to argue as follows: the growing misuse of 
peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War era was caused by states in the 
international community, especially the major Western countries, rather than the 
Secretary-General Boutros Ghali or the United Nations. Hannay said that the UN 
member states were eager to usher the UN into the conflicts in Somalia and Bosnia: 
`[... ] the member states, particularly the Europeans with the Canadians and 
Americans, and Russians because they wanted to avoid getting into a conflict with 
each other, kept pushing the UN in' (Interview on 24 April 2006). 
The UN and Secretary-General do not have authority over the assets 
required or the budget necessary for its actions. The assets and budget must come 
from its member states and there is no guarantee that they will comply. This 
limitation of the UN stems from its structure as an organisation of individual 
sovereign states. Mr. Ahmed who is the Special Assistant to the UN Under- 
Secretary-General for peacekeeping pointed out that it is difficult for the UN to go 
against its member states, especially the members of the Security Council: 
Everyone knows ... um... our political masters 
for these operations [peacekeeping 
operations] are in the Security Council, the fifteen countries. [... ] That's reality and a 
true secret. Um... obviously their decisions and actions that they take in the Security 
Council are formed by whether they perceive it to be of international interest. It's a 
fact. I mean... so... That is the reality we live with. Many people say why did the UN 
do this or that. They need to be clear. They are talking about the decision of out 
political masters (Interview on 21 April 2005). 
It is definitely right that due to its structural limitations the UN is inevitably 
contingent on its member states, especially the Security Council members. In this 
sense, a statement of Kofi Annan's Millennium report is worthy of mention: 
The structural weaknesses of United Nations peace operations, however, only 
Member States can fix. Our system for launching operations has sometimes been 
compared to a volunteer fire department, but that description is too generous. 
Every 
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time there is a fire, we must first find fire engines and the funds to run them before 
we can start dousing any flames. The present system relies almost entirely on last 
minute, ad hoc arrangements that guarantee delay, with respect to the provision of 
civilian personnel even more so than military (Annan 2000: paragraph 224). 
The strategic failure of the states in properly using peacekeeping operations should 
be considered within the perspective of agent-structure interrelation. There was a 
structural factor that made UN member states, especially the permanent members 
of the Security Council, strongly force the UN and the Secretary-General to 
maneuver UN peacekeeping into the grey zone. It was the end of the Cold War. 
The demise of the Cold War system has created two kinds of new structures 
differing from those of the Cold War system: material and ideational. The features 
of the new material structure of the post-Cold War era are first, the increased 
number of regional intra-state or trans-national conflicts on an unprecedented scale; 
second, more intensified civil strife and hostile ethnic, nationalistic, and religious 
conflicts than ever before. These features of the new world order have been a 
significant challenge to the international community, and have resulted in the 
feeling that `something must be done' by someone. In the early post-Cold War era, 
it was a matter of course that the UN was highlighted as the appropriate body and 
asked to take a decisive role in tackling the crises. That was why the leaders of UN 
member states convened at the summit meeting in January 1992 and proclaimed 
that `all member states expect the United Nations to play a central role at the this 
crucial stage' (United Nations Security Council 1992). As mentioned, according to 
Hannay, UN member states, particularly the United States and European countries 
also with Russia, urged and were pushing the UN to do something in managing the 
new world order because `they wanted to avoid getting into the conflicts'. They 
regarded the UN as `the best possible international tool to avoid the involvement'. 
Thus, the governments were `always in favour of UN's involvement' in the crises 
instead of themselves (Interview on 24 April 2006). 
In terms of the structure of the post-Cold War international system, another 
effect of the end of the Cold War on the excessive expectation of the international 
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community of the UN's activities was the widespread belief of the `liberal triumph'. 
As explained in the chapter on Somalia, there was a strong belief in the West that 
they had won the Cold War and the victory belonged to the idea of liberal 
democracy. As this claim of the triumph of liberal democracy against absolutism, 
fascism, and Communism had been widely accepted by the international 
community, the emphasis on human rights and democracy and the development of 
a more cooperative spirit between the permanent members in the UN Security 
Council had moved the issue of `forcible multilateral humanitarian intervention' 
forwards on the international agenda. In other words, the cognition of the western 
and liberal triumph had gradually grown and constructed an identity of Western 
governments actively dealing with the post-Cold War regional conflicts. In this 
circumstance, the UN was required to conduct its peace operations within the 
context which had expanded from traditional peacekeeping being appropriate to the 
increasing demands for more effective and massive armed intervention in conflicts. 
As to UN peace operations, American support for its missions was vital to 
their success. The U. S. government pays around 30% of the regular budget of the 
UN and usually takes the largest single share of UN peacekeeping expenses32. The 
political changes in the international system after the demise of the Cold War order 
left the United States as the world's supreme power in the new world order. In this 
quasi-unilateral international system, it is inevitable that Washington has an 
immense influence upon UN peace operations. 
The Clinton Administration had two key regional focuses of its foreign 
policy: the Middle East and North Korea. The two regions were critical for U. S. 
national interests because the regions have been the would-be theatres of massive 
armed conflict including tactical nuclear war with the highest probabilities of the 
emergence of crises compared to other regions around the world. Actually, the 
policy makers of the administration devoted their efforts to building the concrete 
political and military system to prevent war in the two regions. One of the results 
of the administration's efforts was the `Win-Win' strategy. The problem that the 
32 As of January 2006, the U. S. paid 27% of the expenses. Japan took the next largest share, 
19%. Germany: 9%; UK and France 7 %; Italy: 5%; Canada and Spain: 3% (United 
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations 2006). 
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administration faced was how to tackle the other minor intra-state or transnational 
conflicts in the other regions, such as Africa or East Europe. They had to resolve 
the less severe conflicts as well to maintain the U. S. leadership in the post-Cold 
War world order. The Americans needed someone to help them. It was the United 
Nations. 
As explained above, the interests of actors are also constructed within the 
interrelations of both the material and ideational structure. At the early stage of the 
end of the Cold War, the Clinton Administration's foreign policy team formulated 
its national interests in securing and strengthening U. S. leadership in the post-Cold 
War international order stressing human rights and humanitarian affairs. To 
achieve this ideational national interest, the Clinton Administration strategically 
used the UN as a tool for its foreign policy by sometimes working with it very 
cooperatively and sometimes heavily criticising it. After Black Hawk Down in 
October 1993, the U. S. government realised that casualties in peace operations 
cannot be tolerated when they intervene in the conflict with ideational (or soft) 
national interest only. Soon after the accident, criticising the United Nations 
directly or indirectly they shifted the centre of gravity of the strategic calculation 
related to national interest from the ideational interest to material interests. The 
result was the non-intervention in Rwanda and PDD 25, which clearly proclaims 
that the United States would not become involved unless American (material) 
interests could be secured, and `Somalia-like intervention' will be avoided (Weiss 
and Collins 2000: 103). 
6.3 The Lessons of the Kosovo Intervention 
On 15 November 1999, the Secretary-General submitted a report pursuant to 
paragraph 18 of General Assembly resolution 53/35 of November 1998. In the 
paragraph, the General Assembly requested the Secretary-General to provide `a 
comprehensive report, including an assessment, on the events dating from the 
establishment of the safe area of Srebrenica' (United Nations General Assembly 
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1998). It is called `the Srebrenica report'. As explained in the Bosnia chapter, it 
was a truly terrible massacre of the Bosnian Muslim population in the UN- 
designated safe haven of Srebrenica in July 1995. The report is not only the 
account of the event in Srebrenica but also a painful review on the lessons learned 
from the crime against humanity. Paragraph 498 of the report states as follows: 
[... ] peacekeeping and war fighting are distinct activities which should not be mixed. 
Peacekeepers must never again be deployed into an environment in which there is no 
ceasefire or peace agreement. Peacekeepers must never again be told that they must 
use their peacekeeping tools - lightly armed soldiers in scattered positions - to 
impose the ill-defined wishes of the international community on one or another of 
the belligerents by military means. If the necessary resources are not provided - and 
the necessary political, military and moral judgements are not made - the job simply 
cannot be done (United Nation Secretary-General 1999). 
It is the key lesson learned from the fall of Srebrenica that peacekeepers should not 
be sent where there is no peace to keep. It is also the prime lesson of the whole 
Bosnian mission and the Somali intervention. The experience in the regions 
demonstrates to us that peacekeeping techniques should not be used in a situation 
of war and the three principles of peacekeeping should be kept as the tenets of 
peacekeeping in both the field and headquarters. However, the international 
security environment of the post-Cold War era demanded UN peacekeeping to play 
a more active role with expanded mandates. The international community does not 
want to leave peacekeeping mission within the restricted boundary of its traditional 
mission. Hannay (1996) states that: 
[... ] the UN does not have the same liberty of choice as does a nation state. It was set 
up by states explicitly to promote international peace and security, a role which was 
largely blocked by the Cold War for several decades but is clearly not so any longer. 
Thus if the UN stays on the sidelines, that is a choice too, and one for which it is 
likely to be sharply criticised (p. 11). 
This is the problem that made the UN and international community fail in Somalia 
and Bosnia. Within this context, which means at the strategic and operational level 
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should the UN choose to be effective in its peacekeeping efforts? The experience of 
the UN and international community in Kosovo provides useful implications for 
answers to this question. The Kosovo intervention was distinctively different from 
the peace operations in Somalia and Bosnia in two points: the major involvement 
of regional organisation, which was also a military organisation with full 
capabilities for armed operations, and use of air power. 
The UN peacekeepers in Kosovo successfully worked in coordinating and 
supporting humanitarian assistance through UNMIK (UN Mission in Kosovo). 
With regard to their efforts for humanitarian relief, the UN cannot be perceived as a 
bystander in Kosovo. However, it was obvious that the UN was a minor actor 
especially in comparison with NATO, which played a key role to tackle the crisis. 
NATO was also involved in Bosnia providing air power and sending ground troops, 
IFOR (Implementation Force). Unlike in Kosovo, NATO was a relatively minor 
actor in the Bosnian crisis. As the UN positioned UNPROFOR at the front line of 
the conflict resolution, NATO stepped aside until 1994. NATO's intervention in 
Bosnia was initiated by the fall of Srebrenica and Zepa in 1995. After the massacre 
in Srebrenica, the U. S. led-international community launched a full-scale military 
intervention in the crisis. Especially, as the Bosnian Serbs were attacking Zepa on 
21 July, the member states of the Contact Group and NATO were deeply 
concerned about the inability of UNPROFOR to deter the attacks of Serbs on the 
UN's safe havens. They decided to use decisive force to tackle the violations of the 
safe areas and protect the people in the areas. Finally, NATO's full-scale 
intervention started with the use of air strikes. NATO also deployed ground troops 
throughout the regions. However, the multinational military contingent of mainly 
ground units from NATO member states and partly non-NATO member states, 
which was called IFOR, did not play a major role in the resolution of the conflict. 
IFOR was established to ensure compliance with the peace agreement between the 
parties concerned by taking over UNPROFOR's responsibilities and missions 
(United Nations 1996a: 558-562). As to NATO's involvement in Bosnia, it would 
be useful to listen to Lord Owen's explanation: 
As part of assessing a European Defence capacity, it is important to understand 
how 
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and why NATO began to involve itself in a shooting war in the former Yugoslavia, 
eventually replacing UN forces. Having rejected calls in 1991 to act over the shelling 
of Vukovar and Dubrovnik, and over ethnic cleansing in the summer of 1992 in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, NATO only began to move towards intervention from the air 
in the autumn of 1992. The reason was that it was self evidently intolerable for 
Yugoslav aeroplanes, claimed as being part of the Bosnian Serb airforce, to be 
strafing Bosnian Government forces and advancing military objectives in Bosnia- 
Herzegovina with UN forces on the ground, largely British and French, as part of a 
humanitarian intervention, helpless to prevent such air attacks (Owen, 16 September 
1999). 
In the Bosnian crisis, the military combination of NATO and UNPROFOR 
to cope with the hostile aggressors was not effective and efficient at all due to the 
very different mandates and approaches of the two organizations to the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Unlike in Bosnia, the states 
concerned decided to fully entrust resolution of the crisis in Kosovo to NATO. It 
was one of the key reasons that the Kosovo intervention became a successful case. 
As explained in the Kosovo chapter, NATO is a military organisation more suitable 
than the UN for that kind of enforcement mission in Kosovo. NATO is well 
structured and equipped to take on the tasks with C31 (Command, Control, 
Communication and Information) capabilities and its own troops and facilities, 
which are essential for the nearly war-fighting peace operations. Unfortunately, the 
UN does not have any of them because UN forces are made up of national forces 
when they are required to be deployed in troubled areas. In the UN Secretariat, 
there are no military components of being able to perform a war like that in Kosovo. 
This is the reason that the failings of the UN armed operations were unavoidable in 
Bosnia. The Brahimi report clearly confirms this: 
The panel recognizes that the United Nations does not wage war. Where 
enforcement action is required, it has consistently been entrusted to coalitions of 
willing States, with the authorization of the Security Council, acting under Chapter 
VII of the Charter (United Nations 2000c: paragraph 53). 
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As the end of the Cold War was ushered in, the number of regional and 
intra-states conflicts dramatically increased and they became more threatening than 
before. Peace-enforcement missions in many troubled areas are beyond the UN's 
ability regarding its limited resources and capabilities of performing military 
operations. A peacekeeping operation is a very useful instrument to cope with civil 
war, intra-states dispute and human-caused catastrophe. However, as the 
experiences in Somalia and Bosnia demonstrated, it cannot be used to deal with 
every kind of conflict in the post-Cold War era. Thus, the UN needs to more 
actively employ regional and/or military organisations to tackle conflicts in hostile 
and aggressive circumstances, which require enforcement actions or even war- 
fightling. As to cooperation with regional organisations, the UN already has a clear 
legal basis in the Charter. Chapter VIII of the Charter clarifies the usefulness of 
regional organisations and their role in the maintenance of international peace and 
security: 
Article 52 
1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements 
or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international 
peace and security as are appropriate for regional action, [... ]. [... ] 
3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of 
local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies 
either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security 
Council. [... ] 
Article 53 
1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional 
arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no 
enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional 
agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, exception of measures 
against any enemy states, as defined in paragraph 2 of the Article, [... ] (United 
Nations 1945). [... ] 
The advantages of cooperation with or reliance on regional organisations for 
conflict resolution and management are reasonably clear. Such strategies reduce 
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burdens on the United Nations. Regional actors may well know the parties of local 
conflicts or disputes and have strong political influence on them so that they might 
be able to more effectively mediate between the parties concerned. Moreover, 
regional organisations are more likely to provide the resources required for peace 
operations in their region because they have direct interests in the operations. 
The second lesson of the Kosovo intervention is the use of air power. 
NATO launched air strikes in both Bosnia and Kosovo. According to the 
Srebrenica report by Kofi Annan, Boutros-Ghali and other decision-makers of the 
Bosnian intervention were very hesitant about using air power against the Serbs: 
What is clear is that my predecessor, his senior advisers [... ], his Special 
Representative and the Force Commander were all deeply reluctant to use air power 
against the Serbs for four main reasons. We believed that by using air power against 
the Serbs we would be perceived as having entered the war against them, something 
not authorized by the Security Council and potentially fatal for a peacekeeping 
operation. Second, we risked losing control over the process - once the key was 
turned we did not know if we would be able to turn it back, with grave consequences 
for the safety of the troops entrusted to us by Member States. Third, we believed that 
the use of air power would disrupt the primary mission of UNPROFOR as we then 
saw it: the creation of an environment in which humanitarian aid could be delivered 
to the civilian population of the country. Fourth, we feared Serb reprisals against our 
peacekeepers. Member States had placed thousands of their troops under United 
Nations command. We, and many of the troop-contributing countries, considered the 
security of those troops to be of fundamental importance in the implementation of 
the mandate. That there was merit in our concerns was evidenced by the hostage 
crisis of May-June 1995 (United Nations Secretary-General 1999: paragraph 482). 
Because of the reasons stated above, the use of air power was very limited and 
ineffective in Bosnia. The Kosovo intervention was different in this point. Since 
there were few UN peacekeeping troops contributed by member states in the field 
and the UN did not take control of the conflict resolution and military operations, 
NATO could conduct their air strike strategy more effectively and efficiently. 
Owen pointed out that `there is a widespread, but mistaken, belief that 
NATO air strikes in the summer of 1995 were the decisive factor in bringing about 
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the Dayton peace accords' (Owen, 16 September 1999). In the interview in October 
2006, he clearly proves that that belief was definitely misperceived: 
The problem of U. S. policy makers is that they had a belief they could do all from 
30,000 feet by air power. They couldn't defend UN safe havens from 30,000 feet. 
[... ] And the British, French and Dutch introduced well-equipped troops with the 
capacity to fire artillery. Up to that time there were no artilleries in the UN forces. 
And with radar-attached... So, the artillery could fire even if there was fog around 
Sarajevo as often there is so aircrafts couldn't take off. Also radar-monitored mortar 
units came in. So, the French, British and Dutch were much better equipped by then. 
So, they could reinforce NATO air power (Interview on 16 October 2006). 
Not only the U. S. decision-makers but European leaders also believed that air 
strikes had been a strong influence on the Serbs in Bosnian. From the initial stage 
of the air campaigns they were convinced that the threat to repeat bombings forced 
Milosevic to cease his hostile intention and accept the Rambouillet terms (Owen, 
16 September 1999). The belief misguided many American and European leaders 
to repeat air strikes in Kosovo. The decisive factor in the Kosovo intervention, 
which ended the crisis, was not NATO's air strike strategy but the political will of 
the states involved to resolve the crisis. It is obvious that use of air power without 
the support of ground troops has a limited effect in peace operations. Regarding 
humanitarian assistance and relief missions ground troops are very essential for 
completing the missions. In many ways, peace operations and the use of air power 
are an ineffective or sometimes non-functional combination of strategies. That was 
why NATO needed a huge military presence in Kosovo after its air strikes. As soon 
as the bombing was ceased, with the legal support of UN Security Council 
resolution 1244 (1999), the North Atlantic Council authorised the deployment of 
KFOR troops in June 1999. However, due to the possibility of reducing the risk of 
casualties in the field, many states seem to repeatedly rely on using only air power 
in future peacekeeping operations. We must learn from the past. 
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6.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the changes to peacekeeping operations in the 1990s. It 
is very important to clarify whether UN peacekeeping especially in Somalia and 
Bosnia was misused or evolved in terms of its conception and practice because 
appropriate recommendations for the better performance of peacekeeping 
operations in the future are contingent on how to understand the changes to the 
operations in the regions, which were the most unsuccessful cases in the history of 
UN peacekeeping. That is, the clarification of the changes will provide very 
different solutions for future peacekeeping related to these issues: how to conduct 
operations in order not to repeat the misuse and what to do regarding the expanded 
roles and functions. 
Somalia and the former Yugoslavia were the cases of the change of post- 
Cold War peacekeeping. For many, such interventions are widely held to be an 
innovation of the post-Cold War era, but in fact they are just exceptional cases 
among UN peace operations in 1990s. As argued in the first section of this chapter, 
peacekeeping was applied to the definitely inappropriate circumstances of the 
crises. The misuses of UN peacekeeping were deeply related to the failures of the 
UN and international community in both regions. Unfortunately, the international 
security environment of the post-Cold War era is demanding more expanded and 
active involvement of the UN in regional conflicts, increasing the possibility of the 
repeating misuse of peacekeeping techniques. It seems inevitable that the UN will 
make efforts to cope with conflicts in any circumstances according to the growing 
demands of the international community because as Hannay said the UN does not 
have the same liberty of choice as do its member states. 
The UN already has a useful tool for hostile conflicts by aggressive parties, 
which require massive and coercive armed operations like those in Somalia and 
Bosnia. That is peace-enforcement. Thus, what is essential for the UN is to 
improve skills to clarify the diversity of each conflict and develop strategic 
calculations about the choice of the proper tool appropriate to the nature of a 
conflict based on its analysis. The selective adaptation of the tool of peace 
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operations requires the appropriate analysis of national interests of states 
contributing to the operations. Through UN history, most successful peacekeeping 
operations were established in cases in which external powers had considerable 
influence and interests. Indeed, a driving force behind peacekeeping was the 
superpowers' mutual interest in bringing an end to conflicts. Therefore, the UN 
when it launches especially grey zone operations should be very selective and 
conduct a very careful review of national interests of states concerned based on the 
conceptual analysis of material and ideational interests. Peacekeeping is not a 
panacea and should not be used as a panacea. For better performance and success 
in the future, UN peacekeeping should remain in its traditional responsibility and 
role. It does not mean that mandate and mission of peacekeeping operations must 
not be expanded from those of traditional operations during the Cold War. With 
robust doctrine and realistic mandates authorised by the Security Council, the UN 
can expand its operational boundary beyond traditional peacekeeping. However, 
that boundary should not include enforcement actions or war-fighting. And, in 
operations, it should be firmly perceived and strictly observed by the decision- 
makers of peacekeeping that the three basic principles of peacekeeping are 
essential to its success. 
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Chapter 7: Conclusion 
This study has examined the practices of UN peacekeeping operations during the 
first decade of the post-Cold War era, focusing primarily on three cases: Somalia, 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Kosovo. In spite of the initial optimism and eagerness of 
the international community to tackle the post-Cold War-type intra-state conflicts, 
the UN and its member states failed in Somalia and Bosnia and the results of the 
interventions were disastrous. The first research question of this thesis is: What has 
brought the UN and states involved in the interventions to the point of outright 
strategic failure? It is evident from the case studies of the interventions in Somalia 
and Bosnia that the failures were mainly caused by the fact that the UN employed 
peacekeeping techniques within the wrong context. UN peacekeeping is designed 
to tackle small-scale and less-aggressive armed conflicts in which there is at least a 
cease-fire or peace agreement, but not suitable for such hostile and intensive war- 
fighting as occurred in Somalia and Bosnia, which required the massive military 
operation of peace-enforcement action. Hence, the practices of peacekeeping in 
both regions clearly prove my hypothesis: the interventions of the UN and 
international community could not be successful in these crises because they used 
peacekeeping techniques as a means of military intervention. 
The practices of peace-enforcement actions by UN peacekeepers in both 
regions have made many believe that UN peacekeeping operations have evolved 
from traditional peacekeeping. However, the operations there were not evidence of 
the evolution, but were cases of the misuse of peacekeeping techniques. It is 
important to properly understand the peacekeeping practices because they could set 
a crucial precedent for later peacekeeping operations. If we understand them as 
cases of misuse, such `grey zone' missions would not be repeated any more. 
However, if they are recognised as a type of newly evolved peacekeeping operation, 
the UN and international community shall be willing to choose that kind of 
peacekeeping again whenever they feel it is needed. It should be noted that in the 
early and mid-1990s UN peacekeeping operations, like a rubber band, had been 
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stretched beyond their realistic tolerance and capabilities. As they were employed 
in inappropriate circumstances without proper preparation and support, each 
mission deteriorated sharply in the regions. Indeed, Ruggie's statement should be 
kept in mind by decision-makers of peace operations: the `growing misuse of 
peacekeeping does more than strain the United Nations materially and 
institutionally' (p. 26). 
The prime role of the United Nations is to maintain international peace and 
security. For this end, both peaceful means and collective coercive measures are 
enshrined in Chapter VI and Chapter VII of the UN Charter respectively. Article 41 
and 42 of Chapter VII are extremely important because those are the concrete legal 
basis for the collective security system of the international community to achieve 
the prime purpose of the UN. The collective security system essentially requires the 
consent of all the permanent member states of the Security Council. During the 
Cold War era, on account of the fierce rivalry between the West and the East the 
security system could not work properly for the maintenance of peace and security. 
Since the end of the Second World War, decolonisation had caused a lot of ethnic 
conflicts, civil wars, and humanitarian catastrophes, but the international 
community and the UN could not easily employ the collective system to deal with 
those disputes and conflicts due to the political stalemate in the Security Council. 
UN peacekeeping operations were born in this circumstance. 
As is well known, peacekeeping operations are not based on any article of 
the UN Charter. They have been recognised through the early practices such as 
UNEF and ONUC; and legal support by General Assembly Resolution 377 (V), 
Uniting for Peace and the Certain Expenses of the United Nations Case of ICJ. UN 
peacekeeping falls short of the provision of Chapter VII of the Charter mainly in 
terms of the enforceability of the use of force. It is also obvious that they go 
beyond the pacific and diplomatic measures described in Chapter VI. That is why 
the former Secretary-General Dag Hammarskjöld said that UN peacekeeping might 
be put in a new Chapter `Six and a Half (United Nations 1990: 5). In spite of the 
absence of a concrete legal base and the limitation of their role and responsibility, 
the practices of UN peacekeeping during the Cold War years have proved that 
peacekeeping operations are a very useful instrument for securing peace in troubled 
200 
areas. Since the first observer peacekeeping mission, UNTSO in 1948, the UN 
established 18 peacekeeping bodies during the Cold War era by 1989. 
Peacekeeping operations have been contingent on mandates from the Security 
Council, and could therefore be mounted only where there was no objection from 
the permanent member states of the Security Council. The operations have been 
successfully conducted in circumstances in which conflicting parties had given 
their consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers and a ceasefire had been 
agreed, that is to say, there was a peace to keep. The success of peacekeeping 
missions was very dependant on whether peacekeeping forces were trusted by all 
the parties concerned because the ceasefire agreements that the UN was called 
upon to police were generally precarious. This in turn required strict impartiality in 
conducting the missions. The expertise including the three key principles of 
peacekeeping, impartiality, the consent of parties, the use of force for self-defence 
only, developed by the UN during the Cold War stands as one of the organisation's 
major achievements regarding the key purpose of the UN. 
The end of the Cold War has brought enormous changes to the environment 
of international peace and security. The easing of the East-West confrontation 
during the Cold War enabled cooperation in the Security Council and provided 
opportunities to resolve long-standing inter-states conflicts. But, it also has caused 
the outbreak of other conflicts, giving rise to fierce claims of subnational identity 
based on ethnicity, religion, culture, and economy, which have often resulted in 
armed conflict. Responding to the new political landscape, the international 
community turned to peacekeeping, which grew rapidly in size and scope, 
especially in the early 1990s. The UN failed to appreciate the nature of the new 
type of conflict and its own capability in conflict management. Consequently, the 
peacekeeping missions of the UN in Somalia and Bosnia were unable to achieve 
their objectives as it sent its peacekeepers where there was no peace to keep. 
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7.1 The Reflections of the Three Cases 
The United Nations and international community got themselves into serious 
trouble in Somalia and the former Yugoslavia. This trouble stems from the fact that 
they applied a useful tool to inappropriate circumstances. As defined in chapter 2, 
peacekeeping operations are the interposition of unarmed or lightly-armed UN 
forces, including police personnel or civilians, in an environment with the consent 
of all the parties concerned to encourage the warring parties to negotiate a 
settlement or to impartially buttress a political agreement between them through the 
means authorised by the Security Council. The elements for success are the three 
principles: impartiality, the consent of the parties involved, and the use of force for 
self-defence only. The problem with the Somali and Bosnian missions was that 
peacekeepers were sent where the principles could not be kept. Then, what caused 
the misuse of peacekeeping? To answer this second research question, the 
analytical framework of the structure-agency interrelationship has been employed 
through the case studies. The structure-agency approach as an analytical framework 
is very useful to overcome the theoretical limitations of both structuralism and 
intentionalism. Structure and agency dynamically interact in shaping the course of 
political events and phenomena. Any type of explanation which employs a position 
based solely either on structure or on agency possibly faces difficulty in 
understanding the dynamics of the causality of political events. Hence, examining 
the relational interactions between structure and agency provides a range of crucial 
insights into the analysis of the causality. 
Any action of an agent is formulated within structural contexts through 
strategic calculation. A `contextualised' actor within the structure monitors the 
immediate consequences of its actions. It assesses success or failure of its actions 
in securing its prior objectives and then strategically learns from the consequences. 
Through this learning process, an actor formulates their revised actions or reactions, 
which partially cause direct effects upon the structured contexts producing a partial 
formation of the structure. Both the misuse of peacekeeping techniques at the 
strategic level and the operational failures at the field level were the product of 
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strategic calculation of the actors. These were formulated definitely within the 
structural contexts of the post-Cold War international order. The structural effect of 
the Cold War ending on the UN was that the new international humanitarian order 
of the post-Cold War compelled the UN to do something to tackle the increased 
armed intra-state conflicts. The UN was definitely under the pressure of the huge 
expectations of the international community for its active role and enlarged action 
in the post-Cold War era. 
In Somalia, the field commanders of U. S. troops tried to approach their 
mission to apprehend General Aidid and his assistants very strategically in terms of 
military tactics but their strategic consideration lacked political analysis of the 
context of their mission as a peace operation. As Clinton (2004) points out, at that 
time the UN was not a peacekeeper any more, but a party to the conflict warring 
against USC/SNA led by General Aidid (p. 550). Eventually, the inappropriate use 
of peacekeeping techniques caused Black Hawk Down, which was a decisive event 
in the failure of the whole peacekeeping mission in Somalia. Concerning the initial 
stage of the intervention, Operation Restore Hope had some elements of success in 
terms of securing an environment for humanitarian relief and saving many lives. 
However, despite this short-term success at the beginning of the intervention the 
peace operation of the U. S. -led international force under the authority of the UN 
failed to undertake the harder job of disarming the militia and then eventually ran 
into the disastrous result of the whole mission in Somalia as Black Hawk Down 
happened. Albright (2003) testifies to the failure of international cooperation in 
Somalia as follows: 
[... ], other nations contributing peacekeepers had followed their own agendas 
instead of functioning as a team. The Italians had openly disagreed with the UN 
strategy and were suspected of bringing Aidid's forces in order to protect their own. 
The Saudis had said their unique status within Islam prohibited them from engaging 
in offensive operations. The French had cooperated sometimes, sometimes not. 
India 
had provided a brigade but then refused to deploy it to Mogadishu. The Pakistanis 
had grown understandably gun-shy (p. 146). 
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This failure to cooperate effectively in the operation was fundamentally caused by 
the fact that the UN peacekeepers had to conduct a dangerous peace-enforcement 
mission, not a traditional `peacekeeping' mission. The Somali intervention is an 
explicit case showing how a peace-enforcement mandate without proper military 
preparation and political willingness within a peacekeeping context seriously spoils 
the efficacy and effectiveness of multilateral peacekeeping operations. Albright 
(2003) says in her autobiography that `we had to turn the lesson of Somalia into a 
positive one. Our defeat there didn't mean we should never get involved; it meant 
we needed to be better prepared (p. 157). ' 
The UN peacekeepers deployed in the former Yugoslavia could not prevent 
the ethnic cleansings and even failed to defend UN-designated `safe areas' in 
Bosnia. The Bosnian Serbs seized UN peacekeepers and used them as a `human 
shield' against further attacks from NATO. The Bosnian crisis was almost a war 
waged by well-disciplined and heavily-armed forces, differing from other regional 
conflicts in which the UN had intervened. The key point is that in Bosnia, there 
was no peace to keep. Thus, it was impossible for the usual UN peacekeeping 
forces in terms of mandate and facilities to cope with the conflict. They lacked 
adequate support from the UN for massive fighting with the mighty warring parties 
and some of them lacked even essential training for their mission. The decision- 
makers of the UN mission send the wrong type of troops to Bosnia. 
The other reason for the failure in both regions was the absence of the 
unified and efficient command and control system in the operational-level 
headquarters. It was primarily caused by the fact that most of the member states 
who contributed did not want to give up control of their troops. A GAO report on 
the limitations of the UN in using force states that: 
[... ], the United Nations cannot ensure that troops and resources will be provided to 
carry out and reinforce operations as necessary, especially since such operations are 
risky and nations volunteering troops and arms may not have a national interest 
in 
the operation (U. S. GAO, March 1997: 4). 
It seems obvious that the Clinton administration believed that in order to encourage 
U. S. national interests whenever and wherever they wanted to, it was critical to 
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retain U. S. forces under the president's command authority. In A National Security 
Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement: 1995-1996, he clearly states as follows: 
In order to maximize the benefits of UN peace operations, the United States 
must take highly disciplined choices about when and under what circumstances to 
support or participate in them. [... ] Far from handing a blank check to the UN, [... ] 
[it is required] to undertake a rigorous analysis of requirements and capabilities 
before voting to support or participate in peace operations. The United States has not 
hesitated to use its position on the Security Council to ensure that the UN authorizes 
only those peace operations that meet these standards. 
[... ] On those occasions when we consider contributing U. S. forces to a UN 
peace operation, we will employ rigorous criteria, including the same principles that 
would guide any decision to employ U. S. forces. [... ] 
The question of command and control is particularly critical. There may be times 
when it is in our interest to place U. S. troops under the temporary operational control 
of a component UN or allied commander. [... ] under no circumstances will the 
President ever relinquish his command authority over U. S. forces (Clinton 1995: 69- 
72). 
Many point out that Boutros-Ghali was mainly responsible for the wrong 
decision-making leading to the misuses. It is widely accepted that he was known to 
have great hope for a fundamental restructuring of UN peace operations. However, 
my findings throughout elite interviews show that he was less enthusiastic than it 
has been perceived about calling for a new and active role for the UN and rather 
had different and specific views on the actual cases. It seems right that he had ideas 
in general for the expanded roles and responsibilities, but he was actually not 
enthusiastic for the expansion rather reluctant in some cases. His An Agenda for 
Peace was just a reflection of the expectations and demands of UN member states 
for the UN's active role in the post-Cold War era. The growing misuses of 
peacekeeping operations in the early post-Cold War era were caused by member 
states of the international community, especially the major Western countries, 
rather than the Secretary-General Boutros Ghali or the United Nations. 
The Kosovo intervention is a useful case because it provides a good 
contrast to the operations in Somalia and Bosnia. In comparison with the other two 
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cases, the Kosovo intervention was relatively successful in putting an end to the 
crisis. This success was enabled by the fact that NATO played a major role in the 
conflict resolution and the UN stepped aside from the front line. NATO is an 
organisation suited to such military intervention in Kosovo, but the UN is not. As a 
military body, NATO has C31 capabilities, well-disciplined troops, and facilities. 
However, the UN does not have the military components to make it able to conduct 
a war like the one in Kosovo. This is also the reason that the UN could not be 
successful in dealing with the Bosnian crisis. UN forces as peacekeepers were 
made up of national forces contributed by member states when they were required 
to be deployed. They cannot conduct operations which are nearly war-fighting due 
to the lack of a unified command and control structure, proper and sustainable 
logistic support, and political willingness. 
The other lesson learned from the Kosovo case regards the use of air power. 
Unlike in Bosnia, the decision-makers of the intervention in Kosovo could easily 
decide to use an air strike because there were few UN peacekeeping troops in the 
field. As mentioned in the Srebrenica report by Kofi Annan, the safety of 
peacekeepers was a serious concern for the UN feared Serb reprisals against its 
peacekeepers as experienced in the hostage crisis of May-June 1995 in Bosnia 
(United Nations Secretary-General 1999: paragraph 482). As many point out, it 
was not the use of air power that put an end to the Kosovo crisis, but the political 
will of the states involved to resolve the crisis. It is clear that the use of air power 
without the support of ground troops has a limited effect in peace operations. But, 
this kind of intervention seems very attractive to states contributing to peace 
operations because the use of air power only is obviously able to reduce the risk of 
casualties among their solders. It is a key issue, which is a deep concern of states 
when they decide to be involved in peace operations. Black Hawk Down 
in 
Somalia clearly showed us that a high number of casualties makes a peace 
operation unable to be sustained. Therefore, in order to successfully complete 
peace missions the UN or states involved should reduce the risk of casualties. 
The 
only possible way to do that is that they selectively send their peacekeepers where 
there is peace to keep and to adhere to the three principles of peacekeeping 
operations. 
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7.2 Lessons for Future Peacekeeping Operations 
The increase of intra-state conflicts or ethnic strife in the early post-Cold War era 
may be a passing phenomenon, but it surely does not mean that the role of UN 
peacekeeping will be gradually reduced in the future. Rather, the UN seems to be 
more actively used by its member states to conduct multidimensional missions 
within the complex operational context. As Hannay (1996) points out, the UN does 
have the limited liberty of choice in making their decisions and conducting actions. 
Thus, `the UN cannot really avoid being used by its members, whether it likes the 
use or not' (p. 11). Unfortunately, it is true that the capabilities of the UN system to 
shoulder a burgeoning number of security missions do not reach the required level. 
At present, the system is staggering at nearly full capacity. In addition to traditional 
peacekeeping missions, the UN has many difficult tasks to deal with such as 
disarmament and arms control in war-torn areas and post-conflict peace-building. 
Thus, what is essential for the future of peacekeeping operations is to improve their 
effectiveness and efficacy, and to use the techniques properly in appropriate 
circumstances. 
UN peacekeeping forces are lightly armed and allowed to shoot only in 
self-defence situations. As we know, peacekeeping does not have any 
constitutional basis in the UN Charter, thus UN peacekeeping troops have been 
sent with the mandate of the authority of the Security Council and only sent with 
the consent of parties concerned. Ruggie (1993) points out that unlike combat units 
of regular forces of states, `peacekeeping forces are not designed to create the 
conditions for their own success on the ground; those conditions must pre-exist for 
them to be able to perform their role'. Although peacekeeping troops are military 
personnel and carry arms, their role is fundamentally in non-military mission. 
Therefore, the effectiveness of field units of peacekeeping forces and the adequacy 
of UN headquarters' capabilities for the operations were not major issues of 
concern in the past (p. 28). However, the changed environment of the post-Cold 
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War international order requires the UN to increase the effectiveness and efficacy 
of their field armed missions. Unlike NATO, the UN is just an intergovernmental 
political body not a military alliance, which has an institutionalised military 
enforcement capability. Accordingly, it seems very difficult for the UN to conscript 
troops and arms from its member states to conduct large-scale military enforcement 
operations. In the future, a huge multilateral contingent for enforcement actions or 
war-fighting, such as UN forces in the Korean War, will probably not be possible. 
With regard to minimising the inefficiency experienced in past operations 
and improving the effectiveness of its activities in peace operations, various 
options have been suggested over the years. One of the plausible options is the 
creation of standing UN armed forces like the Rapid Reaction Forces. The idea of a 
standing United Nations force is not new. There has been much talk about the 
formation of a UN army. Trygve Lie, the first Secretary-General of the United 
Nations, made suggestions to this effect as early as 1948. They have been made on 
numerous occasions since. In 1990 member states were requested to indicate what 
military personnel they were, in principle, prepared to make available for United 
Nations service. In An Agenda for Peace of June 1992, the Secretary-General 
Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated that: 
[... ] Stand-by arrangements should be confirmed, as appropriate, through exchanges 
of letters between the Secretariat and Member States concerning the kind and 
number of skilled personnel they will be prepared to offer the United Nations as the 
needs of new operations arise (Boutros-Ghali 1992: paragraph 51). 
In his Supplement to An Agenda for Peace of January 1995, the Secretary-General 
took this further to propose the formation of a `rapid reaction force', which would 
be under his `executive direction and command', and which would act as the 
Security Council's `strategic reserve' for emergency intervention in crises 
(Boutros-Ghali 1995: paragraph 38). Studies to this effect have since 
been 
undertaken by a number of UN member states and scholars. 
In all cases these 
studies have come up against the realities of consensus and 
jurisdiction as outlined 
in the preceding paragraphs. The hindrances to a standing 
UN force exposed 
through the studies and the past experience of the UN are the various opinions 
that 
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member states have on the idea in relation to many issues such as the force's 
jurisdiction, rules of engagement, budget, and so on. Moreover, they would not 
want to give up control of their troops and place them under the UN's authority. As 
Gray (2000) notes, there are many `serious practical problems with the quality and 
training of troops, their equipment, and with speed of deployment (p. 198). 
Therefore, it is very difficult to make the states compromise and reach a consensus 
on it. In this sense, although the idea of the creation of a UN army is a very 
attractive option for tackling the existing problems of UN peace operations, it 
would not seem to be feasible in the near future. 
Instead of a standing UN army, Boutros-Ghali established a peacekeeping 
operations `standby arrangement system' in 1994 to enhance the UN's capacity to 
set up a new operation quickly and efficiently. Under this system, some 70 member 
states have undertaken to provide, in principle, a total of some 100,000 personnel 
to future peacekeeping operations (United Nations 1996a: 7-8). However, 
contribution to these operations is entirely voluntary and even those member states 
that participate in the standby system decide on a case-by-case basis whether and 
what to contribute to a specific future operation. The first test case of the system, 
that of organising an enlarged operation for Rwanda in 1994, failed when all 
member states that had registered their willingness declined the Secretary- 
General's request for troops. In sum, the UN Secretariat has restricted authority 
over its peacekeeping operations because the assets and budget required for the 
operations come from its member states and there is no guarantee that member 
states will comply. 
The key motive, which determines whether member states will contribute 
troops to peacekeeping situations where there is a significant risk of casualties, is 
the political willingness based on the strategic calculation of their national interests. 
As the Kosovo intervention clearly showed, using regional and/or military 
organisations for peace operations is one of the most effective measures to summon 
the political willingness of states concerned because the member states of a 
regional organisation usually have strong interests in the troubled areas within their 
region. Like Kosovo, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS)'s intervention in Liberia in late 1990 was also a good example of the 
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`military involvement' of regional organization. ECOWAS established the 
ceasefire-monitoring group (ECOMOG) to restore peace and security in Liberia. 
The actions of the ECOMOG force were widely regarded as a successful military 
peace operation in terms of regional resolution of intra-state conflicts. 
To conclude, the early 1990s were a time of experimenting and learning 
hard lessons about the potential and limits of UN peacekeeping operations. One of 
the most basic lessons taught by the experiences of the international community in 
Somalia and Bosnia was that an inappropriate use of peacekeeping techniques with 
the lack of strategic consideration of the conflicts would cause more disastrous 
results. In contrast, the intervention in Kosovo tells us that we already have various 
options to effectively tackle a crisis in the post-Cold War era, such as using 
regional and/or military organisations for peace operations. Each conflict had its 
own unique aspects normally with a blend of history, religion, economy, and 
politics. The overriding lesson was clear. The international community has a 
responsibility to help societies endangered by natural or human-caused catastrophe. 
An important point is that the means to help them should be thoroughly considered 
in its preparation and properly employed. This will promote the peace and security 
of the international community and eventually encourage the national interests of 
each state as well. In this sense, it is worthwhile to mention Albright's statement: 
I acknowledged the UN's flaws but argued that many were correctable and in the 
process of being corrected -a process it was in America's interests to encourage. 
The more effective the UN was, the more it could help us by sharing the costs, risks, 
and responsibilities of promoting peace. If we did not back the UN sufficiently, it 
would not succeed. And when the UN didn't succeed, we all paid a price. We had 
seen that in Somalia and Rwanda. And from my first days in New York, we had seen 
it in Bosnia as well (Albright 2003: 176). 
Peacekeeping techniques stand out as one of the UN's most remarkable creations 
and ambitious undertakings in its effort to maintain international peace and security. 
It is an inspired innovation in terms of conflict resolution. The Blue Helmets with 
the UN symbol will continue to break new grounds as the international community 
is required not only to control conflicts and alleviate the suffering they cause, but 
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also to prevent the outbreak of civil wars among nations and to build towards 
enduring peace. What is essential for successful peacekeeping is to develop a 
comprehensive and robust framework suited to the realities of the post-Cold War 
era and to appropriately use peacekeeping within the framework. The UN has been 
heavily used by its member states and will be in the future. As Hannay (1996) 
notes, if the UN were to take a minimal role in military actions, it would be likely 
to be sharply criticised by its member states. However, the UN would be also 
criticised for failing to do rightly what it is required to do and for problems exposed 
in the course of its performance. Hannay (1996) says that: 
Did the League of Nations damage itself more by what it did not do over Manchuria 
or by what it tried and failed to do over Abyssinia? It is sadly the case that the UN 
cannot really avoid being used by it members, whether it likes the use or not. The 
tendency to treat it as a scapegoat when things go wrong, therefore, must be 
condemned for the damage it does to the long term usefulness of an instrument we 
will no doubt wish to use again effectively in the future (p. 11). 
The lessons of the interventions in Somalia and Bosnia need to be learned. The UN 
could surely improve its performance in future peace operations if it carefully 
analyses the nature of conflicts and the national interests of states concerned; 
properly employs its measures according to crises; and shares the burden of 
intervention with regional and/or military organisations. 
211 
Bibliographical References 
Abiew, Francis Kofi (1999), The Evolution of the Doctrine and Practice of Humanitarian Intervention, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
Albright, Madeleine (2003), Madam Secretary: A Memoir [autobiography], New 
York: Talk Miramax Books. 
Annan, Kofi A. (2000), `We the peoples: the role of the United Nations in the 
twenty-first century: Report of the Secretary-General (A154/2000)' [The 
Millennium Report] [online], UN Documentation Center website. Available from: 
http: //www. un. org/documents [Accessed in September 20061. 
Archer, Margaret S. (1995), Realist Social Theory: the Morphogenetic Approach, 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
BBC News (17 Dec. 2005), `Country profile: Former Yugoslav Republic of 
Macedonia' [online], BBC News website. Available from: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/ 
hi/world/europe/country profiles/1067125. stm [Accessed in January 2006]. 
-------------- (15 October 1999), `World: Europe - Kosovo war cost £30bn' [online], 
BBC News website. Available from http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/world/europe/ 
476134. stm [Accessed in August 2006]. 
-------------- (5 June 1999), `Kosovo Crisis - Background: Roots of conflict' [online], 
BBC News website. Available from http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/special_report/1998/ 
kosovo/305008. stm [Accessed in April 2006]. 
BBC News, `The shape of Yugoslavia has changed profoundly since its creation in 
1945' [online], BBC News website. Available from: http: //news. bbc. co. uk/hi/ 
english/static/map/yugoslavia [Accessed in October 2005]. 
Bennett, A. LeRoy (1995), International Organizations: Principles and Issues, 6th 
ed., London: Prentice-Hall International, Inc. 
Bercovitch, Jacob (1996) (ed. ), Resolving International Conflicts: The Theory and 
Practice of Mediation, Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Biermann, Wolfgang and Vadset, Martin (1998) (eds. ), UN peacekeeping in 
Trouble: Lessons Learned from the Former Yugoslavia: Peacekeeper's Views on 
the Limits and Possibilities of the United Nations in a Civil War-like Conflict, 
Aldershot, England: Ashgate Publishing. 
Biermann, Wolfgang (16 Oct. 1997), `From Stoltenberg - Owen to Dayton: 
Interview with Thorvald Stoltenberg about Peacekeeping Principles, Politics and 
212 
Diplomacy' [Interviewed in Copenhagen Denmark], in Biermann and Vadset (1998). 
Blair, Tony (24 April 1999), `Doctrine of the International Community' - Speech by Prime Minister Tony Blair at the Economic Club, Chicago [online]. Available 
from: http: //www. numberI0. gov. uk/output/Page1297. asp [Assessed in December 
2007]. 
Booth, Ken (ed. ) (2001), The Kosovo Tragedy: the Human Rights Dimensions, 
London: Frank Cass. 
Bothe, Michael and Dörschel, Thomas (1999) (eds. ), UN Peacekeeping: A 
Documentary Introduction, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
Boutros-Ghali, Boutros (1995), `Supplement to An Agenda for Peace: Position 
Paper of the Secretary-General on the Occasion of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the 
United Nations Nations - Report of the Secretary-General on the Work of the 
Organization' (A/50/60 - S/1995/1), in Bothe and Dörschel (eds. ) (1999), pp. 29- 
57. 
----------------------------- (1992), `An Agenda for Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping - Report of the Secretary-General pursuant to the 
statement adopted by the Summit Meeting of the Security Council on 31 January 
1992', in Roberts and Kingsbury (eds. ) (1993), pp. 468-98. 
Bowden, Mark (1999), Black Hawk Down, London: Corgi Books. 
The British Army (1995), Wider Peacekeeping - The Army Field Manual Vol. 5, 
Operations other than war, Part 2., London: HMSO. 
Bryman, Alan (2001), Social Research Methods, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Burchill, Richard et al. (eds. ) (2005), International Conflict and Security Law: 
Essay in Memory of Hilaire McCoubrey, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Burchill, Richard (2005), `Regional organizations and the promotion and protection 
of democracy as a contribution to international peace and security', in Burchill, 
Richard et al. (eds. ) (2005), pp. 209-34. 
Burchill, Scott et al. (2001), Theories of International Relations, 2nd ed., New 
York: Palgrave. 
Burnham, Peter (ed. ) (1997), Surviving the Research Process in Politics, London: 
Pinter. 
Burton, Dawn (eds. ) (2000), Research Training for Social Scientists, London: Sage 
Publications. 
213 
Bush, George H. (1989), Inaugural Address on 20 January [online], Bartleby 
website. Available from: http: //www. bartleby. com/124/pres63. html [Accessed on 1 February 2005]. 
Cerjan, Paul E. (1994), `The United States and Multilateral Peacekeeping: The Challenge of Peace', in Mokhtari (ed. ) (1994). 
Chomsky, Noam (1999), The New Military Humanism: Lessons from Kosovo, 
London: Pluto Press. 
Christopher, Warren (1993), `Democracy and Human Rights: Where America 
Stands' - Remarks at the World Conference on Human Rights on 14 June at Vienna [online], U. S. Department of State website. Available from: 
http: //dosfan. lib. uic. edu/ERC/briefing/dossec/1993/9306/930614dossec. html 
[Accessed in February 2005]. 
Clark, Ian (2001), The Post-Cold War Order, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Clark, Wesley K. (2003), Winning Modern Wars: Iraq, Terrorism, and the 
American Empire, New York: PublicAffairs. 
---------------------- (2001), Waging Modern War: Bosnia, Kosovo, and the Future 
of Combat, Oxford: PublicAffairs. 
Clarke, Walter and Herbst, Jeffrey (1996), `Somalia and the Future of 
Humanitarian Intervention', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 75, No. 2, pp. 70-85. 
Clausewitz, Carl Von (1976), On War, edited and trans. by Howard, Michael and 
Paret, Peter (first published in 1830), Princeton, Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
Clinton, Bill (2004), My Life [autobiography], London: Hutchinson. 
--------------- (1993), `Inaugural Address on 21 January' [online], Bartleby website. 
Available from: http: //www. bartleby. com/124/pres64. html [Accessed in February 
2005]. 
-----------, William J. (1995), A National Security Strategy of Engagement and 
Enlargement: 1995-1996 [Annual Report], Washington DC: Brassey's. 
CNN. com (15 April 1999), `NATO confirms `mistakenly' bombing civilians in 
convoy' [online], CNN. com website. Available from http: //www. cnn. com/WORLD/ 
europe/9904/1 5/nato. attack. 02/ [Accessed in August 2006]. 
Crigler, T. Frank (1993), `The Peace-Enforcement Dilemma', Joint Force 
Quarterly, Autumn, No. 2, pp. 64-70. 
214 
Curtis, Willie (1994), `Maneuvering in the Gray Zone: The Gap Between 
Traditional Peacekeeping and War Fighting, Peacemaking, Peace-Enforcement, 
and Post-Conflict Peace-Building', in Mokhtari (ed. ) (1994). 
Daniel, Donald C. F. and Hayes, Bradd C. (eds. ) (1995), Beyond Traditional 
Peacekeeping, London: Macmillan Press. 
Danish Institute of International Affairs (1999), Humanitarian Intervention: Legal 
and Political Aspects, Copenhagen: Danish Institute of International Affairs. 
Davis, Lynn E. (1993), Peacekeeping and Peacemaking After the Cold War, Santa 
Monica, California: RAND, Summer Institute. 
Dexter, Lewis Anthony (1970), Elite and Specialized Interviewing, Evanston Ill.: 
North-western University Press. 
Dixon, Martin (1996), Textbook on International Law, 3rd ed., London: Blackstone 
Press. 
Donnelly, Jack (1989), Universal Human Rights in Theory & Practice, London: 
Cornell University Press. 
Dunne, Tim and Wheeler, Nicholas J. (eds. ) (1999), Human Rights in Global 
Politics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Durch, William J. (ed. ) (1996), UN Peacekeeping, American Policy, and the 
Uncivil Wars of the 1990s, New York: St. Martin's Press. 
----------------------- (ed. ) (1993), The Evolution of UN Peacekeeping: Case Studies 
and Comparative Analysis, London: Macmillan Press. 
Evans, Gareth (1993), Cooperating For Peace: The Global Agenda for the 1990s 
and Beyond, St Leonards: Allen & Unwin Pty. 
Franck, Thomas M. (1999), `Break It, Don't Fake It'; a response to Glennon's 
(1999) article in Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3. 
Freedman, Lawrence (ed. ) (1994a), War, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
------------------------- (ed. ) (1994b), Military Intervention in 
European Conflicts, 
Oxford: Blackwell Publishers. 
Friedman, Thomas (1993), `Mission in Somalia; Dealing with Somalia: Vagueness 
as a Virtue', The New York Times, 15 October 1993. 
Frye, Alton (ed. ) (2000), Humanitarian Intervention: Crafting a Workable 
Doctrine, New York: The Council on Foreign Relations. 
215 
Fukuyama, Francis (1989), `The End of History? ', National Interest, No. 12, 
Summer, pp. 1-16. 
Gardner, Richard N. (1992), `Collective Security and the "New World Order": 
What Role for the United Nations? ', in Nye, Joseph S. and Smith, Roger K. (eds. ) 
(1992), After the Storm: Lessons ftom the Gulf War, Lanham: Madison Books. 
Ghebali, Victor-Yves (1995), `UNPROFOR in the Former Yugoslavia: the misuse 
of peacekeeping and associated conflict management techniques', in Warner, 
Daniel (ed. ) (1995), pp. 13-40. 
Gibbs, David N. (1997), `Is Peacekeeping a New Form of Imperialism? ', 
International Peacekeeping, Vol. 4, No. 1, pp. 122-128. 
Glennon, Michael F. (1999), `The New Interventionism: The Search for a Just 
International Law', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 78, No. 3, pp. 2-7. 
Glenny, Misha (1999), The Balkans 1804-1999: Nationalism, War and the Great 
Powers, London: Granta Books. 
------------------ (1995), `Heading Off War in the Southern Balkans', Foreign 
Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 3, pp. 98-108. 
Global Policy Forum (2007), `The Power of the Veto' [Online], Global Policy 
Forum website. Available from http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security/membship/ 
veto. htm [Accessed January 2007]. 
GlobalSecurity. org (2005), `War and Ethnic Cleansing in Yugoslavia' [online], 
GlobalSecurity. org website. Available from: http: //www. globalsecurity. org/ 
military/world/war/yugo-hist4. htm [Accessed in January 2006]. 
----------------------- (2005), `Yugoslavia's Ethnicities' 
[online], GlobalSecurity. org 
website. Available from: http: //www. globalsecurity. org/military/world/war/ 
yugoslavia_ethnicities. htm [Accessed in January 2006]. 
Gorry, Johathan (1997), `A Comparison of MA and PhD Research Processes', in 
Burnham (1997), pp. 1-23. 
Gow, James (1997), Triumph of the Lack of Will: International Diplomacy and the 
Yugoslav War, London: Hurst & Company. 
Gray, Christine (2000), International Law and the Use of Force, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Haass, Richard N. (1999), Intervention, Washington: Brookings Institution Press. 
216 
Halverson, Thomas (1994), `Disengagement by Stealth: the Emerging Gap 
Between America's Rhetoric and the Reality of Future European Conflicts', in 
Freedman (ed. ) (1994b), pp. 76-93. 
Hannay, David (1996), `The UN's Role in Bosnia Assessed', Oxford International 
Review, Vol. VII, No. 2, pp. 4-11. 
Harris, David. J. (ed. ) (1998), Cases and Materials on International Law, 5th ed., 
London: Sweet & Maxwell. 
Hastedt, Glenn P. (1991), American Foreign Policy: Past, Present, Future, 2nd ed., 
New Jersey: Prentice Hall. 
Hay, Colin (2002), Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction, New York: Palgrave. 
------------- (1996), Re-Stating Social and Political Change, Buckingham: Open 
University Press. 
(1995), `Structure and Agency', in Marsh and Stoker (1995), pp. 189- 
208. 
Henkin, Louis (1977), `The Internationalization of Human Rights', in Human 
Rights: A Symposium, Columbia University, Proceedings of the General Education 
Seminar, 6, No. 1, pp. 5-16. 
Higgins, Rosalyn (1994), Problems and Process: International Law and How We 
Use It, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
Hoffmann, Stanley et al. (1996), The Ethics and Politics of Humanitarian 
Intervention, Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Holbrooke, Richard (1998), To End A War, New York: Random House. 
Holt, Benjamin (1999) and updated by Gya, Giji (2001), `Veto Use in the UN 
Security Council (1946-2001)' [Graph], Available from: http: //globalpolicy. igc. org 
/security/data/vetogph2. htm [Accessed in May 2004]. 
Howarth, David (2000), Discourse, Buckingham: Open University Press. 
Howard, Michael (1978), War and The Liberal Conscience, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Huntington, Samuel P. (1997), The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of 
World Order, London: Simon & Schuster UK Ltd. 
Ignatieff, Michael (2003), Empire Lite: Nation-building in Bosnia, Kosovo and 
Afghanistan, London: Vintage. 
218 
---------------------- 
(1993), Balkan Ghosts: A Journey Through History, New York: 
. Vintage Books. 
Karns, Margaret P. and Mingst, Karen A. (2001), `Peacekeeping and the changing 
role of the United Nations: Four dilemmas', in Thakur and Schnabel (eds. ) (2001). 
Kissinger, Henry (1994), Diplomacy, New York: Simon & Schuster. 
Knudsen, Tonny Brems (1996), `Humanitarian Intervention Revisited: Post-Cold 
War Responses to Classical Problems', International Peacekeeping, Vol. 3, No. 4, 
pp. 146-163 . 
Landman, Todd (2003), Issues and Methods in Comparative Politics: An 
Introduction, 2nd ed., London: Routledge. 
Lewis, loan and Mayall, James (1996), `Somalia', in Mayall (ed. ) (1996), pp. 94- 
126. 
Luck, Edward C. (1995), `The Case for Engagement: American Interests in UN 
Peace Operations', in Daniel and Hayes (eds. ) (1995), pp. 67-84. 
Macmillan, Margaret (2001), Peacemakers: The Paris Conference of 1919 and its 
Attempt to End War, London: John Murray. 
Magas, Branka (1994), `Milosevic's Serbia and Ethnic Cleansing: The Making of a 
Fascist State [online], Against the Current, Vol. 52, Sep. /Oct. Available from: 
http: //www. solidarity-us. org/MagasOnSerbia. html [Accessed in January 2006]. 
Malanczuk, Peter (1993), Humanitarian Intervention and the Legitimacy of the Use 
of Force, Amsterdam: Het Spinhuis Publishers. 
Marsh, David and Stoker, Gerry (eds. ) (2002), Theory and Methods in Political 
Science, 2nd ed., New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 
----------------------------------------- (eds. ) (1995), Theory and Methods 
in Political 
Science, 1st ed., New York: St. Martin's Press. 
Maslow, A. H. (1943), `A Theory of Human Motivation', Psychological 
Review, 
Vol. 50, pp. 370-96. 
Mayall, James (ed. ) (1996), The New Interventionism: United Nations experience 
in Cambodia, former Yugoslavia and Somalia, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University 
Press. 
McAnulla, Stuart (2002), `Structure and Agency' in March, David and 
Stoker, 
Gerry (eds. ) (2002), Theory and Methods in Political Science, 
2nd ed., New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 271-291. 
217 
------------------------ (2000), Virtual War: Kosovo and Beyond, London: Vintage. 
The Independent International Commission on Kosovo (2000), The Kosovo Report: 
Conflict, International Response and Lessons Learned, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
International Court of Justice (1962), `Certain Expenses of the United Nations 
(Article 17, Paragraph 2, of the Charter), Advisory Opinion of 20 July 1962: I. C. J. 
Reports 1962, p. 151. ' [online], ICJ website. Available from: http: //www. icj- 
cij. org/docket/files/49/5259. pdf [Accessed in December 2007]. 
Jessop, Bob (2002), The Future of the Capitalist State, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
---------------(1990), State Theory: Putting the Capitalist State in Its Place, 
Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Johnson, Janet B. et al. (2001), Political Science Research Methods, 4th ed., 
Washington DC: CQ Press. 
Johansen, Robert C. and Mills, Kurt (1996), `Appendix: Peacekeeping Operations 
with Humanitarian Components since 1990' in Hoffmann, Stanley et al (1996), 
pp. 101-116. 
Joll, James (1973), Europe Since 1870: An International History, New York: 
Harper & Row Publishers. 
Judah, Tim (2000), Kosovo: War and Revenge, New Haven: Yale University Press. 
------------- (24 March 1999), `History, 
bloody history' [online], BBC News 
website. Available from http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/special_report/1998/kosovo2/ 
110492. stm [Accessed in April 2006]. 
-------------- (9 March 1998), `Slobodan 
Milosevic: President under siege' [online], 
BBC News website. Available from http: //news. bbc. co. uk/l/hi/special_report/1998/ 
kosovo2/63851. stm [Accessed in April 2006]. 
Kafala, Tarik (2003), `The veto and how to use it' [Online], BBC News Online: UK 
edition. Available from: http: //news. bbc. ac. uk/l/hi/world/middle_east/2828985. stm 
[Accessed in April 2004]. 
Kaldor, Mary (1999), `Transnational Civil Society', in Dunne and Wheeler (1999), 
pp. 195-213. 
Kaplan, Robert D. (2002), Warrior Politics, New York: Random House. 
219 
McCoubrey, Hilaire and Morris, Justin (2000), Regional Peacekeeping in the Post- Cold War Era, The Hague: Kluwer Law International. 
--------------------- and White, Nigel D. (1996), The Blue Helmets: Legal Regulation 
of United Nations Military Operations, Aldershot, England: Dartmouth. 
Mingst, Karen A. and Karns, Margaret P. (2000), The United Nations in the Post- 
Cold War Era, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Ministry of Defence (2004), `Annual Report and Account 2003-04' [online], The 
Ministry of Defence website. Available from: http: //www. mod. uk/linked_files/ 
publications/dra2003_2004/dra2003-04_sl. pdf [Accessed in September 2005]. 
------------------------- (2000), Kosovo: Lessons from the Crisis [MOD report to 
Parliament], London: The Stationery Office. 
Mokhtari, Fariborz L. (ed. ) (1994), Peacemaking, Peacekeeping and Coalition 
Warfare: The Future Role of the United Nations, Washington DC: National 
Defense University Press. 
Moran, Laurence (1993), `What is Evolution? '[online], The TalkOrigins Archive 
website. Available from: http: //www. talkorigins. org/faqs/evolution-definition. html 
[Accessed in November 2006]. 
Morphet, Sally (1993), `UN Peacekeeping and Election-Monitoring', in Roberts, 
Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict (eds. ) (1993), United Nations, Divided World: The 
UN's Roles in International Relations, 2nd ed., Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Morris, Justin (2005), `Law, power and force in an unbalanced world', in Burchill, 
Richard et al. (eds. ) (2005), pp. 286-313. 
Müllerson, Rein (2000), Ordering Anarchy: International Law in International 
Society, London: Brill. 
--------------------- (1997), Human Rights Diplomacy, London: Routledge. 
Nahory, Celine et al. (2007), `Subjects of UN Security Council Vetoes' [Online], 
Global Policy Forum website. Available from http: //www. globalpolicy. org/security 
/membship/veto/Vetosubj. htm [Accessed in January 2007]. 
Nambiar, Satish (2001), 'UN peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia - 
from UNPROFOR to Kosovo', in Thakur and Schnabel (eds. ) (2001), pp. 167-181. 
NARA (2005), `Executive Order 12958 - Classified National Security Information, 
as Amended' [online], the National Archives and Records Administration Website. 
Available from: http: //www. archives. gov/isoo/policy_documents/Executive_order_ 
220 
1295 8_amendment. html# 1.1 [Accessed in May 2004]. 
NATO (2008), `Kosovo Force (KFOR)' [online], NATO website. Available from: 
http: //www. nato. int/issues/kfor/index. html [Accessed in February 2008]. 
--------- (8 December 2005), 'NATO-Russia Compendium of Financial and 
Economic Data Relating to Defence (Information for the Press)' [online], NATO 
website. Available from: http: //www. nato. int/docu/pr/2005/pO5-116. pdf [Accessed 
in August 2006]. 
--------- (1999), The NATO Handbook, 50th Anniversary Edition, Brussels: Office 
of Information and Press of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation. 
Neuendorf, Kimberly A. (2002), The Content Analysis Guidebook, London: Sage 
Publications. 
Nobelprize. org (2007), `Nobel Peace Prize Laureates' [online], the Nobel 
Foundation website. Available from: http: //nobelpeaceprise. org/eng_lau_list. htm 
[Accessed in February 2007]. 
Ordanovski, Saso (13 Jan. 1992), `Interview with Stojan Andov, President of the 
Macedonian Parliament', Vreme News Digest Agency, No. 16 [online]. Available 
from: http: //www. scc. rutgers. edu/serbian_digest/16/tl6-7. htrn [Accessed in January 
2006]. 
Owen, David (16 September 1999), `The New EU: Lessons from Bosnia and 
Kosovo' - Speech by the Rt. Hon. the Lord Owen CH to the Churchill Conference 
at Zunfthaus zur Meisen, Zurich. 
----------------- (1995), Balkan Odyssey, London: Victor Gollancz. 
Panov, Lou (22 Apr. 1993), 'UN Entry Clears Way for Macedonian Recognition', 
Macedonian Tribune [online]. Available from: http: //www. b-info. com/places/ 
Macedonia/republic/news/301-400/346.2 [Accessed in January 2006]. 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Section (2007), `About Us' [Online], UN DPKO 
website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/lessons [Accessed in 
January 2007]. 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit (2003), Handbook on United Nations 
Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations [Online], UN DPKO Peacekeeping 
Best Practices Section website. Available from: http: //pbpu. unlb. org/handbook. aspx 
[Accessed in December 2006]. 
Poulton, Hugh (1991), The Balkans: Minorities and States in Conflict, London: 
Minority Rights Publications. 
221 
Rabie, Mohamed (1992), The New World Order: A Perspective on the Post-Cold War Era, New York: Vantage Press. 
Ramet, Sabrina P. (2005), Thinking about Yugoslavia: Scholarly Debates about the Yugoslav Breakup and the Wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Ramsbotham, Oliver and Woodhouse, Tom (1996), Humanitarian Intervention in 
Contemporary Conflict, Cambridge: Polity Press. 
Ray, Robert (1993), `Peacekeeping and Peacemaking - The Challenge for the Future', in Smith, Hugh (ed. ) (1993), Peacekeeping: Challenges for the Future, 
Canberra: Australian Defence Studies Centre / Australian Defence Force Academy. 
Reus-Smit, Christian (ed. ) (2004), The Politics of International Law, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. 
Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict (1993), `Introduction: The UN's Roles in 
International Society since 1945', in Roberts and Kingsbury (1993), pp. 1-62. 
Roberts, Adam and Kingsbury, Benedict (eds. ) (1993), United Nations, Divided 
World: The UN's Roles in International Relations, 2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Rohde, David (1997), End Game: the betrayal and fall of Srebrenica, Europe's 
worst massacre since World War II, Boulder: Westview Press. 
Ropp, Theodore (1962), War in the Modern World, New York: Collier Books. 
Rose, Michael (1998), Fighting for Peace: Bosnia 1994, London: The Harvill Press. 
Ruggie, John Gerald (1993), `Wandering in the Void: Charting the U. N. 's New 
Strategic Role', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 72, No. 5, pp. 26-31. 
Sarooshi, Danesh (1993), Humanitarian Intervention and International 
Humanitarian Assistance: Law and Practice, London: HMSO. 
Sartori, Giovanni (1970), `Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics', The 
American Political Science Review, Vol. 64, No. 4, pp. 1033-53. 
Schachter, Oscar (1991), `The Role of International Law in Maintaining Peace', in 
Thompson, W. Scott et al. (eds. ) (1991), Approaches to Peace: An Intellectual Map, 
Washington, D. C.: United States Institute of Peace, pp. 65-128. 
Schaefer, Brett D. (2007), `Time for a New United Nations Peacekeeping 
Organization' [Online], The Heritage Foundation website. Available from: 
http: //www. heritage. org/Research/InternationalOrganizations/bg2006. cfm 
222 
[Accessed in March 2007]. 
Schlesinger, Arthur Jr. (1995), `Back to the Womb?: Isolationism's Renewed 
Threat', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 74, No. 4, pp. 2-8. 
Schnabel, Albrecht and Thakur, Ramesh (2001), `From An Agenda for Peace to the 
Brahimi Report: Towards a new era of the UN peace operations? ', in Thakur and 
Schnabel (eds. ) (2001), pp. 238-255. 
Serafino, Nina M. (December 3 1996), `CRS Issue Brief - Peacekeeping: Issues of 
U. S. Military Involvement' [online], GlobalSecurity. org website. Available from: 
http: //www. globalsecurity. org/military/library/report/crs/-work/old/94-040. htm 
[Accessed in February 2006]. 
Shawcross, William (2000), Deliver Us From Evil: Warlords and Peacekeepers in 
a World of Endless Conflict, London: Bloomsbury. 
Shimura, Hisako (2001), `The Role of the UN Secretariat in organizing 
peacekeeping', in Thakur and Schnabel (eds. ) (2001), pp. 46-56. 
Silverman, David (2000), Doing Qualitative Research: A Practical Handbook, 
London: SAGE. 
Simms, Brendan (2001), Unfinest Hour: Britain and the Destruction of Bosnia, 
London: Penguin Books. 
Skidelsky, Robert (1995), The World after Communism: A Polemic for Our Times, 
London: Papermac. 
Smith, Jeffrey R. and Preston, Julia (June 18,1993), `United States Plans Wider 
Role in U. N. Peace Keeping', the Washington Post. Available from: http: //www. fas. org/ 
irpr/offdocs/pddl3html [Accessed in January 2006] 
Smith, Rupert (2005), The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, 
London: Allen Lane. 
Sowards, Steven W. (1996), `Lecture 19: The traditional regimes and the challenge 
of Nazism: Collaboration vs. resistance' [online]. Michigan State University 
Library website. Available from: http: //www. lib. msu. edu/sowards/balkan/lectl9. 
htm 
Stedman, Stephen John (1993), `The New Interventionists', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 
72, No. 1-2, pp. 1-16. 
Stedward, Gail (1997), `On the Record: An Introduction to Interviewing', in 
Burnham (1997), pp. 151-165. 
223 
Szayna, Thomas S. (2000), Identifying Potential Ethnic Conflict: Application of a Process Model, Santa Monica, California: Rand's Arroyo Center Division [online]. 
Available from: http: //www. rand. org/publications/MR/MR1188/ [Accessed in 
September 2005]. 
Tenbergen, Rasmus (2001), `Bombs for Human Rights? Humanitarian intervention 
in Kosovo', Paper presented at the Human Rights Conference of the University of 
Bonn and the Institute for Leadership Development, June 2001 [online]. Available 
from: http: //rasmus-tenbergen. de/publikationen/Bombs%20for%2OHuman%20 
Rights. pdf [Accessed in December 2007]. 
Thakur, Ramesh and Schnabel, Albrecht (2001) (eds. ), United Nations 
Peacekeeping Operations: Ad Hoc Missions, Permanent Engagement, Tokyo: 
United Nations University Press. 
Todorova, Maria N (1997), Imagining the Balkans, Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Towle, Philip (2000), Democracy and Peacemaking: Negotiations and Debates 
1815-1973, London: Routledge. 
Tripodi, Paolo (1999), The Colonial Legacy in Somalia, London: Macmillan Press. 
United Nations (2008), `United States Member States', [Online], United Nations 
website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/members/growth. shtml [Accessed in 
January 2008]. 
------------------ (2000a), Basic Facts About the United Nations, New York: United 
Nations Department of Public Information. 
------------------ (2000b), `How the UN Works - The Security Council' [Online], 
United Nations website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/overview/briefl. html 
[Accessed in April 2004]. 
------------------- (2000c), `Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations 
(A/55/305-S/2000/809)' [The Brahimi Report] [online], UN Documentation Center 
website. Available from: http: //daceessdds. un. org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N00/594/70/ 
PDF/N0059470. pdf [Accessed in August 2006]. 
-------------------- (1998), `Completed Peacekeeping Operations: Somalia - UNOSOM 
IF [online], UN Peacekeeping website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/Depts/ 
dpko/dpko/co_mission/unosom2. htm [Accessed on 20 August 2004]. 
------------------ (1996a), The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations 
Peace- 
keeping, 3rd ed., New York: UN Department of Public Information. 
224 
------------------- (1996b), `Completed Peacekeeping Operations: Somalia - UNOSOM I' [online], UN Peacekeeping website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/ 
dpko/co-mission/unosoml. htm [Accessed on 10 June 2004]. 
------------------ (1994), United Nations Peacekeeping: Information Notes, New 
York: UN Department of Public Information, June. 
------------------- (1990), The Blue Helmets: A Review of United Nations Peace- 
keeping, 2nd ed., New York: United Nations Department of Public Information. 
------------------- (1945), Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the 
International Court of Justice, New York: Department of Public Information of the 
United Nations; also available from: http: //www. un. org/aboutun/charter/index. html 
[Accessed in January 2004]. 
United Nations Department of Public Information (2006), `Sudan - UNMIS - 
Background' [Online], United Nations Mission in the Sudan (UNMIS) website. 
Available from: http: //www. un. org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/background. html 
[Accessed in April 2007]. 
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations (2006), `DPKO Fact 
Sheet' [online], UN DPKO website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/Depts/ 
dpko/factsheet. pdf [Accessed in December 2006]. 
United Nations General Assembly (1998), `Resolution 53/35: The situation in 
Bosnia and Herzegovina' (A/RES/53/35) [online], UN Documentation Centre 
website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/Depts/dhl/resguide/r53. htm [Accessed 
in February 2007]. 
--------------------------------------------- (1991), `Strengthening of the coordination of 
humanitarian emergency assistance of the United Nations' - Resolution 46/182 on 
19 December [online], UN Documentation Centre website. Available from: 
http: //www. un. org/documents/ga/res/46/a46rl82. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
--------------------------------------------- (1950), `Resolution 
377 (V): Uniting for 
Peace' (A/RES/377(V)) [online], UN Documentation Centre website. Available 
from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ga/res/5/ares5. htms [Accessed in December 
2007]. 
______________________________________________ (1948), `Resolution 
190 (III): Appeal to the 
Great Powers to renew their efforts to compose their differences and establish a 
lasting peace' (A/RES/190(III)) [online], UN Documentation Centre website. 
Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ga/res/3/ares3. htm [Accessed in 
December 2007]. 
UNMIK (2008), `UNMIK at a Glance' [online], UNMIK website. Available from: 
http: //www. unmikonline. org/intro. htm [Accessed in January 2008]. 
225 
United Nations Secretary-General (1999), `Report of the Secretary-General 
pursuant to General Assembly resolution 53/35: The fall of Srebrenica' (A/54/549) 
[Srebrenica report] [Online], UN Documentation Centre website. Available from: 
http: //www. un. org/peace/srebrenica. pdf [Accessed in May 2005]. 
---------------------------------------------- (1993a), `Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolutions 982 (1995) and 987 (1995)' (S11995/444) 
[online], UN Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/ 
documents [Accessed in May 2005]. 
---------------------------------------------- (1993b), `Further Report of the Secretary- 
General Submitted in Pursuance of Paragraphs 18 and 19 of Resolution 794 
(1992)' (S/25354) [online], UN Documentation Centre website. Available from: 
http: //www. un. org/documents [Accessed in January 2007] 
---------------------------------------------- (1992a), `Report of the Secretary-General 
on the Situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina' (S/24540) [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents 
[Accessed in November 2006]. 
--------------------- ------------------------ (1992b), `The Situation in Somalia: Report 
of the Secretary-General' (S/24480) [online], UN Documentation Centre website. 
Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents [Accessed in November 2006]. 
---------------------------------------------- (1992c), `Report of the Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 749 (1992)' (S/23836) [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents 
[Accessed in January 2007]. 
----------------------------------------------- (1992d), `The Situation in Somalia: 
Report 
of the Secretary-General' (S/23829) [online], UN Documentation Centre website. 
Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents [Accessed in November 2006]. 
----------------------------------------------- (1992e), `The Situation 
in Somalia: Report 
of the Secretary-General - Addendum: Consolidated inter-agency 90 
day Plan of 
Action for Emergency Humanitarian Assistance to Somalia' (S/23829/Add. 1) 
[online], UN Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/ 
documents [Accessed in November 2006]. 
----------------------------------------------- (1991), `Report of the 
Secretary-General 
Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 721 (1991)' [online], UN Documentation 
Center website. Available from: http: //documents. un. org/mother. asp [Accessed 
in 
October 2005]. 
United Nations Security Council (2001), `Resolution 1367 (2001)' [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/document/sc/ 
226 
res/2001/scres0l. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1999a), `Resolution 1244 (1999)' [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/document/sc/ 
res/1999/scres99. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1999b), `Resolution 1239 (1999)' [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/document/sc/ 
res/1999/scres99. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1998a), `Resolution 1203 (1998)' [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/document/sc/ 
res/1998/scres98. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1998b), `Resolution 1199 (1998)' [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/document/sc/ 
res/1998/scres98. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1998c), `Resolution 1160 (1998)' [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/document/sc/ 
res/1998/scres98. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1998d), `Security Council 3868th Meeting, 31 
March 1998 (S/PV. 3868)' [Provisional Meeting Record] [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //daccess-ods. un. org/TMP/ 
1792031. html [Accessed in August 2006]. 
---------------------------------------- (1994a), `Report of the Security Council Mission 
to Somalia on 26 and 27 October 1994' [online], UN Documentation Centre 
website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/Docs/sc/missionreports. html [Accessed 
in March 2004]. 
---------------------------------------- (1994b), `Resolution 947 
(1994)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
----------------------------------------- (1994c), `Resolution 
908 (1994)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
---------------------------------------- (1993a), `Resolution 
871 (1993)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
________________________________________ (1993b), 
`Resolution 870 (1993)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
227 
----------------------------------: ----- (1993c), `Resolution 869 (1993)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
---------------: ------------------------ (1993d), `Resolution 847 (1993)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
---------------------------------------- (1993e), `Resolution 836 (1993)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
---------------------------------------- (1993f), `Resolution 815 (1993)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
---------------------------------------- (1993g), `Resolution 807 (1993)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2005]. 
--------------------------------------- (1992a) `Annex III: The military structure, 
strategy and tactics of the warring factions' [S/1994/674/Add. 2 (Vol. 1)] in `Final 
report of the United Nations Commission of Experts established pursuant to 
Security Council Resolution 780 (1992)' [online]. Available from: http: //www. ess. 
uwe. ac. uk/comexpert/ANX/III. htm [Accessed in November 2005]. 
---------------------------------------- (1992b) `Note by the President of the Security 
Council - The Declaration for the Security Council Summit meeting at the level of 
Heads of States and Government on 31 January 1992' [S/23500] [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. [Accessed in March 2005]. 
----------------------------------------- (1992c), `Resolution 794 (1992)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1992d), `Resolution 775 (1992)' 
[online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1992e), `Resolution 770 
(1992)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
secres. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1992f), `Resolution 
757 (1992)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
secres. htm [Accessed in September 2004]. 
228 
----------------------------------------- (1992g), `Resolution 751 (1992)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1992h), `Resolution 743 (1992)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in September 2004] 
----------------------------------------- (1991a), `Resolution 721 (1991)' [online], UN 
Documentation Center website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1991b), `Resolution 713 (1991)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed January 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1991c), `Resolution 688 (1991)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in January 2004]. 
----------------------------------------- (1991d), `Resolution 678 (1991)' [online], UN 
Documentation Centre website. Available from: http: //www. un. org/documents/ 
scres. htm [Accessed in June 2004]. 
USA Today (Feb. 14 1996), `History of Balkan Conflict' (The War in Bosnia) 
[online]. Available from: http: //www. usatoday. com/news/index/bosnia/nbos002. htm 
[Accessed in September 2005]. 
U. S. Department of the Army (1994), `FM 100-23: Peace Operations' [Online], 
Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) website. Available from: 
http: //www. dtic. mil/doctrine/J*el/service_pubs/fmlOO_23. pdf [Accessed in May 
2004]. 
U. S. Department of Defense (2001), Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms 
(Joint Publication 1-02) [Online], Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC) 
website. Available from: http: //www. dtic. mil/doctrine/jel/new-Pubs/jpl_02. pdf 
[Accessed in January 2007]. 
U. S. Department of State (1996), `Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25) - 
Clinton Administration Policy on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations' 
[online]. Available from: http: //www. mikenew. com/pdd25. html [Accessed on 5 
April 2005]. 
U. S. GAO (June 2003), `Military Transformation: Realistic Deployment Timelines 
Needed for Army Stryker Brigades (GAO-03-801)' [online], United States General 
Accounting Office. Available from: http: //www. gao. gov/new. items/d03801. pdf 
229 
[Accessed in January 2007]. 
------------ (July 2001), `Kosovo Air Operations: Need to Maintain Alliance 
Cohesion Resulted in Doctrinal Departures (GAO-01-784)' [online], United States 
General Accounting Office. Available from: http: //www. gao. gov/new. items/ 
d01784. pdf [Accessed in August 2006]. 
------------ (March 1997), `United Nations: Limitations in Leading Missions 
Requiring Force to Restore Peace (GAO/NSIAD-97-34)' [online], United States 
General Accounting Office. Available from: http: //www. gao. gov/new. items/ 
d09734. pdf [Accessed in August 2006]. 
Urquhart, Brian (1981), `International Peace and Security: Thoughts on the 
Twentieth Anniversary of Dag Hammarskjöld's Death', Foreign Affairs, Vol. 60, 
No. 1, pp. 1-16. 
Vickers, Rhiannon (2000), 'Blair's Kosovo Campaign Political: Political 
Communications, the Battle for Public Opinion and Foreign Policy', Civil Wars, 
Vol. 3, No. 1, pp. 55-70. 
Walker, William G. (2001), `OSCE Verification Experiences in Kosovo: 
November 1998-June 1999', in Booth (ed. ) (2001), pp. 127-142. 
Warner, Daniel (ed. ) (1995), New Dimensions of Peacekeeping, Dordrecht: 
Martinus Nijhoff Publishers. 
Webb, Keith with Koutralou, Vassiliki and Walters, Mike (1996), `The 
Yugoslavian Conflict, European Mediation, and the Contingency Model: A Critical 
Perspective', in Bercovitch (ed. ) (1996). 
Weiss, Thomas G. and Collins, Cindy (2000), Humanitarian Challenges and 
Intervention: World Politics and the Dilemmas of Help, 2nd ed., Boulder: 
Westview Press. 
Weiss, Thomas G. (1994), `The United Nations and Civil War', The Washington 
Quarterly, Vol. 17, No. 4, pp. 139-159. 
Wendt, Alexander (1995), `Constructing International Politics', International 
Security, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 71-81. 
----------------------- (1992), `Anarchy is what states make of 
it: the social 
construction of power politics', International Organization, Vol. 46, No. 2, pp. 
391-425. 
Wheeler, Nicholas J. (2004), `The Kosovo bombing campaign', in Reus-Smit (ed. ) 
(2004), pp. 189-216. 
230 
------------------------ (2000), Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in 
International Society, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
White, Nigel D. (1993), Keeping the Peace: The United Nations and the 
maintenance of international peace and security, Manchester: Manchester 
University Press. 
Winnefeld, James A. et al. (1995), Intervention in Intrastate Conflicts: Implications 
for the Army in the Post-Cold War Era, Santa Monica, CA: RAND's Arroyo 
Center. 
Woodhouse, Tom and Ramsbotham, Oliver (1998), `Peacekeeping and 
Humanitarian Intervention in Post-Cold War conflict', in Woodhouse et al. (1998), 
pp. 39-73. 
Woodhouse, Tom et al. (eds. ) (1998), Peacekeeping and Peacemaking: Towards 
Effective Intervention in Post-Cold War Conflicts, London: Macmillan Press. 
Woolley, Peter J. (1994), `Geography Revisited: Expectations of U. S. Military 
Intervention in the Post-Cold War Era', in Mokhtari, Fariborz L. (1994). 
Yin, Robert K. (2003), Case Study Research: Design and Methods, 3rd ed., 
London: SAGE. 
231 
Interviews 
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Mr. Frederick Mallya - Coordination Officer at Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit 
(United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations). 
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Methodological Appendix: Research trip to the 
United States for elite interviewing and 
archival work 
Introduction 
For my research fieldwork I visited the United States, specifically New York, in 
which the UN headquarters is located, and Washington D. C. for two months from 1 
March to 3 May 2005. The main purpose of the trip was to interview UN and/or 
U. S. government officials and collect documents relevant to my research topic: UN 
peacekeeping operations. This appendix gives a full detail of the work undertaken 
and illuminating research lessons I have learned from it. 
This appendix is divided into three parts. In the first section I discuss some 
preliminary points I considered in the course of preparing for the trip. As we well 
know, advance preparation is extremely important because it saves researchers time 
and money by eliminating unexpected time-consuming problems and expenses to 
the research budget. In this sense it was needed in order to get clear answers to 
what I am looking for. Regarding this, I examine my preparation for the trip in the 
section. 
The second section looks at how I conducted elite interviewing with UN 
officials. As a valuable qualitative research method interview consists of the 
component parts of the process as follows: `identifying interviewees and securing 
interviews; determining interview content; conducting interview; and recording and 
writing up the data gathered' (Stedward 1997: 151). In terms of elite interviewing 
identifying potential interviewees, gaining access to elites, and securing interviews 
were the most difficult work in my interview experience. 
Documentation is a veritable treasure trove for researchers. Using 
documents as sources of research data, however, has several disadvantages. 
According to Johnson el al. (2001), document analysis has five limitations: the 
selective survival of records, the incompleteness of collections, the problem of bias, 
accessibility in terms of confidentiality, and lack of a standard format (pp. 265-6). 
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In my archival work I faced one of these problems: accessibility in terms of 
confidentiality. This is explained in detail in the last section. 
Preparing for fieldwork 
Before starting specific preparation it is necessary to get a clear idea about what I 
am looking for throughout a research trip. This requires identifying the research 
topic, specifying the time period and country or countries, listing key words for 
what I will do, and specifying language. At the preliminary stage of a research trip, 
thus, researchers should consider the following two key points: where to go and 
what to do there. 
My supervisor suggested I have a trip to the U. S., as a fieldwork place, 
specifically New York where the UN headquarters is located. The primary purpose 
of a research trip is to collect the empirical qualitative and/or quantitative data 
required. The question, therefore, where to go, definitely refers to this question: 
`where is the data? ' Research fieldwork should be conducted where what 
researchers seek to obtain exists. New York and additionally Washington D. C. 
fully contain what I needed for my research, such as UN and U. S. government 
officials with plenty of knowledge about and experience of the peacekeeping 
operations in Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo, which are my research cases, and an 
enormous amount of relevant documentation in archives and libraries. It was 
definitely the right choice for me to visit New York and Washington D. C. as places 
of fieldwork. 
Regarding what to do in a research trip, researchers should get a clear idea 
about the methodological strategy and relevant methods first. My research uses 
qualitative methods. I have settled on individual interview, specifically elite 
interview, and document collection and analysis. Whatever my method is, I will 
need to justify it and show that I have thought through the practical and analytical 
issues involved in my choice. The next two sections provide an explanation of the 
choice. 
234 
Elite interviewing 
Interview is a useful tool for obtaining necessary data and thus a preferred method 
of social science as it allows researchers to probe deeply into issues and affords 
evidence of originality of the discovery of new facts. My interview strategy was 
semi-structured elite interviewing. As Johnson el al. (2001) point out, elite 
interviewing requires a great deal of preliminary preparation, the ability to gain 
access to potential interviewees, and interpersonal skill (p. 276). Researchers should 
be ready well in advance of the actual interview. The Research Methods course I 
took before commencing my research was greatly helpful for conducting the 
interviews, especially the Qualitative Methods module, which gave me a chance to 
practise focused and individual interviews. Through the experience, I acquired 
practical knowledge of interviewing, such as how to prepare, how to secure, and 
how to conduct interview. In this sense experiencing interviewing may be required 
for students hoping to read for a PhD degree. 
Elite interviewing is difficult work. According to Dexter (1970), a member 
of the elite is anyone `who in terms of the current purposes of the interviewer is 
given special, nonstandardized treatment'(p. 5, cited in Johnson el al. (2001): 272). 
Regarding the `special and not-standardized treatment', one of the greatest 
difficulties is accessibility. It is extremely difficult to access to the elite because 
they often have `gatekeepers' who limits access to them. In this sense making a 
phone call or sending a letter to request an interview is less effective because most 
of them will be filtered by the secretaries of the elite. My strategy was emailing at 
the initial stage of the request. These days most people at least have an email 
account. Sending emails created an opportunity to expose my request to potential 
interviewees. It does not, however, mean that emailing is the easiest way to arrange 
an interview. For example, to obtain potential interviewees' contact details and 
facilitate contact with them, I emailed more than twenty people, who would or 
could help me. Many of them did not respond to my emails. The golden rule 
is this: 
do not give up. Sometimes I emailed a person three times to extract a response. 
Keeping on emailing requires perseverance but is not always stressful. 
In the 
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course of doing that you can get unexpected help. I emailed some academics to 
request an interview. Professor Michael Doyle at Columbia University, one of the 
people whom I emailed, replied giving advice and recommending some of his 
articles related to my research topic. 
Another point to consider is who to contact first, that is to say, subordinates 
first or superiors first. My answer was superiors first and the result was successful. 
At the beginning of securing interviews with UN officials, I wished to interview 
Mr Jean-Marie Guehenno, the Under-Secretary-General for peacekeeping 
operations in the Department of Peacekeeping Operations, who is the top man in 
UN peacekeeping. It was almost impossible to contact him. My alternative was to 
interview Ms Donna Marie Chiurazzi-Maxfield, Special Assistant to the Under- 
Secretary-General. After I emailed twice, she replied to my emails and suggested 
another Special Assistant to the Under-Secretary-General and the Chief of 
Peacekeeping Best Practices Unit of the DPKO, Mr David Harland. Harland 
suggested a Coordination Officer in the Unit, who is his subordinate. In the course 
of facilitating contact with the suggested interviewees I received great help from 
Ms Chiurazzi-Maxfield. Finally, I succeeded in interviewing Mr Salman Ahmed, 
the Special Assistant, and Mr Frederick Mallya, Coordination Officer. I have 
attached the details of the interviews and interviewees before this appendix. 
The other point, which interviewers should deeply consider, is how to 
interview. Because both of the interviewees were extremely busy I had to limit the 
interviews to around 30 minutes. I interviewed Ahmed for 20 minutes and Mallya 
for 40 minutes. The interview questions were carefully selected by eliminating 
questions that can be answered elsewhere. Johnson el al. (2001) point out that `a 
good rapport between the researcher and interviewee facilitates the flow of 
information' (p. 275). For this I fairly and very shortly explained the interviews at 
the beginning, such as the purpose and duration of the interview and the number of 
questions. Also, I never dominated the conversation in the interviews and tried to 
maintain good eye contact with the interviewees. 
It is very important to write up interviews in a more complete 
form soon 
after the interview, while it is still fresh in the interviewer's mind. An alternative 
means to record an interview is using a tape or electronic recorder. I recorded my 
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interviews. Using this kind of equipment is very useful because the interviewer can 
concentrate on the interview and it allows extra time to quickly change the original 
order of questioning if necessary or raise new questions to respond to an 
interviewee's unexpected answers. Recording may make interviewees 
uncomfortable because after the interview there can be no denying what is recorded 
or conversely more comfortable as it may give a chance to check what they said in 
the course of the interview and correct it if they want. Interviewers, thus, need to 
get permission in advance. Finally, good preparation buoys the confidence of 
novice interviewers like me when interviewing important people. I separately 
prepared a question list as a handout for the interviewees and my question sheet, 
which was supplemented by some keynotes. I, then, had a mock-up interview 
several times. 
Archival work: acquiring documents as sources of 
data 
At the beginning of the archival work my first choice was the National Archives, 
which is the main facility of the National Archives and Records Administration 
(NARA). The archives are divided into two buildings: one is located on 
Pennsylvania Avenue in Washington D. C and the other is at College Park in 
Maryland. NARA runs a free shuttle service every hour between the buildings in 
College Park and downtown Washington, for the use of visitors on a space- 
available basis. When researchers come to the archive facilities to look at records, 
they are required to show `a researcher identification card'. To obtain the card an 
applicant must show official identification such as a driver's license or passport 
that includes a photograph. Additionally, they are also required to show proof of 
their address. After completing a short form and viewing a short PowerPoint 
orientation explaining how to handle records and the most basic research 
procedures and rules, the card is immediately issued. 
Though researchers can access the online catalogue of the National 
Archives' website (http: //www. archives. gov), it does not seem easy to find the 
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location of records which researchers want to look at. One of the best solutions is 
consulting with the staff of the archive. The NARA staff whom I met was qualified 
and ready to assist me in the navigation of relevant indexes. The hindrance I faced 
was accessibility to the documents I wished to look at in terms of confidentiality. 
What I was looking for in the archives were diplomatic or internal documents 
concerning UN peacekeeping produced by the White House and the Department of 
State under the Clinton Administration. Unfortunately, the archives do not have 
any documentation related to the Clinton Administration's foreign policies because 
according to the archive staff the U. S. government still holds the documentation. 
Most of the documents may be classified by the federal government until legal 
action has ceased, the political actors involved have passed away, or the 
consideration of the sensitivity of the information in terms of U. S. national interests 
has perished. Executive Order 12958 (April 17,1995) of the U. S. federal 
government on classified national security information clearly prescribes that 
`information shall be marked for declassification 10 years from the date of the 
original decision' and the duration of classification can be extended up to 25 years 
if the original classification authority of the information determines the extension 
(NARA 2005). I expected some internal documents of the Clinton Administration 
produced before 1995 to be available because 10 years had already passed. As an 
alternative way to access the documents they suggested the library of the Clinton 
Presidential Center in Little Rock, Arkansas and its website (http: //www. Clintonlibrary 
. gov). Because the library 
has uploaded a limited number of selected sources online, 
the best way was to visit the library and conduct off-line research. Although I could 
not visit the library due to the limits of budget and time, it was a useful lesson that 
consulting archive staff is important in terms of the efficient navigation of sources 
which I want to consult and in coming up with alternative ways to access them if 
they are unavailable in an archive. 
The library of Congress was the main archive I consulted. In the library I 
collected many useful primary and secondary sources. Regarding my research topic 
and the limits of other libraries' collections it was the best place for my archival 
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research. For example, I discovered the U. S. General Accounting Office* Reports 
to Congressional Committee on peacekeeping or peace operations by the U. S. 
government, which do not exist in the catalogue of other libraries in Britain. The 
office is an investigative agency of the U. S. Congress. Congress asks the office to 
evaluate federal programmes, audit federal expenditures, and issue legal opinion. It 
advises Congress and the heads of executive agencies of the federal government, 
such as the Department of State. This means that reports by the office directly 
reflect the U. S. government's position on the issues investigated. The office 
produced dozens of reports related to UN PKO or U. S. peace operations. I picked 
out eleven reports among them, such as `United Nations: Limitations in Leading 
Missions Requiring Force to Restore Peace' (GAO/NSIAD-97-34) and `United 
Nations: U. S. Participation in Peacekeeping Operations' (GAO/NSIAD-92-247). The 
GAO reports I collected may provide crucial evidence supporting the arguments in 
my PhD thesis. 
In New York, I wished to consult the UN Dag Hammarskjöld library. It is, 
however, a library designated to serve UN Secretariat staff and the staff of 
Permanent Missions to the UN. Though it is not open to the public, it provides 
online access to the UN's official documentation collection through tools, such as 
the UN Documents Research Guide, the UN Info Quest (UN-I-Que), and 
UNBISnet. Its online collection has an enormous amount of documents, thus it is 
necessary to consult a librarian to track down the documents required. A Help Line 
has been set up to serve this need of external researchers. I consulted with a 
librarian through the Help Line and found some useful documents, such as the 
Declaration for the Security Council Summit meeting at the level of Heads of 
States and Government on 31 January 1992. Most of major UN document series 
like Security Council Resolutions are available with the full text from the UN's 
Official Document System. Some documents that are not available on the Official 
Document System of the library may be published through the UN Department of 
* From 7 July 2004, the GAO's legal name became `the Government Accountability 
Office'. Some reports of the office produced before the date still hold the original name, 
`General Accounting Office' report. 
239 
Public Information. I obtained some valuable primary sources, such as The Blue 
Helmets: a Review of United Nations Peace-keeping, through the UN Sales service. 
Conclusion 
The research trip was a very useful experience for my research. Through the trip I 
collected valuable documents and empirical data from the elite interviewing. 
Additionally, the experience has taught me several lessons with regard to research 
methodology. 
First, the most important thing in the methodological process is preliminary 
preparation. First of all, researchers should get a clear idea about what they are 
looking for and how to find out what they want. Advance experience in research 
methods chosen and background preparation about potential interviewees and 
archives to consult are also essential for satisfactory results of research fieldwork. 
Second, the methods for data collection should be selected by a deep 
consideration of how to fit a researcher's purposes and the availability of the data 
required. As to my fieldwork elite interviewing was the most useful means to 
obtain what I needed for my thesis. The UN personnel I interviewed are one of the 
top members of the decision-making process for UN peacekeeping operations or a 
key person in the unit for evaluating previous PKO missions and policing new 
missions. They are full of knowledge of peacekeeping operations and experience in 
previous missions including my research cases. Their answers to my interview 
questions, thus, were longer and deeper than what I had expected and I got more 
data than I needed. 
Third, keeping records and taking notes are definitely helpful in avoiding 
derailment from the track of a researcher's research process. Conducting interviews 
and archival work in a limited time mostly requires multitasking. In this process, it 
is very possible for researchers to lose their research position and targets. The 
records and notes will help a researcher to escape from practical confusion in 
research fieldwork. 
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Fourth, research is not always solely conducted by a researcher themselves. 
Help from supervisors, colleagues, and other assistants around researchers will 
increase the efficiency of navigating the data required and the reliability of their 
research. My experience suggests that consulting with a supervisor is vital at the 
initial stage of the preparation and in the course of fieldwork it is recommended to 
assertively seek help from archival staff, librarians or any other people who can 
support the fieldwork. 
Finally, what is most required to succeed in research fieldwork is not only 
proficiency in specific methodological techniques or project management skills, 
but also more importantly `sensitivity to the research attitude', such as patience and 
determination (Gorry 1997: 23). Fieldwork is definitely not an easy job. In most 
cases it takes a long time and many problems come about during fieldwork. 
Perseverance, thus, is definitely required for satisfactory achievements. 
